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Justifying an Analysis of the Ecclesiological Development of Subsidiarity  
via Civil and Common Law Jurisprudential Epistemology  
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
This article seeks to justify an examination of subsidiarity's development within 
Catholicism.  Due to the fact that the European Union ["EU"] codified subsidiarity via 
the Treaty of Maastricht, subsidiarity is now a part of EU law.  Although seemingly 
intended to resolve questions concerning the proper allocation of powers, its codification 
has generated substantial debate concerning the proper meaning(s) (if any) and/or 
application(s) of subsidiarity within the EU.   
 
Due to the facts that 1) the EU's legal traditions are heavily influenced by both the civil 
and common law traditions, 2) both of these traditions advocate the use of established 
jurisprudential methodologies to interpret ambiguities, and 3) subsidiarity can reasonably 
be classified as ambiguous within EU law, utilizing these methods can foreseeably 
generate insight into subsidiarity's meaning.  Furthermore, an examination of these 
methods arguably authorizes civil and/or common law jurists to investigate the 
ecclesiological development of subsidiarity even if the term itself is not deemed 
ambiguous.   
 
A cursory examination of 1) (at least some of) these jurisprudential methodologies, 2) the 
development of subsidiarity within Catholicism, and 3) the development of subsidiarity 
within the EU appears to reveal several material similarities and no material 
dissimilarities.  As a consequence, this article concludes that a more detailed examination 
of subsidiarity's development within Catholicism may potentially resolve pending 
questions about its application(s) and/or meaning(s) within EU law.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
William Pieratt Demond 
25 April 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"For what can be explained, 
investigated, or demonstrated 
about the nature of things 
without the assistance of 
speech and words which 
signify things?  Or without 
the ministry of 
interpretation?"1
 
                                                 
1 Johannes Goeddaeus, Commentarius repetitae praelectionis in tit. XVI libri L. Pandectarum de verborum 
et rerum significatione (1591), quoted by IAN MACLEAN, INTERPRETATION AND MEANING IN THE 
RENAISSANCE: THE CASE OF LAW 87 (1992).   
I. INTRODUCTION AND THESIS STATEMENT 
 
 
Although arguably a principle of common sense,2 the principle of subsidiarity 
appears to be one of the most popularly discussed3 yet ambiguous4 topics within EU 
                                                 
2 Commission of the European Communities, The Principle of Subsidiarity: Communication of the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament at Annex, ¶ 2, SEC(92) 1990 final, Brussels 27 
October 1992 (“The subsidiarity principle as applied in the institutional context is based on a simple 
concept: the powers that a State or a federation of States wields in the common interest are only those 
which individuals, families, companies, and local or regional authorities cannot exercise in isolation.  This 
commonsense principle therefore dictates that decisions should be taken at the level closest to the ordinary 
citizen and that action taken by the upper echelons of the body politic should be avoided.").  See also id. at 
2 (“In practical terms it implies for the Community institutions, and in particular for the Commission, the 
application of the simple principle of good sense that, in the exercise of its competences, the Community 
should do only what is best done at this level.”); HELEN J. ALFORD, O.P. AND MICHAEL J. NAUGHTON, 
MANAGING AS IF FAITH MATTERED: CHRISTIAN SOCIAL PRINCIPLES IN THE MODERN ORGANIZATION 77 
(2001) (“The term [subsidiarity]…rests on the commonsense truth that people simply do better at tasks they 
themselves plan and control.”); ANTONIO ESTELLA, THE EU PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY AND ITS CRITIQUE 
82 (2002) (“From a theoretical perspective, subsidiarity is so undefined that the concept amounts, at best, to 
a common sense principle of good government or a political objective.”); and John E. Linnan, C.S.V., 
Subsidiarity, Collegiality, Catholic Diversity, and Their Relevance to Apostolic Visitations, 49 THE JURIST 
399, 421 (1989) (“[W]herever just relationships have existed in society, and wherever individuals and 
smaller groups have realized an appropriate liberty with respect to higher authority or larger societies, this 
principle [of subsidiarity], formulated or not, has been operative and at least implicitly recognized in 
practice, if not in theory.”). 
3 A lexis search performed on 19 November 2007 reveals 1,378 law review articles containing the word 
"subsidiarity," 35 of which contain the term in the title. 
4 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 9 (1995) 
(“Admittedly, first experience shows that the institutions and the Council are occasionally having 
difficulties in agreeing how it [subsidiarity] is to be evaluated and applied.”); A.G. Toth, A Legal Analysis 
of Subsidiarity, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 37 (O'Keeffe and Twomey eds., 1994) (“It is 
no exaggeration to say that there are few concepts in the Maastricht Treaty, or indeed in Community law as 
a whole, which are more elusive than the concept of subsidiarity.”); Jo Steiner, Subsidiarity under the 
Maastricht Treaty, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 4, at 49, citing Lord 
Mackenzie-Stuart, contribution to the Proceedings of the Jacques Delors Colloquium, Subsidiarity and the 
Challenge of Change (1991) at 39 (“Discussion of the principle…reveal [sic] that it is capable of no less 
than 30 different meanings.”); P.P. Craig and G. de Búrca, General Editors' Preface, in ESTELLA, supra 
note 2, at v (2002) (“[S]ubsidiarity is a concept that is notoriously fluid and difficult to define, something 
which promoted many commentators to dismiss its legal relevance at the time of its introduction.”); 
Nanette A. Neuwahl, A Europe Close to the Citizen? The 'Trinity Concepts' of Subsidiarity, Transparency, 
and Democracy, in A CITIZENS' EUROPE; IN SEARCH OF A NEW ORDER 39 (Allan Rosas and Esko Antola 
eds., 1995); George MacDonald Ross, In Defence of Subsidiarity, PHIL. NOW, 1993 (“The Philosophy 
Glossary defined subsidiarity as 'nobody agrees on what this word means' (p.32), and John Crosthwaite 
described its meaning as a 'grey area', and 'hand[ed] the question over to the real philosophers' (p.25).”), at 
http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/GMR/articles/subsid.html (last visited 2 July 2007); George A. 
Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 332, 332-333 (1994) (“Subsidiarity has been criticized as 'inelegant…Eurospeak,' 'the 
epitome of confusion,' and simple 'gobbledegook.'”) (internal citations omitted); and Dennis J. Edwards, 
Fearing Federalism's Failure: Subsidiarity in the European Union, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 537, 544 (1996) 
(“[Subsidiarity has been called] 'an empty shell devoid of concrete substance' and 'totally alien to...the 
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jurisprudence.5  Despite the considerable legal and ecclesiastical scholarship, however, a 
noteworthy body thereof appears to focus on either 1) examining subsidiarity's Catholic 
foundations or 2) analyzing the nature of its application within the EU.  At least one 
article has even attempted to separate the term from its Catholic heritage altogether.6  The 
result is a body of legal scholarship that, in large part, appears to either ignore 
subsidiarity's Catholic origins altogether or mention such origins only in passing.7  This 
paper seeks to justify rectifying the apparent academic disconnect between subsidiarity's 
codification within the EU and its origins within Catholicism.   
In order to properly understand the principle of subsidiarity within European 
Union jurisprudence, it is first necessary to examine its development within the Catholic 
Church.  Ultimately, this proposition is built upon the foundational belief that separating 
a historically established concept from its philosophical moorings inevitably leads to a 
                                                                                                                                                 
logic, structure and wording of the founding Treaties [of the EC] and the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Justice.'”). 
5 Admittedly, the mounting legal and ecclesiastical scholarship addressing various aspects of its origin 
and/or implementation in various languages generates a daunting task for virtually anyone with the 
potentially ill-advised desire to write a Master's thesis on both.  This difficulty is only exacerbated if the 
aspiring author happens to be non-Catholic, non-European, essentially uni-lingual, and a recent law school 
graduate. 
6 Reimer von Borries and Malte Hauschild, Implementing the Subsidiarity Principle, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 
369, 369-370 (1999) (“The term 'subsidiarity' has, however, misled many authors who have presented 
extensive studies on the 'subsidiary function' which plays a central role in the social philosophy of the 
Catholic church [sic]. Many of these publications fail to recognize that the subsidiarity principle as laid 
down in Article 3(b)(2) of the EC Treaty, rather than being a socio-philosophical doctrine, is a principle of 
constitutional law. It concerns the relationship between the European Community and its Member States 
and not the structure of society. Its practical aim is not to 'renationalize' Community competencies but to 
prevent an overcentralization of power at the EU level and to thereby ensure the acceptance of the EU 
among the citizens….The term 'subsidiarity principle' is thus no more than a succinct expression of the rule 
of Section 2 of this Article. More important than its controversial philosophical aspects, therefore, is its 
application in practice."). 
7 Even Professor Bermann's article, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, an exhaustive and well-regarded analysis 
of subsidiarity's application within the European Union, mentions its ecclesiological roots only once.  See 
Bermann, supra note 2, at 339 (“Advocates of subsidiarity in the European Community trace the concept to 
twentieth-century Catholic social philosophy, citing a 1931 Papal Encyclical of Pius XI entitled 
Quadragesimo anno [sic]…I seek a better understanding of the concept of subsidiarity, first and briefly as a 
purely analytic matter, and then much more extendedly as a response to the European Community's 
distinctive legal and political evolution.”). 
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myopic interpretation of that concept's meaning.8  Instead, both civil and common law 
jurisprudential epistemology appear to permit (if not mandate) the interpretation of 
ambiguous ideas according to their accepted historical meaning if such meanings are 
ascertainable.  As a consequence, this paper seeks to establish the propositions that 1) the 
principle of subsidiarity is arguably ambiguous within EU jurisprudence, 2) both civil 
and common law jurisprudential methodologies encourage investigating the historical 
development of an ambiguity if it is discernable, and 3) an examination of subsidiarity's 
development within the Catholic Church yields results that appear to be wholly consistent 
with the intention underlying its codification via the Treaty of Maastricht.  If provable, 
these three propositions can collectively justify a more comprehensive examination of 
subsidiarity's ecclesiological development in order to resolve any ambiguities concerning 
its meaning and/or application within European jurisprudence.9
 
                                                 
8 GEOFFREY SAMUEL, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL REASONING 30 (1994) (“The modern…cannot…be 
explained without reference to the whole of the past.").  See also id. at 114 (“In science itself the progress 
of each science is accomplished by inventions, discoveries and revolutions, but always on the basis of 
previously accumulated knowledge; and this is ‘why the study of the history of science is an absolute 
requirement for anyone who wants to understand and interpret the sense and scope of existing 
discoveries.’”); Konrad Zweigat and Hans-Jürgen Puttfarken, Statutory Interpretation-Civilian Style, 44 
TUL. L. REV. 704, 712 (1970), in CIVIL LAW 267 (Ralf Rogowski ed., 1996) (“If a legal rule in the course 
of its development has been subject to a change of meaning by different interpretations, we cannot today 
start interpreting it as if it had never been interpreted before; we cannot totally disregard history. The 
‘legislative materials’ may at least serve as a starting point; they may yield aspects of interpretation which 
are still valid today, and they may be most important as additional support for an interpretation based on 
actual criteria if the result of such interpretation coincides with the intention of the historic legislator.”); and 
Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103, 
109 (2001) (“To invoke subsidiarity in public policy debates without acknowledging and exploring its 
Catholic roots is to cut off the principle from the particular priorities it reflects and the broader values it 
embodies."). 
9 But see POLITICAL ORDER AND THE PLURAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY 179 (James W. Skillen and Rockne 
M. McCarthy, eds., 1991) ("There is no more thankless task than trying rationally to distinguish and to 
circumscribe – in other words, trying to raise to a scientific or philosophical level – common notions that 
have arisen from the contingent practical needs of human history and are laden with social, cultural, and 
historical connotations as ambiguous as they are fertile, and which nevertheless envelop a core of 
intelligible meaning."). 
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II. A CURSORY EXAMINATION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE'S ROLE IN 
INTERPRETING THE MEANING OF SUBSIDIARITY  
 
 
The European Court of Justice [“ECJ”] is the supreme judicial organ of the 
European Union and is vested with a supranational mandate to ensure that the reasonably 
predictable laws10 of the European Union are properly observed.11  This obligation 
clearly extends to the interpretation of subsidiarity.12  It is important to note that both the 
civilian tradition13 and its teleological approach14 have left a profound impact on the 
                                                 
10 F.A.R. BENNION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: A CODE § 403, at 1097 (4th ed., 2002) (1984) ("It is 
regarded as important that [European] Community law should be so applied as to achieve certainty and 
predictability in its operation."). 
11 See Treaty Establishing the European Community (“TEC”), art. 220, available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/C_2002325EN.003301.html (last visited 20 March 2006) 
(“[The ECJ is obligated] to ensure that in the interpretation and application of [the EU Treaties] the law is 
observed."). 
12 See id., at pmbl, Article B, and Article 3b.  See also TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU 
LAW 185 (2d ed., 2006) (“Subsidiarity is a legally binding rule compliance with which is subject to review 
by the Court…Given, however, that the principle is political in nature and gives much scope for subjective 
judgment, the Court cannot employ a high level of scrutiny.”); Dr. Christoph Henkel, The Allocation of 
Powers in the European Union: A Closer Look at the Principle of Subsidiary, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 359, 
373 (2002), quoting E.C. Bull., no. 12, at 14, point I.15., P 5 (1992) (“[I]nterpretation of [subsidiarity], as 
well as review of compliance with it by the Community institution, are subject to control by the Court of 
Justice, as far as matters falling within the Treaty establishing the European Community are concerned.”); 
and von Borries and Hauschild, supra note 6, at 374 (“Regardless, the European Court is obliged to review 
the observance of the subsidiarity principle."). 
13 ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 621 (2d ed., 2006) (“[The Court's 
approach] is also profoundly influenced by its civil law origins[.]”). 
14 Carl Baudenbacher, Some Remarks on the Method of Civil Law, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 333, 346 (1999) 
(“Purposive interpretation is of particular significance in the case law of the ECJ. Contrary to widespread 
opinion, the ECJ is not only an administrative and constitutional court, but it also plays an important role in 
interpreting and further developing civil (or private) law.  The Court's former president, Hans Kutscher, 
stated over twenty years ago that 'the literal and historical methods of interpretation recede into the 
background. Schematic [i.e., contextual] and teleological interpretation ... is of primary importance.' In fact, 
the teleological method favored by Community law is similar to the rule contained in Article 1 of the Swiss 
Civil Code.  The ECJ has, however, not limited itself to purposive interpretation, but has in many cases 
followed the so-called 'dynamic method,' thereby actively promoting integration where the political organs 
of the Community were unable or unwilling to fulfill this task.  That the ECJ seems to have adopted a new 
restrained approach to judicial activism since the early 1990s is not due to a new methodological 
orientation, but rather to the fact that since the mid-1980s, the political organs of the Community have 
increasingly taken the responsibility of moving European integration forward."). 
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Court's interpretative methodologies15 and that it generally considers ambiguous 
provisions "in the context of the instrument as a whole."16  
It is also important to note that if the context of a document in question does not 
adequately provide the Court with interpretative guidance, it can utilize the "ordinary 
meanings of the words used."17  More specifically, where 1) "neither the directive nor the 
documents relevant for [a provision's] interpretation, such as the travaux préparatoires, 
provide clarification of the exact scope of the concept [in question]" and 2) the general 
scheme of the provision in question is inconclusive, the Court may utilize the "usual 
meaning in everyday language" of the concept in question.18  Thus, due to the fact that 
there is reason to believe that the Court has found the general scheme of subsidiarity to be 
unclear,19 it may utilize the ordinary meaning of the term if the preparatory documents 
are either unusable or do not clarify its meaning.  There is, however, an argument that the 
                                                 
15 TRIDIMAS, supra note 12, at 18 (“[B]y its nature, the Community is a dynamic entity.  The founding and 
amending treaties are moulded by teleology.  The EC Treaty itself sets final objectives and intermediate 
goals, the notion of incremental integration being inherent in its provisions.  Recourse to general principles 
enable the Court to follow an evolutive interpretation and be responsive to changes in the economic and 
political order.").  See also ARNULL, supra note 13, at 612 (“An essential component of 'the European way 
is the teleological and contextual method…It would be quite wrong to suggest that the Court pursues some 
hidden agenda of its own in its approach to questions of interpretation.  If there is an agenda pursued by the 
Court, it is one set by the authors of the Treaties and by the Community legislature."). 
16 T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 85 (3d ed., 1994) (1981) 
("The interpretation of the Treaties and Community legislation is one of the principle tasks of the Court.  
To some extent the Court's approach to this is the same as that of an English court: it looks at the words 
used and considers their meaning in the context of the instrument as a whole.  In doing this, it tries to give 
the provision an interpretation which fits in with the general scheme of the instrument, though it is much 
more willing than an English court to depart from the literal meaning of the words used to achieve this."). 
17 ARNULL, supra note 13, at 608.   
18 Id. at 617, citing Case C-336/03, judgment of 10 March 2005.  See also BENNION, supra note 10, § 221 
(2), at 580 ("Whichever status a treaty has, its provisions may be referred to as an aid in the interpretation 
of a relevant enactment.  So too may its preparatory work (travaux préparatoires), the decisions on it of 
foreign courts (la jurisprudence) and the views on it of foreign jurists (la doctrine)."). 
19 See, e.g., TRIDIMAS, supra note 12, at 183 (“Since its introduction, the principle of subsidiarity has had 
virtually no impact as a ground for review or as a rule of interpretation in the case law of the ECJ or the 
CFI."). 
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Court is either altogether precluded from relying on such preparatory documents20 or that 
it simply does not do so as a matter of practice.21  Although the Court is by no means 
obligated to examine the travaux, the argument that it is precluded from doing so is 
becoming less virile now that many preparatory documents are becoming more readily 
accessible.22   
 If the Court makes a proactive effort to interpret subsidiarity, it could foreseeably 
do so in one of two principle ways: 1) it could utilize its own interpretative 
methodologies and/or general principles or 2) it could rely on the interpretations of 
Member States' judiciaries23 (all of which are currently based upon either civil or 
common law).  Instead of directly analyzing the Court's jurisprudence concerning 
subsidiarity (which appears to be inconclusive), this paper focuses on select 
methodologies authorized by both the civil and common law concerning the 
interpretation of ambiguities.  If successful, this analysis could foreseeably prove relevant 
                                                 
20 ARNULL, supra note 13, at 614, citing Kutscher, Methods of Interpretation as seen by a judge at the 
Court of Justice, in Reports of a Judicial and Academic Conference held in Luxembourg on 27-28 
September 1976, I-21 (“The Court cannot rely on preparatory work which provides a history of how the 
Treaties came into being…Documents which are not generally accessible must…be ruled out as aids to 
interpretation for constitutional reasons.").  But see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 
1969 (entered into force on 27 January 1980), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331., art. 32 ("Recourse may be had to 
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances 
of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to 
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or 
obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."). 
21 HARTLEY, supra note 16, at 85 ("[T]he Court makes little attempt to establish the actual subjective 
intention of the authors of the text.  The preparatory documents (travaux préparatoires) for the Treaties 
have never been published; there are certain national materials, such as official statements by the national 
governments to their parliaments during ratification debates, but these are little used."). 
22 See ARNULL, supra note 13, at 615.   
23 TRIDIMAS, supra note 12, at 29 (“In some cases, instead of developing general principles of EU law, the 
ECJ has been content to allow national courts to rely on general principles recognized by the law of 
Member States…Such selective deference to concepts of national law may be seen as an application of 
judicial subsidiarity in the field of remedies and legal protection.").  See also id. at 419 (“Community law is 
supported by a decentralized system of justice in which national courts are the primary venue for the 
assertion of Community rights."). 
 
 
6 
 
 
to a wider body of scholarship than an analysis that concentrates on ECJ jurisprudence 
alone.   
 
III. A CURSORY OVERVIEW OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY  
 
a. Etymology 
 
 
The word "subsidiarity" is derived from the Latin word subsidium24 (“to help”).25  
The word itself, however, does not refer to the government helping society, but rather to 
society helping the government.26  More specifically, a 1994 paper prepared for the 
Steering Committee on Local and Regional authorities notes that the term "subsidiary" 
originally referred to reserve troops in combat.27  Thomas C. Behr observes that the term 
specifically applied to Roman auxiliary troops who "'sat below' ready in reserve to 
                                                 
24 Ross, supra note 4 (“The abstract noun subsidiarity comes from the adjective subsidiary, which in turn 
comes from the concrete noun subsidy.  The English word subsidy is a direct borrowing of the Latin 
subsidium, meaning 'support' or 'assistance' (though it has subsequently been confined to a financial sense); 
and the adjective subsidiary originally meant 'providing assistance' or 'supportive'; but it gradually changed 
its meaning, via 'auxiliary' or 'tributary', to 'subordinate'.”).   
25 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 146 (1980) (Subsidiarity “signifies not 
secondariness or subordination but assistance; the Latin for help or assistance is subsidium."). 
26 Thomas C. Behr, Luigi Taparelli D’Azeglio, S.J.(1793–1862) and the Development of Scholastic 
Natural-Law Thought As a Science of Society and Politics, 6 J. MARKETS & MORALITY 99, 105 (2003) 
(“The Latin expression subsidia applied, then, not just to mean ‘help’ but in the first instance to auxiliary 
troops within the Roman legion, as they ‘sat below’ ready in reserve to support the battle. The ‘help’ in this 
context is from the bottom up, not from the top down, as the inferior and mediating groups all participate in 
achieving the common good of the more perfect association.”), available at 
http://www.acton.org/publicat/m_and_m/2003_spring/pdf/mm-v6n1-behr.pdf (last visited 11 November 
2005).  See also PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF 
THE CHURCH ¶ 186, at 81 (2005) (“COMPENDIUM”) (“On the basis of this principle, all societies of a 
superior order must adopt attitudes of help (‘subsidium’) – therefore of support, promotion, development – 
with respect to lower-order societies.  In this way, intermediate social entities can properly perform the 
functions that fall to them without being required to hand them over unjustly to other social entities of a 
higher level, by which they would end up being absorbed and substituted, in the end seeing themselves 
denied their dignity and essential place.”) (emphasis in the original). 
27 Alain Delcamp, Definition and Limits of the Principle of Subsidiarity: Report prepared for the Steering 
Committee on Local and Regional Authorities, 10 (“It is in fact the name given in Antiquity to reserve 
troops.”), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/local_and_regional_democracy/documentation/library/localregionalaut
horities/55.pdf. 
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support the battle."28  He goes on to conclude that, "The 'help' in this context is from the 
bottom up, not from the top down, as the inferior and mediating groups all participate in 
achieving the common good of the more perfect association."29  Thus, like its etymology 
suggests, the principle of subsidiarity essentially permits lower consociations to actively 
participate in the resolution of problems that affect them while requiring higher 
consociations to refrain from unnecessary interference.30  In these cases, the restraint 
represents the "negative" aspect of subsidiarity while the necessary intervention 
represents the "positive" aspect.31     
 
 
b. Purported Applications 
 
 
It is clear that the word "subsidiarity" "involves quite different, even opposed, 
implications which are to be found in its Latin etymology."32  Professor Elizabeth 
Defeis33 has found that, since its formulation, Catholic authors have argued for an 
                                                 
28 Behr, supra note 26, at 105.   
29 Id. 
30 Fred Crosson, Catholic Social Teaching and American Society, in PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL 
TEACHING 170 (David A Boileau, ed., 1998) ("[W]hatever individuals and groups can do for themselves in 
pursuit of their proper goals should not be done by the state."). 
31 See PETER G.G. DAVIES, EUROPEAN UNION ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO KEY 
SELECTED ISSUES 19 (2004) (“In effect, two tests must therefore be satisfied: a negative one in the sense 
that objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved (the ‘necessity’ criterion); and a positive test in that the 
objective of the action is better achieved at the EC level by reason of scale or effects of the proposed action 
(the ‘effectiveness’ criterion.").  See also COMPENDIUM, supra note 26, ¶ 186, at 81-82 (“Subsidiarity, 
understood in the positive sense as economic, institutional or juridical assistance offered to lesser social 
entities, entails a corresponding series of negative implication that require the State to refrain from anything 
that would de facto restrict the existential space of the smaller essential cells of society.  Their initiative, 
freedom and responsibility must not be supplanted.") (emphasis in the original) and Ken Endo, 
Subsidiarity: A Matter of Political Vocabulary in a Fragmented World, at 2, available at 
http://www.global-g.jp/paper/4-11.pdf (last visited 8 November 2005). 
32 See Delcamp, supra, note 27, at 10. 
33 Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law.  I am indebted to Professor Defeis for permitting me to 
use the following 19 citations, all of which were taken verbatim from one of her recently published articles.  
See Elizabeth Defeis, Can [G_d] and Caesar Coexist? Balancing Religious Freedom and International 
Law by Robert F. Drinan, S.J.: Religious Liberty and Protections in Europe, 45 J. CATH. LEG. STUD. 73, 
108-109 (2006). 
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extension of subsidiarity to (inter alia) political change,34 health care reform,35 social 
communication,36 humanism,37 fighting crime,38 organization of corporate culture,39 
global civil society,40 transnational authorities,41 globalization,42 agriculture,43 
education,44 public policy,45 balanced markets,46 international debts,47 responsible 
                                                 
34 See Richard R. Gaillardetz, The Ecclesiological Foundations of Modern Catholic Social Teaching, in 
MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: COMMENTARIES & INTERPRETATIONS 85 (Kenneth R. Himes, 
O.F.M., ed., 2005), citing and quoting Pope Paul VI, Octogesima Adveniens (Papal Encyclical) (“It is up to 
these Christian communities…to discern the options and commitments which are called for in order to 
bring about the social, political, and economic changes seen in many cases to be urgently needed.”) and 
Kenneth Himes, The Local Church as a Mediating Structure, in 12 SOC. THOUGHT 23-30 (1986). 
35 See Father Place, Health Care: Essential Building Block of a Free Society, reprinted in 29 ORIGINS CNS 
DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 52 (10 June 1999). 
36 Pontifical Council for Social Communications, Ethics in Communications, reprinted in 30 ORIGINS CNS 
DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 54 (8 June 2000) (“Principles of social ethics like solidarity, subsidiarity, justice 
and equity, and accountability in the use of public resources and the performance of roles of public trust are 
always applicable."). 
37 John Paul II, Address to University Professors (9 September 2000), reprinted in 30 ORIGINS CNS 
DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 54, 287 (8 June 2000) (“The humanism which we desire advocates a vision of 
society centered on the human person and his inalienable rights, on the values of justice and peace, on a 
correct relationship between individuals, society and the state, on the logic of solidarity and subsidiarity."). 
38 U.S. Bishops' Meeting, Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration:  A Catholic Perspective on 
Crime and Criminal Justice (30 November 2000), in 30 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 54, 396 (8 
June 2000) (“[Subsidiarity] encourages communities to be more involved.  Criminal activity is largely a 
local issue and, to the extent possible, should have local solutions.  Neighborhood-watch groups, 
community-oriented policing, neighborhood treatment centers and local support for ex-offenders all can be 
part of confronting crime and fear of crime in local communities."). 
39 See Father William Byron, Speech at Catholic Health Association's annual meeting: Trust and Integrity 
in Organizations (7 June 2004), in 24 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 120 (15 July 2004). 
40 Father John Coleman, Globalization's Challenge, in 24 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 326 (28 
October 2004) (“Catholic voices endorse a notion of global civil society and embrace the concept of 
subsidiarity in any global governance regime."). 
41  Drew Christiansen, S.J., Commentary on Pacem in Terris [Peace on Earth], in MODERN CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL TEACHING, supra note 34, at 245 n.51 (“[W]hile the idea of a universal or transnational political 
authority is an expression of the Catholic belief in the one human family and by virtue of historical 
conditions an increasingly necessary ideal, it is an ideal conditioned and limited by the principle of 
subsidiarity."). 
42 See John Paul II, Pastores Gregis, in 33 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 387 (6 November 2003). 
43 US Bishops' Meeting, For I Was Hungry and You Gave Me Food:  Catholic Reflections on Food, 
Farmers, and Farmworkers, in 33 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 515 (8 January 2004) (“In the 
case of agriculture, solidarity and subsidiarity lead us to support and promote smaller, family-run farms not 
only to produce food but also to provide a livelihood for families and to form the foundation of rural 
communities."). 
44 Pontifical Council for the Family, The Truth and Meaning of Human Sexuality, in 25 ORIGINS CNS 
DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 535 (1 February 1996 ) (“[T]he mission of education must always be carried out 
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.").  See also Letter from Colorado's Bishops to Colorado 
dioceses, The Christian Coalition's Catholic Alliance, in 25 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 576 (9 
January 1996) (“In keeping with the principles of liberty and subsidiarity, the Catholic Alliance asserts that 
parents have the right and responsibility to direct the education of their children[.]”) 
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citizenship,48 the church itself,49 citizen participation in the energy crises of the early 
1980s,50 production in the economy,51 and world political order.52  Other scholars have 
linked it directly to economics,53 the development of civil life,54 contemporary 
                                                                                                                                                 
45 See Archbishop McCarrick, speech to the Distinguished Lecture Series sponsored by the US State 
Department: Religion in Foreign Affairs (23 January 1997), in 26 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 
564-565. 
46 John Paul II, Address to Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences: Towards a Balanced, Well-Regulated 
World Market (25 April 1997), in 27 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 43 (5 June 1997) (“[I]t is 
essential that political activity assure a balanced market in its classical form by applying the principles of 
subsidiarity and solidarity, according to the model of the social state."). 
47 See USCC Administrative Board, A Jubilee Call for Debt Forgiveness, in 28 ORIGINS CNS 
DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 795 (6 May 1999). 
48 See Administrative Board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, Statement on Social Problems, at 
¶ 16 (28 November 1937), in 1 PASTORAL LETTERS OF THE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS: 1792-
1940, at 425 (Hugh J. Nolan, ed., 1984) (“The tendency of our time is to make more and more demands on 
government.  Citizens and groups should not ask the government to do for them what they can do for 
themselves.  Sound social policy requires government to encourage citizens to assume as much personal 
responsibility as possible.").  
49 See Committee on Conciliation and Arbitration, Procedures Adopted by the General Membership of the 
National Conference of Catholic Bishops, ¶ 3 (14 November 1979), in 4 PASTORAL LETTERS OF THE 
UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS 1975-1983, at 331 (Hugh J. Nolan, ed., 1984) (“It shall be the 
secondary function of the Bishops' Committee on Conciliation and Arbitration to be available as a resource 
to assist, upon request, with the development and improvement of local-level structures for the resolution of 
disputes.").  
50 See Committee on Social Development and World Peace, United States Catholic Conference, Reflections 
on the Energy Crisis, ¶ 24 (2 April 1981), in 4 PASTORAL LETTERS, supra note 49, at 444 and 461 
(“Generally speaking, the smaller the entity responsible for a particular decision – individual rather than 
group, state rather than federal government, local distributor rather than multinational corporation – the 
better chance an informed citizenry has of affecting it.…[T]hose holding authority in the public and private 
sectors should be constantly looking for ways to center energy decision making as near the grass roots as 
possible.  While adopting this course might lessen efficiency, it should produce results more satisfactory to 
the people and ultimately to the institutions that serve them."). 
51 Pope John XXIII, Mater et Magistra (Papal Encyclical), ¶ 117 (“The State and other agencies of public 
law must not extend their ownership beyond what is clearly required by considerations of the common 
good properly understood, and even then there must be safeguards. Otherwise private ownership could be 
reduced beyond measure, or, even worse, completely destroyed.").   
52 Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris (Papal Encyclical), ¶ 140, in 5 THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 122-123 
(Claudia Carlen, ed., 1990) (“The same principle of subsidiarity which governs the relations between public 
authorities and individuals, families and intermediate societies in a single State, must also apply to the 
relations between the public authority of the world community and the public relations of each political 
community.  The special function of this universal authority must be to evaluate and find a solution to 
economic, social, political, and cultural problems which [sic] affect the universal common good.  These are 
problems which, because of their extreme gravity, vastness, and urgency, must be considered too difficult 
for the rulers of individual States to solve with any degree of success.”), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/ 
hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.html (last visited November 6, 2005). 
53 See DIDIER FOUARGE, POVERTY AND SUBSIDIARITY IN EUROPE: MINIMUM PROTECTION FROM AN 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 3 (2004) (“In economic terms, the subsidiarity principle states that economic 
activities that can be efficiently carried out by the market should indeed be undertaken by it.").  See also id. 
at 17 (“A higher, all-enveloping level – such as the government – should carry out activities that cannot be 
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management theory,55 United States President George W. Bush's "compassionate 
conservatism,"56 and peacekeeping and conflict response.57  While these various 
applications indicate that the principle of subsidiarity is flexible, they do not necessarily 
contribute to a working definition of the term itself.  Therefore, a further examination of 
its development within both the European Union and Catholicism appears to be 
warranted.   
  
                                                                                                                                                 
performed efficiently by the market, or that should not be performed by it because of the nature of those 
activities.  In other words, public authorities are to take action when market failures arise.  Markets fail to 
achieve an efficient outcome when competition is imperfect, when information is incomplete, when there 
are public goods to be produced, when production induces externalities or when the markets face 
uncertainty.  Equity considerations also call for government intervention.  Starting from the usual 
assumption in economics that market allocation is efficient, the State is a subsidiary of the market.”) and 
U.S. Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All (1986), in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE 
DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE ¶ 323, at 653 (David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992) (“The 
principle of subsidiarity calls for government to intervene in the economy when basic justice requires 
greater social coordination and regulation of economic actors and institutions."). 
54 CARLOS EDUARDO MALDONADO, HUMAN RIGHTS, SOLIDARITY AND SUBSIDIARITY: ESSAYS TOWARD A 
SOCIAL ONTOLOGY 4 (1997) (“The concept of subsidiarity is a principle of coordination between the 
different levels, functions, and organizations of civil society…Despite its technical and administrative 
appearance, the principle of subsidiarity is really about the conditions for the development and affirmation 
of civil life."). 
55 Principia Cybernetica Web, Principle of Subsidiarity, 
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ASC/PRINCI_SUBSI.html (“[P]roblems are best solved in the subsystem where 
they arise. This is similar to the idea of management by exception. Subsystems are encouraged to resolve 
their conflicts themselves without referring them to higher authority. Whatever solution is adopted, the 
subsystem will have to carry it out. Since their consent is essential, the optimum condition is for them to 
resolve their conflicts independently. If a solution is worked out by the subsystem, appeal to authority is not 
necessary.”) (last visited 10 July 2007). 
56 Susan J. Stabile, Subsidiarity and the Use of Faith-Based Organizations in the Fight Against Poverty, at 
http://www.mirrorofjustice.com/mirrorofjustice/stabile/subsidiaritypoverty.pdf (last visited 10 July 2007), 
citing William Bole, Lowering the Safety Net: Say You Want Devolution?, at 
http://www.oursundayvisitor.com/periodicals/show-article.asp?pid=362 (“Bush advisers have said the 
Catholic principle of 'subsidiarity' played a notable part in fleshing out his mantra of compassionate 
conservatism.”) (last visited 10 July 2007). 
57 Serap Bindebir, Mia Handshin, Miodrag Jovanovic, and Christian E. Rieck, Federalism, Decentralization 
and Conflict Management in Multicultural Societies, at 
http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/decentralization/library1/federalism.pdf (last visited 10 July 2007). 
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 IV. SUBSIDIARITY'S DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION  
 
 
a. The first implicit references to subsidiarity 
 
 
The European Commission claims that the first implicit invocation of subsidiarity 
within the European Community arose in Article 5 of the 1951 European Coal and Steel 
Community Treaty.58  Although the term "subsidiarity" is clearly absent, Article 5 reads:  
 
 
"The Community shall carry out its task in accordance with this Treaty, with a limited 
measure of intervention.  
 
To this end the Community shall:  
 
• provide guidance and assistance for the parties concerned, by obtaining 
information, organizing consultations and laying down general objectives;  
• place financial resources at the disposal of undertakings for their investment and 
bear part of the cost of readaptation;  
• ensure the establishment, maintenance and observance of normal competitive 
conditions and exert direct influence upon production or upon the market only 
when circumstances so require;  
• publish the reasons for its actions and take the necessary measures to ensure the 
observance of the rules laid down in this Treaty.  
 
The institutions of the Community shall carry out these activities with a minimum of 
administrative machinery and in close cooperation with the parties concerned."59
 
 
Various scholars, however, appear to disagree with the European Commission's 
assessment.  Specifically, at least one author claims that subsidiarity was introduced into 
                                                 
58 Commission of the European Communities, The Principle of Subsidiarity, supra note 2 (“The 
subsidiarity principle is enshrined in the preamble and in Articles B and 3b of the Treaty on European 
Union.  It was present in embryonic form in the ECSC Treaty (Article 5), implicit in the Treaty of Rome, 
and spelled out in the Single European Act in relation to the environment (Article 130r).”).  See also Ewa 
Rabinowitz, et al, Subsidiarity, CAP, and EU Enlargement, at 18, available at 
http://www.sli.lu.se/pdf/SLI_rapport_20013.pdf (“The principle of subsidiarity was a guiding principle in 
the integration process of forming the Community. As long ago as 1951, Article 5 of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty stipulated that that Community should exert direct influence on 
production only when circumstances so required.”). 
59 European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, art. 5, 18 April 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140. 
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EU governance in the First Environmental Action Programme of 197360 while others 
believe that it first appeared in either the Tindemans Report or the MacDougall Report.61  
Another commentator argues that it did not appear until the late 1980s62 while yet 
another believes that it was first utilized at the European level by European 
Commissioner Roy Jenkins in 1977.63  Therefore, there is considerable disagreement 
concerning the first invocation of subsidiarity within EU government.   
 
 
b. The first explicit references to subsidiarity 
 
 
One scholar has even argued that "the subsidiarity principle as a general 
constitutional rule was for the first time expressly mentioned in the Draft Treaty on 
European Union, which was adopted by the European Parliament in 1984."64  She also 
observes that the European Commission's Spinelli Report on Economic Union (1975) 
advocated the implementation of subsidiarity-like principles without invoking it by 
                                                 
60 Rabinowitz, supra note 58, at 18, citing A. Jordan, The Politics of Multilevel Governance: Subsidiarity 
and Environmental Policy in the European Union, 32 ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING 1307, 1307-1324 
(2000).   
61 ESTELLA, supra note 2, at 85 (“The first important references to the principle [of subsidiarity within the 
Community government] were made in the mid-seventies, in the Tindemans Report on the European Union 
and in the MacDougall Report on fiscal federalism.").  See also Albert Breton, Alberto Cassone, and 
Angela Fraschini, Decentralization and Subsidiarity: Toward a Theoretical Reconciliation, 19 U. PA. J. 
INT'L. ECON. L. 21, 21 (1998); von Borries and Hauschild, supra note 6, at 371; and Paul D. Marquardt, 
Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 620 (1994) (“The word 
[subsidiarity] appears in debates on EC reform as early as 1975.  A committee led by Belgian Prime 
Minister Leo Tindemans had the task of re-evaluating the development of European political union in light 
of the stagnation of the 1970's [sic] and proposing new initiatives."). 
62 Andreas Føllesdal, Subsidiarity, at 19, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 231 (1998) (“The principle of subsidiarity was 
introduced in the European Union in the late 1980s through the initiative of the European Parliament, 
Britain and Germany in response to fears of centralized power by placing the burden of argument with 
integrationists.”), available at http://folk.uio.no/andreasf/ms/subsid.rtf (last visited 10 July 2007). 
63 See William Noë, History of Europe: The Idea of Unification in the Long-Term Perspective, 
http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/cwes/EUC/Visitors/noe/History_of_Europe/history_of_europe.html (last visited 3 
November 2005) (“Acknowledging diversity again played an important role in the concept of subsidiarity. 
This idea, derived from Catholic social theory, was first mentioned on the European level by Commission 
President Roy Jenkins in the re-launching of the idea of EMU in 1977 in a speech in Florence.”) (emphasis 
added).  
64 Rabinowitz, supra note 58, at 18. 
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name.65  A closer examination of Spinelli's report, however, reveals that it does in fact 
utilize the term "subsidiarity" (albeit in French).  Specifically, this document provides 
that: 
 
 
"No more than the existing Communities have done so, European Union [sic] is not to 
give birth to a centralizing super-state. Consequently, and in accordance with the principe 
de subsidiarité, the Union will be given responsibility only for those matters which the 
Member States are no longer capable of dealing with efficiently. If the Union is to be 
given competence in areas not specified in the Act of Constitution, the Act will have to 
be amended by a procedure probably entailing ratification by all the Member States. 
 
"Hence, the competence of the Union will be limited to what is assigned to it, meaning 
that its fields of competence will be specified in the Act of Constitution, other matters 
being left to the Member States. There is nothing new in this. As in the existing 
Communities, the Union could be given competence of three types: exclusive, concurrent 
and potential, as explained below. The terms on which competence may be exercised 
may vary from type to type."66
 
 
 
As a result, contrary to at least one official EU report,67 Spinelli's Report appears to be 
the first official EU document to expressly invoke the principle of subsidiarity.68     
                                                 
65 Id. (“[W]ithout mentioning the subsidiarity principle by name, the 1975 European Commission's Spinelli 
Report on Economic Union advocated an expansion of Community powers only where Member States 
could not effectively accomplish the desired tasks."). 
66 Report of the Commission on European Union (25 June 1975) ¶ 12, available at 
http://www.ena.lu/europe/crisis-recovery/report-commission-european-union-1975.htm (click on “Consult 
this document in European NAvigator” [sic]) (last visited 10 July 2007) (emphasis added).  While at least 
one skeptic argues that Spinelli “proposed subsidiarity only as a clever device [and that] he never intended 
it to be a guiding principle of the European Union,” this argument appears to be uncorroborated.  See 
Lindsay Jenkins, Godfather of the European Union: Altiero Spinelli, 
http://www.brugesgroup.com/mediacentre/index.live?article=104 (last visited 10 July 2007). 
67 Delcamp, supra note 27, at 13 (“One of the greatest paradoxes of the principle of subsidiarity is that it is 
not explicitly named anywhere (apart from recent developments in European Union) although much 
legislation refers to it implicitly, as though most European countries already applied the principle without 
realising it. It is therefore less surprising that a definition of it is to be found in the European Charter of 
Local Self-Government, a Council of Europe Convention opened to signature in Strasbourg on 15 October 
1985[.]”). 
68 Ken Endo, Subsidiarity & its Enemies: On a Post-National Constitutional Principle of the European 
Union, 12 (“It was Altiero Spinelli…who introduced the principle of subsidiarity in the EU's formal 
document: he first led the European Commission to make a contribution report to the Tindemans Report in 
1975, and then the European Parliament to adopt the Draft Treaty on European Union in 1984. On these 
two occasions, he attempted to soothe the fear for a over-centralised Leviathan in Brussels, by stressing the 
negative aspect of subsidiarity."), available at  
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/activitiesnews/conferences/1999_conferences/3rdannualconferenc
e/papers/Endo.pdf (last visited 20 November 2007).  See also Subsidiarity, EURO-KNOW, http://www.euro-
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It is also noteworthy that the 1975 Report on European Union69 (published a day 
later) also expressly invoked the principle of subsidiarity in remarkably similar terms.  
Specifically, the Report noted, "European Union is not to give birth to a centralizing 
super-state.  Consequently, and in accordance with the principe de subsidiarité, the 
Union will be given responsibility only for those matters which the Member States are no 
longer capable of addressing efficiently."70  The Report also observed that providing 
specific general powers to the European Community while simultaneously limiting its 
ability to act within certain spheres was "more in line with [Community] requirements," 
but that the Community required certain powers because it was responsible for 
coordinating "the economic development of the Community as a whole."71  This appears 
to be an expression of the so-called "negative" aspect of subsidiarity insofar as it 
                                                                                                                                                 
know.org/dictionary/s.html#Subsidiarity (last visited 10 July 2007) (“The 'principe de subsidiarité' first 
surfaced in a Commission paper submitted to a report on institutional reform in 1975.”).  Finally, although 
not an official document, research has revealed that the term "subsidiarity" was used by a European Union 
official as early as 1971 (albeit in German).  More specifically, Ralf Dahrendorf wrote: 
 
"Not everything in Europe is lovely because it happens to be European. A European 
Europe is also a much differentiated, colourful, multiple Europe.  It is a Europe in which 
those matters are dealt with and regulated in common which could perhaps only sensibly 
be dealt with in this way. The transition from the First to the Second Europe demands a 
move away from the dogma of harmonization towards the principle of functional utility 
(Subsidiarität)."  
 
Ralf Dahrendorf, A New Goal for Europe, excerpt from “Wieland Europa,” DIE ZEIT, no. 28, 9 
July 1971 p. 3, reprinted in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 82 (Michael Hodges ed., 1972).  
69 Supp. 5/75, Bull. E.C., available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1761/01/EU_report_1975.pdf (last visited 26 
October 2007). 
70 Id. ¶ 12, at 10.   
71 Id. ¶ 34, at 16 (“Two lines of approach are possible. The first - typical mainly of the ECSC and Euratom 
Treaties but in some respects of the EEC Treaty too - is the treaty-law, which would lay down in detail the 
areas covered by the Union and the ways and means by which it could act in each of these areas. The other 
line of approach, that of the outline treaty, would give certain general powers to the Union while at the 
same time setting limits to action by the Union and stating certain fundamental objectives. The experience 
of the Communities, particularly the difficulties encountered in implementing a treaty-law such as the 
ECSC Treaty, has shown that this second approach is more in line with requirements. This will be even 
truer than before as the Union will have to deal with a multitude of matters no longer merely to ensure the 
free movement of the factors of production, but to render coherent the economic development of the 
Community as a whole.”). 
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explicitly advocates limiting the Community's authority to address issues that the 
Member States are capable of adequately resolving on their own.   
The Report also appears to directly invoke the "positive" aspect of subsidiarity 
insofar as it advocates assigning the Community exclusive competence over foreign 
affairs because Member States cannot conduct them in an effective manner.72  In the 
words of the Report, "The security of each Member State intimately affects the security 
of the other Member States and of the Union as a whole…Hence the need for action at 
international level [sic] to be coherent and so make it possible [sic] to protect the interests 
of the individual and of the whole."73  As a consequence, both the Spinelli report and the 
1975 Report on European Union clearly invoked 1) the principle of subsidiarity by name, 
2) the negative aspect of subsidiarity, and 3) the positive aspect of subsidiarity.  These 
similarities are important insofar as they could potentially represent evidence that the first 
express invocations of subsidiarity within EU governance were both compatible with and 
materially similar to its seemingly accepted meaning within Catholicism. 
If laws are to fulfill their intended function of promoting social welfare, it is well 
settled that they must be understood both by those to whom they apply and by those who 
will be responsible for applying them.74  It should be noted from the outset, however, that 
any uncertainty generated by a legal provision or concept within the European Union is 
                                                 
72 Id. ¶ 59, at 22 (“The inclusion of foreign policy within the competence of the European Union is 
warranted on a number of grounds.  Firstly, as recent experience has shown in sometimes dramatic ways, 
the individual Member State are [sic] no longer capable individually of asserting this role on the 
international scene with sufficient weight and efficacy.").   
73 Id.  
74 ARNULL, supra note 13, at 620, citing Joined Cases C-283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/94 [1996] ECR I-
5063, ¶ 29 (“Legislation is addressed to those affected by it.  They must, in accordance with the principle of 
legal certainty, be able to rely on what it contains."). 
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only intensified by the Union's unique and unprecedented composition.75  Bearing this 
difficulty in mind, this analysis is intended to lay the foundation for future scholars who 
are more intimately familiar with the intricacies, subtleties, and nuances of EU 
jurisprudence. 
 
 
V. A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATIVE 
METHODOLOGIES  
 
 
a. A General Overview of Common Law Interpretative Methodologies  
 
 
i. The Common Law's Approach When No Ambiguity Exists 
 
 
The common law generally avoids reversion to the principles of interpretation 
(and/or the rules of construction) where the provision or the word in question is 
unambiguous.76  In other words, if the language itself appears to clearly transmit the will 
of the legislature, then there is no ambiguity for a court to interpret.77  As a general rule, 
                                                 
75 TRIDIMAS, supra note 12, at 18 (“The need to fill gaps is exacerbated by the distinct characteristics of the 
Community legal order.  Community law is not only a new legal order but also a novel one in the sense that 
it has no historical precedent or indeed contemporary equivalent.").  See also ARNULL, supra note 13, at 
607, quoting CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, Case 283/81 [1982] ECR 3415, ¶¶ 17-20 ("Any objective 
appraisal of the [ECJ's] methods of interpretation must take account of 'the characteristic features of 
Community law and the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise.'"). 
76 BENNION, supra note 10, § 195, at 470 ("It is a rule of law…that where, in relation to the facts of the 
instant case- 
 
(a) the enactment under inquiry is grammatically capable of one meaning only, and 
(b) on an informed interpretation of that enactment the interpretative criteria raise no real doubt as 
to whether that grammatical meaning is the one intended by the legislator, 
 
the legal meaning of the enactment corresponds to that grammatical meaning, and is to be applied 
accordingly."). 
77 CRAIES ON LEGISLATION: A PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE TO THE NATURE, PROCESS, EFFECT AND 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION § 17.1.1, at 543 (Daniel Greenberg, ed., 8th ed., 2004) (1907), citing 
Warburton v. Loveland, (1832) 2 D. & Cl. (HL) 480, 489 ("Where the language of an Act is clear and 
explicit, we must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the 
statute speak the intention of the legislature.").  For commonsensical exceptions to this general rule, see 
CRAIES, supra note 77, § 17.1.2, at 544, citing Grey v. Pearson, (1857) 6 H.L.C. 61, 106 ("I have been long 
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courts only resort to the rules of interpretation and/or construction where a "real" or 
"substantial" doubt exists concerning a word or provision.78  However, the common law's 
presumptions that statutory words are intended both to possess meaning79 and to achieve 
a beneficial effect within society80 effectively prohibit a court from exclusively relying 
                                                                                                                                                 
and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now, I believe, universally adopted – at least in the 
courts of law in Westminster Hall – that in construing wills, and indeed statutes and all written instruments, 
the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some 
absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the 
grammatical or ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity and 
inconsistency, but no further."); and CRAIES, supra note 77, § 17.1.9, at 548-549, citing Abel v. Lee, (1871) 
L.R. 6 C.P. 365, 371 ("No doubt the general rule is that the language of an Act is to be read according to its 
ordinary grammatical construction unless so reading it would entail some absurdity, repugnancy or 
injustice…But I utterly repudiate the notion that it is competent to a judge to modify the language of an Act 
in order to bring it in accordance with his view of what is right or reasonable.").  It is worth noting, 
however, that while an absurdity will not necessarily preclude a court from enforcing the enactment in 
question, courts will generally favor reasonable interpretations if they are available.  See also CRAIES, supra 
note 77, § 17.1.8, at 547, citing Holmes v. Bradfield R.D.C., [1949] 2 K.B. 1, 7 ("The fact that the results of 
a statute may be unjust or absurd does not entitle this court to refuse to give it effect, but if there are two 
different interpretations of the words in an Act, the court will adopt that which is just, reasonable, and 
sensible rather than that which is none of those things."); CRAIES, supra note 77, § 20.1.6, at 588-589 ("[I]f 
two constructions of a provision are possible on its face, and one would clearly advance the legislative 
purpose and the other would clearly achieve little or nothing, the former is to be preferred."); JELLUM 
HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND LAWYERING STATEGIES 101 
(2006), citing Wilt v. Brunswick Plaza L.L.C. 703 N.Y.S. 2d 700, 702 (N.Y. 2000) ("If the words…have a 
definite meaning, which involves no absurdity or contradiction, then there is no room for construction and 
courts have no right to add to or take away from that meaning."); and Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, supra note 20, at art. 31, 1.A ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty[.]"). 
78 BENNION, supra note 10, § 3, at 15 ("If, on an informed interpretation, there is no real doubt that a 
particular meaning of an enactment is to be applied, that is to be taken as its legal meaning.  If there is a 
real doubt, it is to be resolved by applying the [rules, principles, presumptions and canons which govern 
statutory interpretation].  For this purpose a doubt is 'real' only where it is substantial, and not merely 
conjectural or fanciful.  A doubt is not substantial where it arises merely because the effect of the 
enactment depends on a decision required to be taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion."). 
79 See id. § 402, at 1097 ("It is presumed that [European] Community law is intended to be effective to 
achieve its ends, and any court applying that law is required to act accordingly.") and id. § 266, at 682-683 
("It is a principle of legal policy that law should be certain, and therefore predictable.  The court, when 
considering, in relation to the facts of the instant case, which of the opposing constructions of the 
enactment would give effect to the legislative intention, should presume that the legislator intended to 
observe this principle.  It should therefore strive to reach a conclusion which was reasonably foreseeable by 
the parties concerned.").  But see CRAIES, supra note 77, § 20.1.6, at 589, quoting Hankey v. Clavering, 
[1942] 2 K.B. 326, 330 ("It is perfectly true that in construing…all documents, the court in a case of 
ambiguity will lean in favour of reading the document in such a way as to give it validity, but I dissent 
entirely from the proposition that, where a document is clear and specific, but inaccurate on some matter, 
such as that of date, it is possible to ignore the inaccuracy and substitute the correct date or other particular 
because it appears that the error was inserted by a slip."). 
80 BENNION, supra note 10, § 264, at 670-671 ("It is the basic principle of legal policy that law should serve 
the public interest.  The court when considering, in relation to the facts of the instant case, which of the 
opposing constructions of the enactment would give effect to the legislative intention, should presume that 
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on the so-called "four corner rule" where 1) an ambiguity arises and 2) it is not clarified 
within the four corners of the document in question.81  Therefore, common law courts are 
arguably required to rely upon the express words of the legislature when a provision is 
clear or upon reasonable implications discerned via various accepted interpretative 
guidelines when such words are unclear.82  The next section provides a brief overview of 
some of these well-settled guidelines. 
 
 
ii. Common Law Approaches to Interpreting Ambiguities  
 
 
 
In the preface to his 1839 book Legal and Political Hermeneutics, or Principles of 
Interpretation and Construction in Law and Politics, Francis Lieber expressly advocated 
acknowledging and synthesizing interpretative guidelines within the common law 
                                                                                                                                                 
the legislator intended to observe this principle.  It should therefore strive to avoid adopting a construction 
which is in any way adverse to the public interest.").  See also CRAIES, supra note 77, § 17.1.12, at 551, 
citing Barnes v. Jarvis [1953] 1 W.L.R. 649, QBD, DC ("A certain amount of common sense must be 
applied in construing statutes.  The object of the Act has to be considered.") and CRAIES, supra note 77, § 
18.1.8, at 563, citing Harrods Ltd v. Remick, [1998] 1 All E.R. 52, 57, CA, per Sir Richard Scott V.C. 
("[W]e should…give a construction to the statutory language that is not only consistent with the actual 
words used but also would achieve the statutory purpose…"). 
81 See BENNION, supra note 10, § 2(2), at 14 ("The court is never entitled, on the principle of non liquet (it 
is not clear), to decline the duty of determining the legal meaning of the relevant enactment."). 
82 CRAIES, supra note 77, § 16.1.4, at 539-540, citing Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd., [1897] A.C. 22, 
38, HL ("'Intention of the legislature' is a common but very slippery phrase, which, properly understood, 
may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the 
legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact it.  In a court of law 
or equity, what the legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained 
from what it has chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication.").  
See also CRAIES, supra note 77, § 20.1.2, at 586 ("It is important to note at the outset that even in times in 
which these canons were constructed and first applied, they were never intended to do more than elucidate 
the intention of the legislature in cases of doubt.  They have no application, and have never had any 
application, in a case where the intention of the legislature is clear on its face.") and id. quoting [1895] 2 
Q.B. 61 ("The duty of the Court when called upon to construe an Act of Parliament is, I conceive, to read 
the Act itself, and if its language is clear to give effect to what the legislature has said.  It is to my mind 
proper to refer to earlier Acts in pari materia only where there is ambiguity."). 
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tradition.83  He believed that these rules should be followed by all jurists seeking to 
interpret the law84 and that a person to whom a statement is made has an affirmative 
responsibility to understand the expositor's intention;85 although any given word can have 
several different meanings, jurists must use every available means "which are in constant 
use among men, to understand the words of one another."86     
Within the common law, it appears to be accepted that words (as a general rule) 
have no "true" meaning.87  There are, however, two notable exceptions to this general 
                                                 
83 FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS: OR PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION AND 
CONSTRUCTION IN LAW AND POLITICS, WITH REMARKS ON PRECEDENTS AND AUTHORITIES viii (1839) 
(“[I]n countries, in which the law is allowed to make its own way, immutable principles and fixed rules for 
interpreting and construing them, should be generally acknowledged, or if they exist already, in a scattered 
state, should be gathered and clearly represented, so that they may establish themselves along with the 
laws, as part and branch of the common law of free countries.").  See also F.A.R. BENNION, 
UNDERSTANDING COMMON LAW LEGISLATION: DRAFTING AND INTERPRETING 5 (2001) ("[The courts in all 
common law countries] still mostly observe the principles of the common law when it comes to statutory 
interpretation.  It is therefore important that the uniform principles should be spelt out and generally 
known.") and SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, 1 DE OFFICIO HOMINIS ET CIVIS JUXTA LEGEM NATURALEM LIBRI 
DUO 83 (*93) (Frank Gardner Moore trans., 1927) (1682) ("Hence, for a right understanding of laws, as 
well as of agreements, and for the performance of the duty involved, it is of the greatest importance to 
establish rules of sound interpretation, for words especially, as the commonest sign."). 
84 LIEBER, supra note 83, at 118 (“We have to follow the special rules of interpretation, which have been 
given by proper authority."). 
85 Id. at 19 (“All the signs…require interpretation, that is, it is necessary for him, whose benefit they are 
intended, to find out, what those persons who used the sign, intend to convey to the mind of the beholder or 
hearer….it is one of the occupations of the historian and antiquarian to find out the meaning of these 
various representations, i.e. the ideas which he who made them (or ordered them to be made) intended to 
convey to the beholder.").  See also BENNION, supra note 10, § 2(1), at 14 ("The interpreter's duty is to 
arrive at the legal meaning of the enactment, which is not necessarily the same as its grammatical meaning.  
This must be done in accordance with the rules, principles, presumptions and canons which govern 
statutory interpretation…"). 
86 LIEBER, supra note 83, at 75 (“A single word may signify indeed several things, and in order to 
determine in which sense it has been used in a particular passage, we shall be obliged, as a matter of course, 
to use grammar, etymology, logic, and every other means, which are in constant use among men, to 
understand the words of one another.  This has been clearly shown as early as by Ernesti in his 
Institutes[.]”). 
87 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 417, 417 
(1899), reprinted in LAW AND LANGUAGE 187 (Frederick Schauer, ed., 1993) (“It is true that in theory any 
document purporting to be serious and to have some legal effect has one meaning and no other, because the 
known object is to achieve some definite result.  It is not true that in practice (and I know no reason why 
theory should disagree with the facts) a given word or even a collection of words has one meaning and no 
other.  A word generally has several meanings, even in the dictionary.  You have to consider the sentence 
in which it stands to decide which of those meanings it bears in a particular case, and very likely will see 
that it there has a shade of significance more refined than any given in the wordbook.").  See also Paul E. 
McGreal, Slighting Context: On the Illogic of Ordinary Speech in Statutory Interpretation, 52 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 325 (2004). 
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rule.  First, if a word has a commonly accepted meaning (either within society as a whole 
or within an identifiable section therein), then the word in question is generally presumed 
to have that accepted meaning.88  This exception has been reiterated and strengthened 
through common law cases,89 contemporary treatises,90 and the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties.91  If an examination of the commonly accepted meaning does not 
                                                 
88 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *59-60 (“Words are generally to be understood in their usual 
and most known signification; not so much regarding the propriety of grammar, as their general and 
popular use…terms of art, or technical terms, must be taken according to the acceptation of the learned in 
each art, trade, or science.”).  See also LIEBER, supra note 83, at 209 (“Words may mean very indefinite 
things; it is by practice only, that they acquire definite significations.”); id. at 100 (“According to the 
character of the text before us, we are obliged to take words, either in their common adaptation in daily life, 
or in the peculiar signification which they have in certain arts, sciences, sects, provinces, &c., in short, we 
have to take words according to what is termed usus loquendi.”); Holmes, supra note 87, at 419 (“[E]ach 
party to a contract has notice that the other will understand his words according to the usage of the normal 
speaker of English under the circumstances, and therefore cannot complain if his words are taken in that 
sense."); HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE 
LAWS 182 (1911) (“Words and phrases which are used only in the law and have a precise legal meaning, 
and also terms used more or less in common speech but which have acquired a peculiar and appropriate 
meaning in the law, or which bear a definite signification at common law, are to be understood in their 
proper technical sense, unless it plainly appears that they were not so used by the legislature."); and 
CRAIES, supra note 77, § 20.1.33, at 607, quoting (1831) 2 D. & Cl. 302, 310 ("There is a principle of 
general application that while a technical legal expression should be construed in a technical way, a word 
that has a natural meaning in ordinary English conversation should be given that meaning and not a 
restrictive technical one.  As Lord Tenterden said in Attorney General v Winstanley – 
 
'the words of an Act of Parliament which are not applied to any particular science or art' 
are to be construed 'as they are understood in common language'."). 
 
89 See, e.g., Mason v. Bolton's Library, [1913] 1 K.B. 83, 90 ("The proviso is expressed in terms of art; 
technical phrases are used.  It is a stringent rule of construction that in construing an Act of Parliament or a 
deed containing technical words those words must be given their technical meaning."); and CRAIES, supra 
note 77, § 20.1.34, at  608, citing Holt & Co. v. Collyer, (1881) 16 Ch. D. 718, 720 ("If it is a word which is 
of a technical or scientific character then it must be construed according to that which is its primary 
meaning, namely, its technical or scientific meaning."). 
90 BENNION, supra note 10, § 365, at 1026 ("If a word or phrase has a technical meaning in relation to a 
particular expertise, and is used in a context dealing with that expertise, it is to be given its technical 
meaning, unless the contrary intention appears.").  See also id. § 363, at 1013 ("The starting point in 
statutory interpretation is to consider the ordinary meaning of the word or phrase in question, that is its 
proper and most known signification.  If there is more than one ordinary meaning, the most common and 
well-established is preferred (other things being equal)."); id. § 366, at 1027 ("If a word or phrase has a 
technical meaning in a certain branch of law, and is used in a context dealing with that branch, it is to be 
given that meaning unless the contrary intention appears."); and id. § 367, at 1030 ("If a word or phrase has 
a technical meaning in relation to a certain area of trade, business, technology, or other non-legal expertise, 
and is used in a context dealing with that expertise, it is to be given its technical meaning, unless the 
contrary intention appears."). 
91 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 20, at art. 31, 1.A ("A treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty[.]"). 
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clarify the ambiguity in question, then courts are permitted to look beyond the four 
corners of the document to ascertain its intended meaning.92  Second, a speaker or author 
may conceivably intend a word to mean something that it does not ordinarily mean; under 
these circumstances, the author's (or utterer's) intention determines the meaning of the 
word in question.93  If neither one of these conditions is not met, however, the common 
law appears to presume that a word has no "true" meaning. 
If adherence to this general rule and its two exceptions does not successfully 
clarify a word's meaning, Blackstone posits that jurists should seek to interpret an 
ambiguous term by first examining its context (frequently in the form of a preamble).94  
If this is unsuccessful, then an examination of other laws passed by the same legislator 
may clarify the relevant intent.95  Blackstone also recognizes that if the effects of a word 
                                                 
92 See CRAIES, supra note 77, § 18.1.1, at  555 ("In advocating the literal approach one is quickly forced to 
concede a great many exceptions and qualifications.  The most important exception, which emanated 
entirely from common sense, is that however literal one wishes to be, if the natural construction of the 
words does not answer the question being asked, the courts are forced to look outside the strict letter of the 
legislation for the intention.").  See also HRICIK, supra note 77, at 97 ("An intentionalist does not need a 
reason – like ambiguity or absurdity – to consider sources beyond the text."); id. at 100 ("[P]urposivists do 
not need a reason – like ambiguity or absurdity – to look to extratextual sources to discern meaning."); and 
id. at 103, citing Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976) ("[W]hen aid to 
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of 
law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on superficial examination."). 
93 Glanville L. Williams, Language and the Law, in LAW AND LANGUAGE 141 (Frederick Schauer, ed., 
1993) (“Scientifically speaking, words have no true or proper meaning, except in two senses.  First, words 
have an ordinary – i.e., commonly-accepted – meaning.  The ordinary meaning need not be current among 
the community as a whole: it may be confined to a particular section of the community, such as educated 
persons, business men, scientists or lawyers…Second, the particular person who uses a word may assign to 
it a special meaning[.]”). 
94 BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, *60.  See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 20, at 
art. 31, 2 ("The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise…the text…its 
preamble, and annexes[.]"). 
95 BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, *60.  Although this examination could conceivably generate a legislative 
intent that differs from the Church's definition, there is no immediate reason to suspect that this is the case.  
Therefore, due to the lack of immediate evidence and both the size and the intricacy of this particular 
research thread, it appears reasonable to reserve this task (as well as an analysis of equitable considerations) 
for future scholarship. 
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are either absurd or minimal, then deviation may be required in order to effectuate the 
proper intention.96  It should be noted, however, that 
 
 
"the most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the 
words are dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it; or the cause which moved 
the legislator to enact it.  For when this reason ceases, the law itself ought likewise to 
cease with it."97   
 
 
 
The common law also supports equitable solutions because the law is incapable of 
foreseeing all potential disputes.98  Even if the law was perfectly clairvoyant, it still 
would be unable to adequately address all disputes with the requisite precision and 
clarity.99  Blackstone expressly recognized the dangers potentially associated with 
                                                 
96 Id. *61 (“Therefore the Bolognian law, mentioned by Puffendorf, which enacted 'that whoever drew 
blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,' was held after long debate not to extend to 
the surgeon, who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street with a fit.'”).  See also Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 20, at art. 32 ("Recourse may be had to supplementary 
means of interpretation…to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to 
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or 
obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.") and PUFENDORF, supra note 
83, at 84 (*94) ("As for the effect and consequences, this is the rule: when words, simply and literally 
taken, would entail either no effect, or an absurd one, there must be a slight departure from the commonly 
received meaning, in so far as the necessity of avoiding the meaningless or the absurd requires."). 
97 BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, *61.  See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 20, at 
art. 31, 1.A ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in…the light of its object and purpose."). 
98 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, *61-62 ("For since laws in all cases cannot be foreseen or expressed, it 
is necessary, that when the general decrees of the law come to be applied to particular cases, there should 
be somewhere a power vested of defining those circumstances, which (had they been foreseen) the 
legislator himself would have expressed.").  See also PUFENDORF, supra note 83, at 85 (*96) ("[N]ot all 
cases can be foreseen, or stated, on account of their infinite variety[.]").  See also PETER GOODRICH, 
READING THE LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL METHOD AND TECHNIQUES 37 (1986) (“In 
practice the judiciary are involved in interpreting words and phrases whose meaning is unclear, dealing 
with lacunae within a text which purports to be a complete exposition of the law and applying the code to 
situations which could not have been foreseen by the legislature.") and Wayne R. Barnes, Contemplating a 
Civil Law Paradigm for a Future International Commercial Code, 65 LA. L. REV. 677, 722 (2005), citing 
Angelo Piero Sereni, The Code and the Case Law, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON-LAW 
WORLD 62 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1956) ("Those changing and petty details with which the legislator 
ought not to be preoccupied and all those matters that it would be futile and even dangerous to attempt to 
foresee and to define in advance, we leave to the courts."). 
99 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND 
APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 225 (1857) (“The imperfection of language is a 
serious evil when it occurs in those legislative commands on which the repose, discipline, and well-being 
of society depend.  In regard to laws, as in other cases, difficulties will arise, in the first place from the 
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equitable solutions, however, as overindulgence may foreseeably "destroy all law, and 
leave decision of every question entirely in the breast of the judge."100   
Although ambiguities concerning such terms may be clarified by reviewing the 
works of credible authorities who have addressed similar topics,101 jurists should not 
permit their veneration for the past to stifle the law's ability to progressively develop.102  
They should, however, be aware of historical precedents concerning similar topics103 (as 
well as their concomitant effects).104  Further, at least one commentator has argued that 
utilizing established technical meanings facilitates a system in which, "doubts concerning 
the meanings of statutes are diminished to their smallest possible proportions.  For thus 
an enactment of to-day has the benefit of judicial renderings extending back though 
centuries of past litigation."105  These methods notwithstanding, the inevitable 
ambiguities concerning legal language will invariably continue to generate disputes 
concerning interpretation.106   
                                                                                                                                                 
disputed meaning of individual words, or, as is usually said, of the language employed; and in the second 
place, assuming the sense of each separate word to be clear, doubt will result from the whole context."). 
100 Id. 
101 LIEBER, supra note 83, at 102-103 (“[W]ith respect to living languages, from works or persons of the 
same nation, community, profession, art, &c., to which the doubtful word may relate, after these persons 
have established their character for competency and truth; from previous expounders, of weighty authority, 
who are known to have paid much attention to the subject, and have done it with patience, learning, 
shrewdness, and conscientiousness; and from scholia, glosses, versions, and commentators."). 
102 Id., at 103 (“We have in this particular, to guard ourselves against an inordinate veneration of old 
authors, merely because they are old, or against a too implicit reliance upon old authors, simply because 
they have been relied upon so long.  Science advances, and it would be a matter of great regret, if 
successive centuries were unable to supersede by their labors some works of previous periods, though they 
have justly enjoyed, and for a long time, the reputation of authority."). 
103 Id., at 217 (“Whether we attribute authority to precedents or not, we ought always to pay proper 
attention to them; for whatever subject may occupy our reflection, it will always be found of great 
assistance, to inquire how others, in different situations, have viewed and acted upon the matter."). 
104 Id. at 219 (“Precedents must be taken with all their adjuncts, or they will be totally misunderstood; and 
not only with their adjuncts at the time, but likewise with their consequences and effects."). 
105 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITTEN LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION § 242 (b), 
at 225 (1882).  
106 See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 87, at 418 (“By the theory of our language, while other words may mean 
different things, a proper name means one person or thing and no other.  If language perfectly performed its 
function, as Bentham wanted to make it, it would point out the person or thing named in every case.  But 
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If it appears that the author(s) of a particular piece of legislation did not "use the 
words with skill, knowledge, and accurate care and selection," then an investigation into 
the word's etymology or classical utility will be to no avail.107  Thus, we must examine 
the source of the text itself and the knowledge of those who drafted it in order to 
effectively discern its meaning.108  In order to accurately construe the intention of the 
legislature, however, it is important to presume that the measure in question was 
approved in a good faith effort to promote the welfare of the citizenry.109
 
iii. An Application of Common Law Interpretative Methodologies  
 
 
1. Ascertaining Subsidiarity's "True" Meaning 
 
 
The common law recognizes that the word "subsidiarity" has no "true" meaning 
unless it has been 1) commonly used within society as a whole (or within a specific 
section therein) or 2) its meaning has been altered by the person using it.  In this 
particular case, the term "subsidiarity" has been commonly and uniformly used within a 
                                                                                                                                                 
under our random system it sometimes happens that your name is idem sonans with mine, and it may be the 
same even in spelling.  But it never means you or me indifferently.  In theory of speech your name means 
you and my name means me, and the two names are different.  They are different words…In such a case 
we let in evidence of intention not to help out what theory recognizes as an uncertainty of speech, and to 
read what the writer meant into what he has tried but failed to say, but, recognizing that he has spoken with 
theoretic certainty, we inquire what he meant in order to find out what he has said."). 
107 LIEBER, supra note 83, at 99 (“Faithful interpretation implies that words, or assemblages of words, be 
taken in that sense, which we honestly believe that their utterer attached to them.  We have to take words, 
then, in their most probable sense, not in their original, etymological, or classical sense, if the text be such 
that we cannot fairly suppose the author use the words with skill, knowledge, and accurate care and 
selection.”) (emphasis added). 
108 Id., at 101 (“The general character of the text, whether it has emanated from a high or low source, and 
was drawn up with care or in haste, with a knowledge of the technical terms or not, the peculiar character 
of the author, and the especial connexion in which we find a doubtful word, must direct us in fixing upon a 
proper meaning."). 
109 Id., at 240 (“We must be convinced that those who have adopted the measure in question, act with us on 
the same principles, or on principles we acknowledge as good, and that with them the measure is neither 
the consequence of chance nor the effect of sinister motives, but carefully adopted or developed on those 
principles."). 
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specific section of society, specifically, the Catholic Church.110  Although it could 
foreseeably be argued that the term has also been used within European society as a 
whole since 1992, this is probably insufficient to generate a "true" meaning insofar as it 
has been the topic of considerable debate for at least fifteen years since its codification at 
Maastricht.111  Therefore, due to the fact that the Catholic Church utilized the term 
"subsidiarity" for at least sixty years prior to its codification at Maastricht,112 the 
common law would seemingly advocate examining that usage in an effort to ascertain its 
"true" meaning. 
This argument could, of course, conceivably be dismissed if it were provable that 
those who codified the term at Maastricht intended to use it in a manner that differed 
from the Catholic Church's meaning.113  This appears to be unlikely because there is no 
evidence indicating that the legislators in question intended to break from the definition 
developed within Catholicism.114  Instead, a superficial examination yields evidence 
concerning the direct influence of Catholicism upon Jacques Delors115 (the President of 
the European Commission at the time the Treaty of Maastricht was signed).  Although 
                                                 
110 See Section VI infra. 
111 See supra note 4. 
112 See Section VI (2) infra. 
113 But see G.A. ENDLICH, ESQ., A COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 11 (1888), quoting 
Wilberforce, Stat. Law, p. 102 (“It is inaccurate to speak of the meaning or intent of a statute as something 
separate or distinct from the meaning of its language.  ‘The intention of the Legislature is to be ascertained 
by means of the words which it has used, and though these words are often modified, though their literal 
sense is not always adopted, though they are sometimes strained, transported, treated as inadequate or 
superfluous, they are still the only interpreters of the mind of the Legislature.’”). 
114 But see DAVIES, supra note 31, at 19 (The principle of subsidiarity as enshrined within the Treaties is 
“deliberately ambiguous in nature allowing much room for political discussion as to its practical 
implementation."). 
115 See Marquardt, supra note 61, at 624 (“Catholic social theory was influential in Delors's [sic] thinking, 
and the German federalist principle thus fell on fertile ground.”), citing Marc Wilke & Helen Wallace, 
Subsidiarity: Approaches to Power-Sharing in the European Community 30 (1990).  See also Føllesdal, 
supra note 62, at 19 (“The Catholic argument for subsidiarity rests on the view that the human good is to 
develop and realize [sic] one's good potential, thus realizing one's dignity as made in the imagine of [G_d].  
As developed by Mounier, this theory of Personalism had profound influence on Jacques Delors."). 
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this is obviously insufficient to conclusively prove the point, it is nonetheless insightful 
considering the lack of evidence demonstrating that the legislators in question 
intentionally utilized a definition that diverged from Catholicism's.  Further, President 
Delors was apparently aware of subsidiarity's connection to both Johannes Althusius116 
and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.117  The former was concerned with human autonomy and 
solidarity within the religious sphere118 while the latter was concerned with human 
dignity within the secular sphere.119  Thus, when combined with the fact that various 
invocations of subsidiarity within the EU (including the Treaty of Maastricht) appear to 
track the language and/or general values promoted by the Catholic Church's definition of 
subsidiarity, the potential connection between President Delors' familiarity with 
                                                 
116 Thomas Hueglin, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the European Tradition, at  
http://www.ecsanet.org/conferences/ecsaworld2/hueglin.htm (“In an internal memorandum to the President 
of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, it has been pointed out that the Subsidiarity now anchored in 
the Maastricht Treaty can be traced back to 16th century European political though and practice, and in 
particular to the 17th century political theory of Johannes Althusius (1557-1638)…This recourse to the 
history of European political though and practice seems to suggest that subsidiarity has its roots in an early-
modern Europe not yet dominated by a fully sovereign nation-state system, and that it is therefore uniquely 
appropriate for the organisation of a post-nation-state European Union. It is, in other words, the timeless 
operational principle of a federally organised democratic European polity.”). 
117 Rabinowitz, supra note 58, at 11 (“Of particular interest and importance is a conference on subsidiarity, 
chaired by the Commission President Jacques Delors, and held in Maastricht in 1991, the same year that the 
agreement on the Maastricht Treaty was reached. Tracing the concept back to Proudhon, Delors argued that 
the application of the subsidiarity principle in general would change Community structures completely.”). 
118 THOMAS O. HUEGLIN, EARLY MODERN CONCEPTS FOR A LATE MODERN WORLD: ALTHUSIUS ON 
COMMUNITY AND FEDERALISM 153 (1999) (“What emerges from Althusius' federalism as the meaning of 
subsidiarity….is an expression of a complex relationship and tension between autonomy and solidarity in a 
multilevel system of governance that can claim universal validity.  It is as much applicable in the family 
and kinship relationships as in a commonwealth or, indeed, in an international political order.”). 
119 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, De la Justice, t. 1, p. 423, reprinted in K. STEVEN VINCENT, PIERRE-JOSEPH 
PROUDHON AND THE RISE OF FRENCH REPUBLICAN SOCIALISM 226 (1984) (“Man, by virtue of the reason 
with which he is endowed, has the faculty to feel his dignity in the person of his fellow man as in his own 
person, of affirming himself simultaneously as individual and as species.   
“JUSTICE is the product of this faculty: it is the respect, spontaneously felt and reciprocally 
guaranteed, for human dignity, in whatever person and whatever circumstances it finds itself compromised, 
and at whatever risk it its defense exposes us to… 
“From the definition of Justice are deduced those of right and duty. 
“Right is for each one the faculty of requiring of others respect for the human dignity of his 
person; - duty, the obligation for each one to respect this dignity in another.”). 
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subsidiarity's secular and ecclesiological development is arguably worth further 
investigation. 
Thus, due to the facts that 1) the term "subsidiarity" had been uniformly used 
within the Catholic Church for at least sixty years prior to its codification at Maastricht 
and 2) there is no immediate evidence suggesting that the legislators at Maastricht 
intended to disregard that usage, this prong of the common law's approach to interpreting 
ambiguities appears to sanction the examination of the development of subsidiarity 
within the Catholic Church.     
 
2. Examining the Context 
 
Even if adherence to this general rule and its two exceptions fails to clarify 
subsidiarity's meaning, its context (especially the preamble) should also be examined.  
Here, the relevant provisions within the Treaty of Maastricht's preamble read as follows: 
 
"CONFIRMING their attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law, 
DESIRING to deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their history, 
their culture and their traditions, 
DESIRING to enhance further the democratic and efficient functioning of the institutions 
so as to enable them better to carry out, within a single institutional framework, the tasks 
entrusted to them… 
RESOLVED to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity[.]"120
 
 
These express concerns appear to comport with the Catholic Church's definition of 
subsidiarity.121  More specifically, the EU's desire to respect the histories, cultures, 
                                                 
120 Treaty of Maastricht (signed Feb. 7, 1992; effective Nov. 1, 1993), O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 
C.M.L.R. 719 [“TEU”], available at http://europa.eu/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/EU_treaty.html (last visited 17 
July 2007). 
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traditions, and liberties of its peoples implies that it will not unnecessarily interfere with 
those traditions.  When coupled with the EU's resolve to take action as close to the citizen 
as possible, it appears that the legislators at Maastricht intended for the term to comport 
with the definition put forth by the Catholic Church.   Therefore, the common law's 
analysis of an ambiguity's context appears to indicate that an examination of the Church's 
use of "subsidiarity" is warranted because the EU has both expressly invoked the term 
itself and implicitly invoked the meaning that it was accorded within Catholicism.   
 
3. Examination of Technical Meanings 
 
 
The common law also expressly sanctions utilizing technical meanings where 
they are sufficiently established.  Therefore, if subsidiarity's meaning within Catholicism 
is sufficiently technical, the common law encourages an examination of that meaning.  
When doubts arise, however, they should almost always be resolved in favor of the 
people.122  Therefore, the common law would arguably deem Catholicism to be 
sufficiently technical and therefore permit an analysis of subsidiarity's development 
therein; if the term remains ambiguous, however, then it appears that the common law 
would prefer any ambiguities concerning the application of subsidiarity to be resolved in 
favor of the Member States due to their relative closeness to the citizenry. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
121 See Section VI, infra. 
122 LIEBER, supra note 83, at 172 (“In cases of doubt between the authority and an individual, the benefit of 
the doubt, all other reasons being equal, ought to be given to the individual, not to the authority; for the 
state makes the laws, and the authority has the power; yet it is subversive of all good government, peace, 
and civil morality, if subtlety is allowed to defeat the wise object of the law, or if a morbid partiality for an 
evil-doer guides the interpreter."). 
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4. Legislative Skill  
 
 
Finally, jurists should examine whether the legislators at Maastricht used the term 
with, "skill, knowledge, and accurate care and selection."123  Due to the fact that (at 
present) there appear to be no facts evidencing that the officials at Maastricht did not 
know its established meaning, jurists should not presume otherwise.124  Instead, the 
authors' express invocation of the term itself, when coupled with their references to 
liberty, closeness to the citizen, and respect for individuals' cultures appear to indicate 
that they perfectly understood its meaning within Catholicism and intended to invoke it in 
its entirety.  However, future analysis may benefit from ascertaining what influence (if 
any) the teachings of Catholicism had on the other officials that signed the Treaty of 
Maastricht.125
 
                                                 
123 Id., at 99 (“Faithful interpretation implies that words, or assemblages of words, be taken in that sense, 
which we honestly believe that their utterer attached to them.  We have to take words, then, in their most 
probable sense, not in their original, etymological, or classical sense, if the text be such that we cannot 
fairly suppose the author use the words with skill, knowledge, and accurate care and selection.”) (emphasis 
added). 
124 See CRAIES, supra note 77, § 17.1.3, at  545, citing Spillers Ltd. Cardiff Assessment Committee, [1931] 
2 K.B. 21, 42-43 ("It ought to be the rule, and we are glad to think that it is the rule, that words are used in 
an Act of Parliament correctly and exactly, and not loosely and inexactly.  Upon those who assert that that 
rule has been broken the burden of establishing their proposition lies heavily.  And they can discharge it 
only by pointing to something in the context which goes to show that the loose and inexact meaning must 
be preferred."). 
125 This analysis may be especially insightful due to the widespread election of Catholic leaders after the 
Second World War.  See Altiero Spinelli, The Growth of the European Movement Since the Second World 
War, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 49 (Michael Hodges ed., 1972) (“After the war, there was a tendency for 
political parties inspired by the Catholic religion to become predominant in all countries of Western 
Europe."). 
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iv. Conclusions Concerning The Application of Common Law 
Interpretative Methodologies  
 
 
 
Thus, under the factors examined herein, the common law appears to encourage 
jurists to examine the ecclesiological development of subsidiarity.  More specifically, 
Catholicism utilized the term for at least sixty years prior to its codification at Maastricht 
and there is no evidence that the legislators intended it to mean something other than it 
did within Catholicism.  This could arguably lead common law scholars to conclude that 
the Catholic Church's definition of subsidiarity accounts for its "true" meaning.  
Furthermore, an examination of the Preamble to the Treaty of Maastricht provides 
examples that comport with Catholicism's use of the term, thereby providing an 
independent justification for examining its development within Catholicism.  The 
common law also encourages the use of technical meanings when they have been 
developed; assuming that subsidiarity's meaning within Catholicism is sufficiently 
technical,126 then this method warrants an examination of its ecclesiological development 
as well.  Finally, some common law scholars sanction the use of any reasonable method 
in an effort to understand a word's meaning.  Each of these common law methodologies 
provides an independent justification for examining the ecclesiological development of 
subsidiarity.   
There are, however, potential arguments to the contrary.  Specifically, the 
common law encourages the examination of both 1) other laws codified by the legislators 
                                                 
126 See BENNION, supra note 10, § 376, at 1047, citing London and North Eastern Rly Co. v. Berriman 
[1946] AC 278 at 305 ("It seems that evidence should be admitted to establish whether or not a term is a 
technical term.  If the evidence shows that it is, then the court determines whether it was intended in the 
technical sense.  If the court finds it was, then evidence of what the technical meaning is becomes 
admissible."). 
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in question and 2) equitable considerations, both of which have been reserved for future 
scholarship.  Assuming temporarily that neither of these methodologies prevents an 
examination of subsidiarity's ecclesiological development, it should be noted that none of 
the aforesaid justifications appear to be trumped by either a lack of skill or by minimal or 
absurd effects.   
 
 
b. A General Overview Civil Law Interpretative Methodologies 
 
 
i. Introduction 
 
 
Although European jurisprudence has been influenced by specific components of 
the common law,127 the civil law tradition informs the legal values of Western Europe128 
and most EU countries are (at a minimum) influenced by its dictates.129  As a 
consequence, any attempt to justify an examination of subsidiarity's ecclesiological 
                                                 
127 See, e.g., Baudenbacher, supra note 14, at 337 (“It is finally time that people on both sides of the 
Atlantic take notice of the fact that the law of the European Union (as well as the law of the European 
Economic Area) is made up of elements of civil law and of common law. Given the history of European 
integration with the United Kingdom and Ireland on the sidelines for the first fifteen years, it is clear that 
EC law was originally comprised of civil law. However, it has since been supplemented by important 
common law elements. Examples include the concept of true and fair view in accounting law, the evolution 
of due process in competition law, and an interpretation of Article 81(1) (former Article 85(1)) of the EC 
Treaty - the provision prohibiting cartels - as a sort of a rule of reason.”) and Ana M. Lopez-Rodriguez, 
Towards a European Civil Code Without a Common European Legal Culture? The Link Between Law, 
Language and Culture, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1195, 1210 (2004) (“Common law is silently permeating 
continental Europe."). 
128 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF 
WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 3 (1969) (“[Civil law] is the dominant legal tradition in most of 
Western Europe…[and] was the legal tradition familiar to the Western European scholar-politicians who 
were the fathers of international law.  The basic charters and the continuing legal development and 
operation of the European Communities are the work of people trained in the civil law tradition.  It is 
difficult to overstate the influence of the civil law tradition on the law of specific nations, the law of 
international organizations, and international law."). 
129 See Stephen Jacobsen, Catalan Nationalism and Civil Codification in Nineteenth-Century Europe: Law 
and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe: The Case of Catalonia in Comparative Perspective, 20 
LAW & HIST. REV. 307, 307 (2002) (“By the close of the nineteenth century, most continental Europeans 
tacitly accepted, if they thought about it at all, the notion that a civil code governed multiple personal and 
familial relationships in their daily lives.").  See also JAMES S.E. OPOLOT, WORLD LEGAL TRADITIONS AND 
INSTITUTIONS 13 (1981) (“European civil law countries include France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, 
Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Scandinavia, Belgium, and Portugal."). 
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development in order to clarify its meaning within the Treaty of Maastricht should be 
sanctioned within the civil law tradition as well. 
 
 
1. Civil Law as a Legal Science 
 
 
In order to understand the civil law's interpretative methodologies, it first seems 
necessary to recognize that it views itself as a "legal science."130  Although there are 
arguably countless reasons why civil law jurists have adopted scientific methodologies, 
Planiol argued that the narrow method of interpretation originally utilized by the Romans 
failed to test the value of their propositions, thereby effectively lowering the civil law's 
standards.131  Another scholar has observed that the development of legal science was in 
many ways deemed necessary due to the "confusion of laws" that appeared as a result of 
increased growth and contact with other legal cultures.132
Legal science within the civil law requires binding laws to be transcribed133 in a 
manner that is comprehensible to those whom it is intended to bind,134 thus promoting 
                                                 
130 See, e.g., A. FOUILLÉE, J. CHARMONT, L. DUGUIT, AND R. DEMOGUE, MODERN FRENCH LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY § 90, at 119 (Franklin W. Scott and Joseph P. Chamberlain, trans., 1968) (“The law 
presupposes general science.”), quoting SALEILLES, LES MÉTHODES D'ENSEIGNEMENT DU DROIT ET 
L'ÉDUCATION INTELLECTUELLE DE LA JEUNESSE 17. 
131 MARCEL PLANIOL, 1 TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW § 224, at 161-162 (Louisiana State Law Institute, 
trans., 12th ed., 1959) (1899) (“Judicial logic has existed for many centuries.  Its origin goes back to Roman 
jurisprudence.  Its counterpart is found in the ability displayed by the old jurists and above all by those of 
the great period, called the age of classical law. (1-III Century A.D.).  Unfortunately, an art evolved from 
these conditions which was somewhat narrow, confined its ambition to the almost mechanical combination 
of texts and reached conclusions without testing their value.  This judicial logic, which had its literature, 
soon exercised a pernicious influence and tended to lower legal standards.  If juridical science was reduced 
to this level, law schools could be closed without any great damage being done…All human knowledge, as 
far as the jurist was concerned, could be compressed into a few maxims."). 
132 GUY CARLETON LEE, HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 1 (1927) (“National growth caused an intermingling of men and a consequent 
confusion of laws.  Because of social and economic reasons, this confusion was intolerable.  Scientific 
arrangement and adjustment became imperative."). 
133 See, e.g., Guido Alpa, The European Civil Code: “E Pluribus Unum”, 14 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 12 
(1999) (“The first problem is language.… The problem of language suggests that it is fundamental to 
choose written rules rather than those derived from case law."). 
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legal certainty135 and facilitating the realization of the greatest possible good.136  Hans 
Georg Gadamer (the influential expositor of Gadamerian hermeneutics)137 notes that, 
"Whoever wants to learn a science has to learn to master its methodology."138  Therefore, 
in order to effectively harness the powers of legal science, one must first understand its 
legal method.  Due to the fact that the vast majority of this method lies outside the scope 
and competence of this particular paper, the analysis contained herein will be limited to 
the civil law's methodologies concerning the interpretation of ambiguities.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
134 See, e.g., ARNULL, supra note 74. 
135 See MERRYMAN, supra note 128, at 51 (“Certainty frequently implied rigidity; law that is certain may be 
difficult to mold in response to changed circumstances or to bend to the requirements of a particular 
case…In the civil law world, the supreme value is certainty, and the need for flexibility is seen as a series 
of ‘problems’ complicating progress toward the ideal of a judge-proof law…if judges are not carefully 
controlled in the way they interpret legislation, the law will be rendered more uncertain.").  See also 
FRANÇOIS GÉNY, METHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF § 98, at 182 (“The 
principle [of legal certainty] acquires particular importance, inter alia, in economic law.  Economic and 
commercial life is based on advance planning so that clear and precise legal provisions reduce transaction 
costs and promote efficient business.  Legal certainty may thus be seen as contributing to the production of 
economically consistent results.”) and Barnes, supra note 99, at 718-720 (“Preventing a freewheeling 
judiciary is one of the reasons for the ideology of the code, but what is the reason behind this reason? 
Certainty in the law. Within civil law jurisdictions, certainty 'has come to be a kind of supreme value, an 
unquestioned dogma, a fundamental goal.'  Certainty is unquestionably a value in common law jurisdictions 
as well, but not to the extent it is in the civil law. Approaching the law from more of a scientific perspective 
than the rugged experiential approach of the common law, civil law jurisdictions approach their codes as 
the embodiment of logic and reason itself. Civil law codes are drafted, developed, and utilized based on the 
view that there is order to life, rather than haphazard happenstance of events."). 
136 PLANIOL, supra note 131, § 224, at 162 (“Laws, however, are made in order to obtain for man the 
greatest possible amount of good.  A juridical science which would lead to unjust or dangerous solutions 
would be false.  It would defeat its own purpose."). 
137 Baudenbacher, supra note 14, at 348 (“According to modern hermeneutics [led by Hans Georg 
Gadamer], the judges' preconception and understanding of the law determines above all the choice of 
method. Since the 1970s, it has been common ground that this preunderstanding constitutes the starting 
point of every interpretation. Like every interpreter, a judge may understand a text only if he or she faces it 
with a certain purposive expectation of the meaning…The interpreter is examining his or her own 
preconception against the text of the norm in the so-called 'hermeneutic circle' - he or she projects an 
understanding for the whole of the text and understands each part in the light of that projection, revising the 
interpretation step by step while further penetrating the text."). 
138 Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
HERMENEUTICS 11 (David E. Linge, ed., 1976). 
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2. Civil Law Jurists May Only Consult the Law Itself 
 
 
 
The civil law is generally promulgated by a code139 that must be complete, clear, 
and without any internal conflicts.140  This belief in the possibility of a complete code is 
aptly demonstrated by the French Civil Code's implication that it adequately foresees and 
addresses every conceivable legal dispute.141  Due to the fact that such codes are 
generally perceived to be complete expressions of the law,142 civil law judges are 
theoretically restricted to utilizing the law itself (embodied by pertinent statutes, 
regulations and customs) in their efforts to adjudicate disputes;143 the use of any other 
                                                 
139 See FRITZ SCHULZ, PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW 13 (Marguerite Wolff, trans., 1956) (1936) (“[A] code 
purports to be a complete and finished whole, which it is not[.]").  See also Barnes, supra note 99, at 721-
722 (“[S]ince positive law in a civil law jurisdiction is ideologically expressed exclusively in the 
comprehensive provisions of the code, the power of courts to adjudicate disputes is limited quite literally 
and strictly to the scope of coverage of the code precepts.”); and Jeffrey A. Talpis, The Civil Law in North 
America: The Civil Law Heritage in the Transformation of Quebec Private International Law, 84 LAW 
LIBR. J. 177, 177 (1992) (“Also fundamental to a civil law system is tradition: a code is based on history 
and is a legal expression of a culture of a people, a symbol reflected in its language, the source of its rules 
and particular policies, and the pulse of a nation."). 
140 MERRYMAN, supra note 128, at 30 (“If a judge were required to decide a case for which there was no 
legislative provision, he would in effect make law and thus violate the principle of rigid separation of 
powers.  Hence it was necessary that the legislature draft a code without gaps.  Similarly, if there were 
conflicting provisions in the code, the judge would make law by choosing one rather than another as more 
applicable to the situation.  Hence there could be no conflicting provisions.  Finally, if a judge were 
allowed to decide what meaning to give to an ambiguous provision or an obscure statement, he would again 
be making law.  Hence the code had to be clear."). 
141 C. CIV. art. 4 (Fr.) (Georges Rouhette and Anne Berton, trans., 2004) ("A judge who refuses to give 
judgment on the pretext of legislation being silent, obscure or insufficient, may be prosecuted for being 
guilty of a denial of justice.”), at  
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes_traduits/code_civil_textA.htm#PRELIMINARY%20TITLE%20
OF (last visited 22 June 2007). 
142 See Barnes, supra note 99, at 720 (“Because civilians value the ability of human reason to effect a legal 
order, the code is envisaged as complete, with the wherewithal to furnish the resolution of any legal issue 
which could possibly arise as to matters within its jurisdiction."). 
143 MERRYMAN, supra note 128, at 25.  See also Barnes, supra note 99, at 721-722 (“The court must come 
to its resolution of the case by working strictly within the framework of the code. Because of the dogmatic 
philosophy that the code is complete and sufficient, the court may not rely on any authorities not contained 
in the code itself. So devout is this dogma of completeness, courts are generally prohibited from declining 
to adjudicate a dispute based on any perception of gaps in the code's coverage of a particular subject 
matter.").  C.f. Peter G. Stein, Judge and Jurist in the Civil Law: A Historical Interpretation, 46 LA. L. REV. 
241, 241-242 (1985) (“Very broadly, the official myth in the civil law is that, although academic writings 
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source is a prima facie violation of the separation of powers doctrine and represents an 
impermissible usurpation of the legislature's law-making function by the judiciary.144  
Thus, without further investigation, it would appear that civil codes restrict civilian jurists 
to the consultation of the law itself in their efforts to resolve any ambiguities that may 
arise. 
 
3. Civil Law Nonetheless Recognizes and Accepts the 
Inevitability of Interpretation 
 
It is generally accepted that civil law jurisdictions nonetheless grant their judges 
the authority to interpret law.145  This is due (at least in part) to the recognition that 
humanity is incapable of foreseeing all possible disputes146 or accounting for every 
conceivable change within society.147  Due to the fact that civilian jurisdictions generally 
                                                                                                                                                 
have authority, judicial decisions have none; in practice, however, great attention is paid to the latter.  As 
all law librarians know to their cost, the publication of case law reports in civil law countries is a massive 
industry which reflects this reality.").  
144 MERRYMAN, supra note 128, at 40 (“[T]he doctrine of separation of powers, when carried to an extreme, 
led to the conclusion that courts should be denied any interpretative function and should be required to refer 
problems of statutory interpretation to the legislature itself for solution.  The legislature would then provide 
an authoritative interpretation to guide the judge.  In this way defects in the law would be cured, courts 
would be prevented from making law, and the state would be safe from the threat of judicial tyranny.").  
See also Barnes, supra note 99, at 720 (“The people democratically elect the legislatures, which enact the 
laws. The judges, not being subject to the electorate, are not empowered to enact laws."). 
145 See Id., at 726-727 (“Quite obviously, in actual practice, the dogma of metaphysical completeness of the 
civil code is a fiction.  Short of perfect clairvoyance, not every conceivable scenario can ever be accounted 
for in a code in advance. Moreover, even where provision is made in a code, the dogma of perfect lucidity 
and clarity so as to obviate the need for any interpretation is likewise a fiction.  Accordingly, though the 
civil law courts do in fact practice…deductive and analogizing processes…they also may fairly be said to 
engage in a considerable amount of statutory interpretation.").  See also MERRYMAN, supra note 128, at 47 
(“[T]here is general agreement in civil law jurisdictions that judges do have the power to interpret 
evolutively.  The discussion thus shifts from the legitimacy of this function to the question of its 
justification and its proper limits.”) and Julio C. Cueto-Rua, The Civil Code of Louisiana is Alive and Well, 
64 TUL. L. REV. 147, 170 (1989) (“Every civil code has its interpretative jurisprudence; the two complement 
each other."). 
146 See, e.g., A. FOUILLÉE, et. al., supra note 130, § 93, at 122 (“No one can believe in this day that the 
written law is all-sufficing[.]”). 
147 Cueto-Rua, supra note 145, at 168-169 (“The law in force in any community is never static, rigid, 
unchangeable…Developments in legislation, in customary behavior, in judicial practices, and in doctrinal 
contributions may give new life, greater energy, and unexpected possibilities to the articles of the Civil 
Code."). 
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concede that it is impractical (if not impossible) for any man-made source of law to be 
completely comprehensive,148 the existence of potentially ambiguous provisions remains 
virtually inevitable.149  Thus, interpretation is acceptable within the civil law tradition.   
 
4. The Civil Law Requires Rules Governing Interpretation so 
that Certainty may be Maintained 
 
It is therefore clear that the civil law tradition demands certainty in the law150 and 
that it requires jurists to interpret the inevitable ambiguities arising therein.151  These 
ambiguities (and their concomitant need for interpretation) does not (and indeed cannot) 
conflict with the EU's preference for legal certainty.152  In other words, the imperfections 
                                                 
148 Baudenbacher, supra note 14, at 336-337 (“The assumption of a complete - and therefore self-sufficient 
- code, however, is at best an historical footnote today; this is the case in every European country. Contrary 
to the theoretical basis of the mechanical theory, most civil codes acknowledge that they are not complete. 
The codes of Austria, France, Italy, and Spain even contain rules providing guidance to judges on how to 
proceed in the case of a gap.  The Swiss Code expressly grants judges the authority to develop judge-made 
law in certain circumstances.  Whether the courts have ever accepted the completeness dogma is 
doubtful."). 
149 GÉNY, supra note 135, § 57, at 78-79 (“As any human work, the statute will always be incomplete.  No 
matter how subtle the human mind may be, it is incapable of a complete synthesis of our world.  This 
deficiency which can not be remedied, is especially noticeable in law…Even if we should imagine the 
impossible, a legislator sufficiently acute to penetrate in all breadth and depth the complete living legal 
order of his time, still we must recognize that he could not foresee and regulate all future legal relations.").  
See also MERRYMAN, supra note 128, at 44 (“[T]he dogma that a code can be complete and coherent fails 
to survive even a cursory glance at the jurisprudence…The books are full of decisions in which the court 
has had to fill gaps in the legislative scheme and reconcile apparently conflicting statutes.  Although the 
text of a statute remains unchanged, its meaning and application often change in response to social 
pressures, and new problems arise that are not even touched on by any existing legislation."). 
150 See supra note 135. 
151 See Section V (b)(3)  supra. 
152 TRIDIMAS, supra note 12, at 245 (“To state the obvious, the use of abstract terms in Community 
legislation does not render the provision in question incompatible with the principle of legal certainty.").  
See also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 98 (2004) ("[Judicial 
discretion does not necessarily undermine legal certainty] if there are shared background understandings or 
customs – either within society or within the legal culture – that inform the application of the broad 
standards.”). 
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of language,153 when coupled with the civil law's overriding interest in the certainty of 
the law, demands recognized and accepted methodologies of juridical interpretation.154   
Among the various methods of interpretation available to civil law jurists, none 
are deemed to be appropriate for all situations at all times.155  Although the first civil law 
treatises concerning interpretative methodologies began to appear over 500 years ago,156 
an overview of permissible methodologies and/or sources is nonetheless necessary.  This 
examination should reveal the sources and/or methodologies civilian jurists are permitted 
to use in their attempts to properly discern the meaning of the term "subsidiarity." 
                                                 
153 GÉNY, supra note 135, § 106, at 207 (“Sometimes it happens that the legislator has not completely and 
precisely articulated the rule he meant to issue.  Such a mental failure is nothing rare in  the sphere of 
manifestations of human will…[These] gaps are equally inevitable in the drafting of legislative acts, 
especially where the legislative thought could not always stop long enough to clarify all the details.”) and 
id. § 15, at 22 (“[T]he thought of the legislator is often not faithfully expressed in the terms he uses.  To a 
legal interpreter, who is to adhere to these terms, the formulation appears obscure, incomplete and therefore 
insufficient to yield the desired solution."). 
154 See MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 103 (“[T]he series of procedures or method associated with 
interpretation…operates as a sort of algorithm for the performance of a difficult operation: Erasmus 
illustrates the need for method in such circumstances by evoking the physical problem involved in moving 
a heavy weight; many hands can attempt the task, but success will only come through a methodical 
approach."). 
155 Baudenbacher, supra note 14, at 348-349 (“The findings of legal hermeneutics have laid to rest the last 
possible notion among scholars that the right result of interpretation can be deduced from the written law 
by way of mechanical application of a certain method. In interpreting the law, the judge necessarily leaves 
his or her own mark on it...Since the theories of hermeneutics have been accepted by most of the scholars, 
the search for the be-all and end-all method of legal interpretation has been practically abandoned.").  
156 MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 84 (“The first monographs to appear on the subject [of legal interpretation] 
are difficult to date with precision: Matthaeus Mathesilanus' short Tractatus extensionis ex utroque iure 
eleucubratus, [was] probably produced around 1435…the De interpretatione legis extensiva of 
Bartolomaeus Caepolla, who was writing in the 1460s, is longer and divided into chapters, prefaced by a 
general account of extensive interpretation.  Constantinus Rogerius' Tracatus de iuris interpretatione, dated 
1463, is more comprehensive still, and obviously designed to fulfil a pedagogical purpose[.]”). 
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 ii. Some Acceptable Methods of Interpretation within the Civil Law 
Tradition 
 
 
As a general rule, courts in civil law jurisdictions may utilize virtually every 
conceivable method of interpretation in order to effectively adjudicate legal disputes.157  
In most (if not all) cases, however, judges are only permitted to interpret the law when its 
express provisions are unclear.158  When this is the case, judges should usually begin the 
                                                 
157 PLANIOL, supra note 131, § 224, at 162 (“The jurist, truly worthy of the name, is not satisfied with 
merely solving practical questions.  He weighs and judges laws.  To do so, he should be able to criticize 
competently.  This he cannot do without bringing into play resources of a wide intellectual culture.  The 
history of the law will make known to him the origin of the institutions.  Political economy will reveal to 
him the practical results achieved by them.  Comparative law will acquaint him with points of comparison 
taken from different legal systems.  It is only under these conditions that the law can fulfill its mission.”); 
and id. § 204, at 152 (“Judicial interpretation is free in principle.  Every tribunal may adopt the solution 
which it considers the most just and the best.  It is bound neither by decisions which it may have handed 
down previously in analogous cases nor by those of a higher court.”).  See also GÉNY, supra note 135, § 15, 
at 22 (“In similar cases…it is necessary to rely on the improperly so called logical interpretation which, as 
Jhering has shown, consists of a search for the meaning of the statute in the intent of the author, without 
paying attention to the words…[I]t is necessary to inquire by other means into the legislative will which 
inspired it, in order to confirm, correct, supplement and widen or narrow the letter.  So one looks for the 
intention of the legislator, by all available means referring in this process to circumstances far outside the 
statute itself, especially those which have accompanied its birth and which, aptly treated, make it possible 
to fructify the statute and multiply its effects.”); CRAIES, supra note 77, § 18.1.3, at 557 ("Recent 
developments…combine both [literal and purposive interpretation] to produce and reflect a situation in 
which it is now beyond doubt that the courts will go to any sensible length to discern and give effect to the 
underlying policy intention of legislation, and that in construing a statute they will use all kinds of material 
available to them as tools to discover that intention."); Roger Perrot, The Judge: The Extent and Limit of 
His Role in Civil Matters, 50 TUL. L. REV. 495, 500 (1976) (“[I]t would be incomprehensible if one had to 
limit himself to a banal inquiry into the legislative will. The truth is that beyond all the exegetical analyses, 
the civil judge remains fundamentally attached to the principle of autonomy of the will and to the climate 
of economic liberalism of which he is the expression.”); Baudenbacher, supra note 14, at 345-346 (“It is, 
however, safe to affirm that civil law courts do not rule out any method of interpretation, and that no order 
of priority of the single elements of interpretation exists. That means that a court might in one case come to 
the conclusion that the right solution should be derived from the text of a provision. In another case the 
court may rely on the legislative history, on contextual interpretation, or on the purpose (the telos) of the 
provision. According to widespread opinion, courts should go through all the mentioned elements of 
interpretation.  The balance, however, will often tip in favor of purposive interpretation. In following that 
approach, courts tend to take into account the social reality at the time of the application of the law.”); and 
id. at 358 (“With regard to the methods of interpretation, it is fair to say that purposive interpretation plays a 
crucial role in all civil law countries and that it clearly prevails in the case law of the European courts."). 
158 MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 89 (“Bartolus, following D 1. 3. 12 and D 1. 3. 23, claims that judges may 
interpret the law 'nisi verba essent plana, quia tunc non potest aliter interpretari quam verba loquuntur' 
(except in cases when the words are clear: in these cases it is not possible to interpret in any other way than 
according to the literal meaning)[.]”).  See also GÉNY, supra note 135, § 14, at 21 (“The legal rule is clear, 
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task of interpreting the relevant ambiguity by examining the literal meaning of the words 
used159 and supplementing that meaning with the sometimes elusive "historic intent, the 
legal context or framework of the norm to be interpreted, teleological considerations, and 
the legislative purpose or the ratio legis."160  Thus, in the event that a jurist encounters an 
unclear provision within the civil law, they should (as a general rule)161 first seek to 
ascertain the intention of the relevant legislator(s).162     
Although Gény recognizes that French lawyers of his time claimed to objectively 
analyze legislative intent,163 he counters that their efforts were erroneously conceived 
                                                                                                                                                 
precise, well constructed.  It suffices to carefully analyze its content, weigh its concepts and relate it to 
facts.  The wisely set up organism functions in such a case automatically and it would be dangerous and 
against its purpose to try to go too far into it.  We shall be halted by one of the maxims which synthesize 
the wisdom of generations of lawyers: 'When the law is clear, one must not go against the text under the 
pretext of discovering its spirit.'”); J. WALTER JONES, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LAW 
51-52 (1940) (“And Portalis was no less alive than Savigny to the danger of arbitrariness if judges were not 
inspired by scientific aims.  Where the statute is clear the judge need only study its terms; when it is vague 
he should turn to well-established custom, an uninterrupted series of decisions, or an accepted juristic 
opinion or maxim, for 'these take the place of the statue'; when it is silent, and the faces are new, he must 
resort to equity or 'natural law'.  And to Portalis this natural law is no other than legal science, for the judge 
should be inspired by that 'spirit of the law' which is above the statutes themselves."). 
159 See, e.g., C. CIV. (Louisiana) ["LA. C. CIV."], at art. 11 (“The words of a law must be given their 
generally prevailing meaning.  Words of art and technical terms must be given their technical meaning 
when the law involves a technical matter."), available at http://www.legis.state.la.us/ (last visited 20 
November 2007).   
160 Wolfgang Oehler, Working with a Code: Is there a Difference Between Civil-Law and Common-Law 
People?, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 711, 715 (1997). 
161 But see Baudenbacher, supra note 14, at 348 (“The findings of legal hermeneutics have laid to rest the 
last possible notion among scholars that the right result of interpretation can be deduced from the written 
law by way of mechanical application of a certain method."). 
162 See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 99, at 726 (“Civil law courts are to take into account not only the express 
grammatical provisions of the code section, but they are also to consider the legislative intent and the social 
goal of the provision. This is sometimes referred to as the 'teleological approach' – that is, interpreting 
legislation in light of evolving societal or market forces.”) and William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: 
Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 704 (2000) (“In civil law 
jurisdictions, the first step in interpreting an ambiguous law, according to Mazeaud, is to discover the 
intention of the legislator by examining the legislation as a whole, including the 'travaux preparatoires,' as 
well as the provisions more immediately surrounding the obscure text.").  See also IAN S. FORRESTER, 
SIMON L. GOREN, AND HANS-MICHAEL ILGREN, THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE (AS AMENDED TO JANUARY 
1975) § 133 (1975) ("In interpreting a declaration of intention the true intention shall be sought without 
regard to the declaration's literal meaning.") and C. CIV., § 133 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/german_civil_code.pdf (last visited 26 October 2007). 
163 GÉNY, supra note 135, § 25, at 35.  
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insofar as they supplanted that intent with their own.164  This practice was (and remains) 
unacceptable because it clearly "suppress[es] the precision and stability which are the 
capital merit and salient advantage of written law."165  Instead, Gény observes that the 
very etymology of the word "interpretation" requires strict adherence to the intention of 
the legislator.166  Planiol appears to concur with Gény's assessment167 and advocates an 
examination of preparatory studies because the law-makers' thoughts are often contained 
                                                 
164 Id. (“The use of this method not only makes the interpreters rectify the thought and will of the 
legislator…it leads to the substitution of their own ideas for the ideas of the statute and even to a complete 
remaking of the statute.  But [those practitioners] pose clearly as spokesmen for the authors of the statute 
and use their procedure of construction satisfied that they are completely faithful to the basic postulate of 
their method[.]”). 
165 GÉNY, supra note 135, § 97, at 180 (“I agree that the statute, once enacted, separates itself from the 
person of the legislator.  But we still have to recognize that he left it filled with his thought and intent; 
otherwise we have to consider the text an empty vessel which everybody can fill according to his pleasure.  
To authorize such freedom is nothing less than to suppress the precision and stability which are the capital 
merit and the salient advantage of written law.").  See also FOUILLÉE, ET AL, supra note 130, § 85 at 114 
(“That system which separates the text from the legislator's thought, giving it an independent existence, 
subject to the law of evolution and subordinate to its social environment, substitutes the interpreter's 
purpose for that of the law, and sacrifices the very essence of the law, namely the deliberate conscious will 
of the legislator, the meaning of which is fixed when this will is formulated.”) and id. § 93, at 123, citing 
ALFRED MARTIN, OBSERVATIONS SUR LES POUVOIRS ATTRIBUÉS AS JUGE PAR LE CODE CIVIL SUISSE 16 
(“But it must nevertheless not be forgotten that the law is above all an expression of declared will.  What 
security could there be in the legal system of a country whose judges, under pretext of recognizing 
insensible changes in the law, ‘should claim the right of attributing to such and such an article the meaning 
which it would have if it had been drawn up by them?”). 
166 GÉNY, supra note 135, § 20, at 20 (“It is not always easy to discover in this process what is textual 
interpretation proper and what is more.  All depends on how broad a meaning one gives to the concept of 
interpretation.  If it is understood, as the very etymology of the word indicates, as a simple diagnosis of a 
will (legislative intent) expressed in a formula (statutory text), one can not deny that no matter how much 
this field of legal diagnosis may be broadened, certain current practices go far beyond these limits and refer 
to ideas completely extraneous to the text and superior to its formulae.").  See also id. § 106, at 206 (“I 
think the first thing to banish from the legitimate sphere of statutory interpretation is any search which aims 
not at the effective and expressed intent of the legislator, but at what rule he would have adopted had he 
directed his thinking on the particular objective.").  C.f. Barnes, supra note 99, at 726-727 (“Civil law 
courts are to take into account not only the express grammatical provisions of the code section, but they are 
also to consider the legislative intent and the social goal of the provision.…[The judge asks] himself what 
would have been their intent if the same article had been framed by them today. He must say to himself that 
in the light of all changes that have occurred in the course of a century of ideas, ethical standards, and 
institutions, in view of the economic and social conditions now prevailing in France, justice and reason 
direct him to adapt the statutory text, liberally and with humanity, to the realities and needs of modern 
life."). 
167 PLANIOL, supra note 131, § 224A, at 163 (“The authors of the Civil Code had no intention of 
eliminating from the interpretation of texts that considerable degree of liberty which had existed under the 
old law…During the greater part of the XIX Century, the dominant method of interpretation of laws 
followed in the French schools was that of an analysis of the text of the law and an endeavor to ascertain 
the thought of the law-maker.  This exegetical method is common to all great French civilians.  It, however, 
was used by each of them, more or less rigorously, according to his temperament."). 
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therein.168  Finally, jurists within the civil law tradition are encouraged to consult history 
when a relevant record is available.169  This investigation into historical jurisprudence 
can effectively chronicle the development of legal norms while simultaneously 
elucidating the nature of that development.170  
 
iii. The Application of Civil Law Interpretative Methodologies 
 
Jurists play a significant role in construing the law in civil law systems171 and 
may utilize virtually every conceivably method of interpretation to adjudicate legal 
disputes.  As demonstrated above, they must generally begin their examination of an 
ambiguous term by ascertaining its literal meaning and supplementing it with (inter alia) 
historical intent and teleological considerations.  Attempts to ascertain the literal meaning 
of "subsidiarity," however, purportedly encounter numerous difficulties.172  Therefore, a 
dictionary appears to be a logical place to seek its literal meaning173 and/or etymology.174
                                                 
168 Id. § 218, at 159 (“The first thing to be done to dissipate doubt, is to consult the preparatory studies 
leading up to the making of the law…There the thought which guided the law-making is often explained."). 
169 JONES, supra note 158, at 52, citing FENET, INTERROGEONS L'HISTORIE, ELLE EST LA PHYSIQUE 
EXPÉRIMENTALE DE LA LEGISLATION, vi, 37 (“Codes are not made, they grow.  Whenever possible, we must 
consult history, 'the experimental laboratory of legislation'."). 
170 CARLETON LEE, supra, note 132, at 6 (“Historical Jurisprudence [sic] deals with law as it appears in its 
various forms and at its several stages of development.  It holds fast the thread which binds together the 
modern and the primitive conceptions of law, and seeks to trace…the line of connection between them.  It 
takes up custom as enforced by the community, and traces its development.  It seeks to discover the first 
emergence of those legal conceptions which have become a part of the world's common store of law, to 
show the conditions that gave rise to them, to trace their spread and development, and to point out those 
conditions and influences which modified them in the varying course of their existence."). 
171 Baudenbacher, supra note 14, at 354. 
172 REV. JOHN J. KELLEY, S.M., FREEDOM IN THE CHURCH: A DOCUMENTED HISTORY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTION 14 (2000) (“The word 'subsidiary' has many entanglements and thus it has been a 
trap for the finest minds in the world."). 
173 See CRAIES, supra note 77, § 27.1.2, at 667, citing R. v. Peters, (1886) 16 Q.B.D. 636, 641 ("I am quite 
aware that dictionaries are not to be taken as authoritative exponents of the meanings of words used in Acts 
of Parliament, but it is a well-known rule of courts of law that words should be taken to be used in their 
ordinary sense, and we are therefore sent for instruction to these books.").  See also BENNION, supra note 
10, § 375, at 1046, quoting R v. Peters (1886) 16 QBD 636 at 641 ("Most judges allow their putative 
memories to be refreshed by the citation of dictionaries and other works of reference.  Lord Coleridge said 
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As a general rule, any dictionary utilized in juridical interpretation should be 
"well known and authoritative."175  The Second Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary 
["OED"] is generally deemed to satisfy these criteria.176  Its entry for "subsidiarity" reads 
as follows: 
 
"[trans. G. subsidiarität (1931, paraphrasing Pope Pius XI in Rundschreiben über die 
gesellschaftliche Ordnung (Quadragesimo Anno § 80); cf. F. subsidiarité and 
SUBSIDIARY a.]  The quality of being subsidiary; spec. the principle that a central 
authority should have a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be 
performed effectively at a more immediate or local level."177
 
 
 
The entry proceeds to list six separate publications in chronological order that utilized the 
term "subsidiarity" between 1936 and 1982.  The first five are directly related to the 
Church.  Thus, between the definition itself and the five subsequent entries concerning its 
use, it would appear that the OED readily recognizes that the term both 1) originates 
within the Catholic tradition178 and 2) it subordinates the role of centralized powers to 
more localized ones.   
                                                                                                                                                 
of dictionaries [sic] 'it is a well-known rule of courts of law that words should be taken to be used in their 
ordinary sense, and we are therefore sent for instruction to these books.'"). 
174 BENNION, supra note 10, § 375, at 1046 ("Dictionaries can be used to arrive at the etymology of the 
word, which may guide the court."). 
175 Id. § 375, at 1046, quoting Per Cozens-Hardy MR in Camden (Marquess) v. IRC [1914] 1 KB 641 at 
647 ("A dictionary cited should be 'well-known and authoritative.'"). 
176 At least one article refers to the OED as, "the most authoritative historical dictionary of English[.]"  
(Carol E. Jordan, Karen Quinn, and Bradley Jordan, and Celia R. Daileader, Stalking: Cultural, Clinical 
and Legal Considerations, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 513, 525-526 (2000)) while another calls it, "the generally 
accepted authority for the early usage of words." (G. Robert Blakely and Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free 
Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 B.Y.U.L. REV. 829, n. 656 (2002)).   
177 17 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 59 (2d ed. 1989). 
178 But see id. ("The 'principle of subsidiarity' – a meaningless or even misleading phase in English, is being 
discussed in the European Parliament in connection with the eventual revision of the Treaty of Rome.  It is 
defined to mean that the European Community's activities should be limited to those which are better 
performed in common than by member states individually.").  Although some may foreseeably argue that 
this sixth and final entry from 1982 represents a superseding definition, such an argument would be 
misguided.  More specifically, the author of the Times article from which this excerpt is taken both 1) 
speculates that the term is either meaningless or misleading and 2) arguably utilizes an inaccurate 
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   The civil law also encourages an examination of preparatory studies.  However, a 
cursory examination of documents leading up to the relevant intergovernmental 
conferences179 reveals few meaningful additions to the development of the subsidiarity 
principle.180  There are, however, a few notable exceptions that may warrant future 
analysis.181
                                                                                                                                                 
definition.  Although some may perceive the author's definition to be accurate, there does not appear to be 
any official European Union documentation concerning a definition of subsidiarity that refers to activities 
"which are better performed in common."  As a consequence, an examination of this entry could reasonably 
justify an examination of subsidiarity's ecclesiological development insofar as it clearly refers to its origin 
within the Catholic Church without providing an official or agreed upon superseding definition.  But see 
Williams, supra note 93, at 142 (“Historical or etymological meaning is simply the ordinary meaning of the 
word, or of the parts from which it is compounded, at some period of the past.  It is an unreliable guide to 
the present meaning of a word, because meanings change."). 
179 See RICHARD CORBETT, THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT: FROM CONCEPTION TO RATIFICATION: A 
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE (1993). 
180 Specifically, this examination included the following documents, all of which expressly invoked the 
term subsidiarity and can be found in CORBETT, supra note 179:  1) Resolution on the intergovernmental 
conference decided at the European Council in Madrid, 19 November 1989; 2) Resolution on the 
Intergovernmental Conference in the context of Parliament's strategy for European Union, 14 March 1990 
(Martin I Report); 3) Resolution on Economic and Monetary Union, 16 May 1990 (Herman Report); 4) 
Belgian Government's Memorandum of 20 March 1990; 5) Resolution on the Intergovernmental 
Conference in the context of Parliament's strategy for European Union, 11 July 1990 (Martin II Report); 6) 
Resolution on the principle of subsidiarity, 12 July 1990 (Giscard d'Estaing Report); 7) Dutch Government 
1st Memorandum, May 1990 ("Possible Steps Towards European Political Union"); 8) Report of the 
Foreign Ministers on the need for treaty changes for political union, presented to Dublin II European 
Council, 25-26 June 1990; 9) European Commission, Proposal for a draft treaty amending the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community with a view to achieving economic and monetary union, 
21 August 1990; 10) Danish Government Memorandum, approved by the Market Committee of the 
Folketing, 4 October 1990; 11) European Commission, Formal opinion pursuant to Article 236 of the EEC 
Treaty on the proposal for amendment of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community with 
a view to political union, 21 October 1990; 12) Dutch government, Policy document on European Political 
Union presented to the Parliament, 26 October 1990; 13) United Kingdom Parliament, Extract from House 
of Lords select committee on the European Communities Twenty-Seventh Report: Economic and Monetary 
Union and Political Union, 30 October 1990; 14) Italian Council Presidency, Institutional Conference on 
Political Union: report of 16 November 1990; 15) Conference of Parliaments of the European Community 
("Assizes"), Final Declaration adopted on 30 November 1990; and 16) European People's Party Dublin 
Congress Document: For a federal constitution of the European Union, 15-16 November 1990. 
181 See, e.g., 1) Belgian Government's Memorandum of 20 March 1990, § III, reprinted in CORBETT, supra 
note 179, at 123 ("At a time when the development of the European enterprise is leading to a major transfer 
of legislative power at the Community level, it is essential that the principle of subsidiarity be formally 
written in to the Treaty, for example in the form in which it was expressed in the draft Spinelli Treaty: 'The 
Union shall only act to carry out those tasks which may be undertaken more effectively in common than by 
Member States acting separately, in particular those whose execution requires action by the Union because 
their dimension or effects extend beyond national frontiers.'"); 2) Dutch Government 1st Memorandum, 
May 1990 ("Possible Steps Towards European Political Union"), § VII, reprinted in CORBETT, supra note 
179, at 133 ("[Taking the principle of subsidiarity into account] implies that when decisions are to be taken 
at Community level the question of whether this constitutes a more effective way of fulfilling the 
responsibilities of government towards individuals citizens must first be answered affirmatively…As long 
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as we are still on the road to integration, the principle can only be applied in a flexible manner which at 
each step compels us to consider whether the benefits achieved have an added value which more than 
compensates for the further distancing of the public from the decision-making process."); 3) Danish 
Government Memorandum, approved by the Market Committee of the Folketing, 4 October 1990, § VII 
(B), reprinted in CORBETT, supra note 179, at 163 ("In the area of fiscal and budgetary policy of the 
individual Member States the Treaty must reflect the principle of subsidiarity.  It must furthermore be clear 
that the Council will not be able to take legally binding decisions on any Member State's budget surplus or 
deficit or its revenue and expenditure, just as distribution policy must remain a national matter.  Anything 
else would be unacceptable to the national parliaments."); 4) European Commission, Formal opinion 
pursuant to Article 236 of the EEC Treaty on the proposal for amendment of the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community with a view to political union, 21 October 1990, § IV (2), reprinted in 
CORBETT, supra note 179, at 170 ("The question of subsidiarity is closely linked to the redefinition of 
certain powers.  The Commission considers that this common-sense principle should be written into the 
Treaty, as suggested by Parliament in its draft treaty on European Union."); 5) Dutch government, Policy 
document on European Political Union presented to the Parliament, 26 October 1990, § 1.6, reprinted in 
CORBETT, supra note 179, at 176 ("[T]here will be a need for political judgments to be made case by case.  
It is not possible to freeze the division of powers between the Community and the Member States.  This is 
why in the discussions in Brussels the Netherlands has rejected the idea of so-called positive and negative 
lists respectively granting or not granting powers exclusively to the Community.  The Netherlands would 
prefer to have a generally applicable provision, for example in the Preamble to the EEC Treaty….The 
Government believes that unnecessary centralization should indeed be avoided.  As was successfully done 
in the case of removing technical obstacles to trade, we should pursue integration through decentralized 
methods where possible."); 6) United Kingdom Parliament, Extract from House of Lords select committee 
on the European Communities Twenty-Seventh Report: Economic and Monetary Union and Political 
Union, 30 October 1990, at ¶ 216, reprinted in CORBETT, supra note 179, at 190 ("The principle of 
subsidiarity should be written into the Treaty, but should not be justiciable before the Court.  The balance 
between Community action and national action should remain a political responsibility.")  C.f. Italian 
Council Presidency, Institutional Conference on Political Union: report of 16 November 1990, § 4 (b), 
reprinted in CORBETT, supra note 179, at 196 ("[R]espect for subsidiarity involving post-control in the 
exercising of competence could be entrusted to the Court of Justice, especially from the viewpoint of 
correlation between means and goals."); 7) Conference of Parliaments of the European Community 
("Assizes"), Final Declaration adopted on 30 November 1990, pmbl, art. E, reprinted in CORBETT, supra 
note 179, at 198 ("[Conference of Parliaments of the European Community] proposing that, in keeping with 
the subsidiarity principle, only those powers should be conferred on the common institutions that are 
necessary for the proper discharge of the Union's duties."); § 23 ("Takes the view that any allocation of new 
powers to the Union must be based on the subsidiarity principle, i.e., the Union will only act to discharge 
the duties conferred on it by the Treaties and to attain the objectives laid down therein; where powers have 
not been exclusively or completely assigned to the Union, it shall act to the extent that the attainment of 
these objectives requires its intervention because their scope or their implications transcend Member States 
frontiers or because they can be carried out more effectively by the Union than by the Member States 
acting alone[.]") and § 24 ("Takes the view that the subsidiarity principle must be enshrined in the preamble 
to the Treaties, and that, as regards interpretation, there must be scope for a priori political evaluation, 
while enabling the Court of Justice to confirm a posteriori the extent of the powers of the Community; 
considers that the principle of subsidiarity must be consolidated in amending the Treaties, and its substance 
clearly defined[.]"); and 8) European People's Party Dublin Congress Document: For a federal constitution 
of the European Union, 15-16 November 1990, Chapter I-B, ¶ 15, reprinted in CORBETT, supra note 179, at 
203 ("The subsidiarity principle must be the basis for distribution amongst the Union, the Member States, 
and the regions – i.e. action taken by the Union will be subsidiary.  The Union should be granted those 
powers which it can make best use or of which it will have sole use.  In other words, the Union will have 
powers in those areas where it can act more effectively than Member States working alone, particularly in 
cases where the scale or the effects of the action go beyond national frontiers.").  See also CORBETT, supra 
note 179, at 18 ("Parliament also advocated the entrenchment in the Treaties of the principle of subsidiarity.  
This principle was often quoted by federalists as the basis for allocating competences between different 
tiers of government.  It had been mentioned in Parliament's 1984 draft Treaty on European Union, since 
when its use in the English language had blossomed…There was broad agreement on the idea of spelling 
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 Finally, the civil law tradition appears to expressly authorize jurists to consult 
historical records if they are available.  Here, the ecclesiological development of 
subsidiarity appears to qualify as a historical record and is clearly available (at least in 
part) as evidenced in Section VI infra.  
 
 
iv. Conclusions Concerning the Application of Civil Law 
Interpretative Methodologies 
 
 
 
Thus, although the civil law clearly prohibits interpretation if a provision is clear, 
it permits jurists to utilize virtually every conceivable method to clarify ambiguities.  
Although jurists should arguably examine relevant preparatory studies in search of this 
intent, they are by no means limited to this source alone.  Ultimately, jurists should strive 
to ascertain both the legislative intent and the purpose of the law itself without replacing 
that intent with their own.  Jurists may also consult reliable historical records concerning 
ambiguous terms when they are available.  Although there is a perfectly valid argument 
that the jurists should accord the intent of the legislator less importance as more time 
passes,182 this argument has little to no impact in this case because the provision in 
question was only codified fifteen years ago. 
                                                                                                                                                 
out the principle of subsidiarity in the Treaty, but in view of the highly divergent interpretations given to 
the term, the exact formulation became a matter of controversy.  Some Members advocated a 'positive' 
definition ('the Union shall carry out those tasks…') whilst others felt that a 'negative' definition ('the Union 
shall carry out only those tasks…') was more reassuring to the Member States in what would effect always 
be a political judgment.  In the end, Parliament opted for the 'negative' definition, but specified that the 
Community should act wherever most effective."). 
182 Zweigat and Puttfarken, supra note 8, at 712 (“It is another result of this historical development of 
different meanings of a legal rule that there is a proportion between the age of the rule and the weight of its 
'legislative intention': as for a recent statute, there is a presumption that its meaning as intended by its 
draftsmen in the legislature should be its actual meaning; however, the older a statute, the more legitimate 
is a method of interpretation which frees itself from the ideas of the historic legislator and attempts to find 
its meaning from different criteria based on the conditions of today.").  See also id. at 709-710 (“[E]very 
case which presents an issue of statutory interpretation is a case of today, i.e., an actual conflict of interests. 
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c. Similarities Between Common Law and Civil Law Interpretative 
Methodologies 
 
 
Both the civil law and the common law traditions recognize that the law is plainly 
incapable of adequately foreseeing or addressing every conceivable conflict,183 that 
ambiguities within the law are inevitable,184 that rules for interpreting those ambiguities 
                                                                                                                                                 
However, facts and values of society and standards of social behavior change in the course of time, and 
they do so at an ever-increasing rate. Value judgments made by the historic legislator may have lost their 
basis and, consequently, their validity under the social conditions of today. Were the judge to decide a case 
on an historical interpretation of a statute, the law would be petrified in the value judgments of the historic 
legislator."). 
183 Compare PUFENDORF, supra note 83, at 85 (*96) ("[N]ot all cases can be foreseen, or stated, on account 
of their infinite variety[.]") and GOODRICH, supra note 98, at 37 (“In practice the judiciary are involved in 
interpreting words and phrases whose meaning is unclear, dealing with lacunae within a text which 
purports to be a complete exposition of the law and applying the code to situations which could not have 
been foreseen by the legislature.") with FOUILLÉE, et. al., supra note 130, § 93, at 122 (“No one can believe 
in this day that the written law is all-sufficing[.]”) and Cueto-Rua, supra note 145, at 168-169 (“The law in 
force in any community is never static, rigid, unchangeable…Developments in legislation, in customary 
behavior, in judicial practices, and in doctrinal contributions may give new life, greater energy, and 
unexpected possibilities to the articles of the Civil Code.").  See also Barnes, supra note 99, at 722, citing 
Angelo Piero Sereni, The Code and the Case Law, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON-LAW 
WORLD 62 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1956) ("Those changing and petty details with which the legislator 
ought not to be preoccupied and all those matters that it would be futile and even dangerous to attempt to 
foresee and to define in advance, we leave to the courts."). 
184 Compare SEDGWICK, supra note 99, at 225 (“The imperfection of language is a serious evil when it 
occurs in those legislative commands on which the repose, discipline, and well-being of society depend.  In 
regard to laws, as in other cases, difficulties will arise, in the first place from the disputed meaning of 
individual words, or, as is usually said, of the language employed; and in the second place, assuming the 
sense of each separate word to be clear, doubt will result from the whole context."); and Holmes, supra 
note 87, at 418 (“By the theory of our language, while other words may mean different things, a proper 
name means one person or thing and no other.  If language perfectly performed its function, as Bentham 
wanted to make it, it would point out the person or thing named in every case.  But under our random 
system it sometimes happens that your name is idem sonans with mine, and it may be the same even in 
spelling.  But it never means you or me indifferently.  In theory of speech your name means you and my 
name means me, and the two names are different.  They are different words…In such a case we let in 
evidence of intention not to help out what theory recognizes as an uncertainty of speech, and to read what 
the writer meant into what he has tried but failed to say, but, recognizing that he has spoken with theoretic 
certainty, we inquire what he meant in order to find out what he has said.”) with GÉNY, supra note 135, § 
106, at 207 (“Sometimes it happens that the legislator has not completely and precisely articulated the rule 
he meant to issue.  Such a mental failure is nothing rare in  the sphere of manifestations of human 
will…[These] gaps are equally inevitable in the drafting of legislative acts, especially where the legislative 
thought could not always stop long enough to clarify all the details."). 
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should be established,185 and that jurists should not seek to interpret statutes or provisions 
that are clear on their face.186  Further, both recognize that words have no inherent 
                                                 
185 Compare MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 103 (“[T]he series of procedures or method associated with 
interpretation…operates as a sort of algorithm for the performance of a difficult operation: Erasmus 
illustrates the need for method in such circumstances by evoking the physical problem involved in moving 
a heavy weight; many hands can attempt the task, but success will only come through a methodical 
approach.") with LIEBER, supra note 83, at viii (“[I]n countries, in which the law is allowed to make its own 
way, immutable principles and fixed rules for interpreting and construing them, should be generally 
acknowledged, or if they exist already, in a scattered state, should be gathered and clearly represented, so 
that they may establish themselves along with the laws, as part and branch of the common law of free 
countries.");  F.A.R. BENNION, UNDERSTANDING COMMON LAW LEGISLATION: DRAFTING AND 
INTERPRETING 5 (2001) ("[The courts in all common law countries] still mostly observe the principles of 
the common law when it comes to statutory interpretation.  It is therefore important that the uniform 
principles should be spelt out and generally known."); PUFENDORF, supra note 83, at 83 (*93) ("Hence, for 
a right understanding of laws, as well as of agreements, and for the performance of the duty involved, it is 
of the greatest importance to establish rules of sound interpretation, for words especially, as the commonest 
sign."). 
186 Compare ENDLICH, supra note 113, at 6, quoting Western Un. Tel. Co. v. District of Columbia, 2 Centr. 
Rep. 694 (“When, indeed, the language is not only plain but admits of but one meaning, the task of 
interpretation can hardly be said to arise (and 'those incidental rules which are mere aids, to be invoked 
when the meaning is clouded, are not to be regarded').”); id., citing Law of N., b. 2, s. 263 (“It is not 
allowable, says Vattel, to interpret what has no need of interpretation.”) and HRICIK, supra note 77, at 96 
(Arguing that even strict textualists believe that it is proper to analyze supplementary materials if the text in 
question "is either ambiguous or absurd."), citing Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 125 S. Ct. 460, 
471 (2004) (Thomas, J. concurring) ("If the text…[is] clear, resort to anything else [is] unwarranted.") with 
MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 89 (“Bartolus, following D 1. 3. 12 and D 1. 3. 23, claims that judges may 
interpret the law 'nisi verba essent plana, quia tunc non potest aliter interpretari quam verba loquuntur' 
(except in cases when the words are clear: in these cases it is not possible to interpret in any other way than 
according to the literal meaning)[.]”); GÉNY, supra note 135, § 14, at 21 (“The legal rule is clear, precise, 
well constructed.  It suffices to carefully analyze its content, weigh its concepts and relate it to facts.  The 
wisely set up organism functions in such a case automatically and it would be dangerous and against its 
purpose to try to go too far into it.  We shall be halted by one of the maxims which synthesize the wisdom 
of generations of lawyers: 'When the law is clear, one must not go against the text under the pretext of 
discovering its spirit.'”); LA. C. CIV., supra note 159, at art. 13 (“When the law is clear and free from all 
ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”); JONES, supra 
note 158, at 51-52 (“Where the statute is clear the judge need only study its terms[.]"); Thomas W. Tucker, 
Interpretations of the Louisiana Civil Codes, 1808-1840: The Failure of the Preliminary Title, 19 TUL. 
EUR. & CIV. L.F. 57, 82-83 (2004) (“Grammatical interpretation is one based on the meaning of the 
words… Logical is based …'upon the intention of the legislator'…If a grammatical interpretation provides 
a solution, it excludes the use of a logical one.”) (internal citations omitted); James L. Dennis, 
Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 
1, 6-7 (1993) (“Gény's theory of 'free scientific research' provides that judges are bound by the text of the 
written law only when, and to the extent that, the text is clear. Otherwise, they must consider, within the 
context of the basic principles and values reflected in the legal system as a whole, the social, economic, and 
moral factors involved in the particular case and arrive at a rule that best promotes justice and social utility 
for the given situation.”); and LA. C. CIV., supra note 159, at art. 9 (“When a law is clear and unambiguous 
and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further 
interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.”). 
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meaning187 and that they should generally be interpreted according to their popular 
meaning.188  Additionally, both traditions agree that if the ambiguity in question is a 
technical term of art, then the authoritative definition should be the one that is utilized by 
those who are trained in that particular art.189  Furthermore, it appears that both the civil 
and common law traditions expressly advocate interpreting a term according to the 
                                                 
187 Compare MERRYMAN, supra note 128, at 46 (“Words have no inherent significance; they are supplied 
with meaning by those who use them, and the problem before the judge is to supply meaning when it is not 
clear what the legislator meant when he used the words.  The resort to legislative intent may be helpful in 
some cases, but reconstruction of the historical process of forming and expressing intent in a forum as 
complex as a representative legislature is a very risky enterprise.  In a surprising number of cases, the 
legislative history will show that the legislature did not foresee the problem facing the judge, and 
consequently had no intent concerning it.  Indeed, it is generally agreed among scholars that the search 
should be not for the actual legislative intent, but for the 'intention, spirit, objective content of the norm [i.e. 
statute] itself.'”) and Barnes, supra note 99, at 727 (“When the text presents some ambiguity, when doubts 
arise as to its meaning and scope, when it can to a certain extent be contradicted or contracted or when on 
the contrary expanded through comparison with another text, I believe that the judge has the broadest 
powers of interpretation. He does not need to confine to an obstinate inquiry into the meaning that, in 
framing such and such an article, the framers of the Code had actually intended a hundred years ago. He 
must ask himself what would have been their intent if the same article had been framed by them today. He 
must say to himself that in the light of all changes that have occurred in the course of a century of ideas, 
ethical standards, and institutions, in view of the economic and social conditions now prevailing in France, 
justice and reason direct him to adapt the statutory text, liberally and with humanity, to the realities and 
needs of modern life.”), citing ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL 
LAW SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 1135-36, n.24 (2d Ed., 1977), 
quoting BALLOT BEAUPRE, LE CENTENAIRE DU CODE CIVIL 27 (1904) with Holmes, supra note 87, at 417 
(“It is true that in theory any document purporting to be serious and to have some legal effect has one 
meaning and no other, because the known object is to achieve some definite result.  It is not true that in 
practice (and I know no reason why theory should disagree with the facts) a given word or even a collection 
of words has one meaning and no other.  A word generally has several meanings, even in the dictionary.  
You have to consider the sentence in which it stands to decide which of those meanings it bears in a 
particular case, and very likely will see that it there has a shade of significance more refined than any given 
in the wordbook.") and McGreal, supra note 87. 
188 Compare LA. C. CIV., supra note 159, at art. 11 ("The words of a law must be given their generally 
prevailing meaning.") with BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, *59-60 (“Words are generally to be understood in 
their usual and most known signification; not so much regarding the propriety of grammar, as their general 
and popular use.").  See also PUFENDORF, supra note 83, at 83 (*93) ("With regard to ordinary terms this is 
the rule: words are regularly to be interpreted in their proper and well-known signification, imposed upon 
them not so much by propriety or grammatical analogy or consistency with derivation, as by popular 
usage[.]") and Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 20, at art. 31, 1.A ("A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty[.]").  
189 Compare LA. C. CIV., supra note 159, at art. 11 ("Words of art and technical terms must be given their 
technical meaning when the law involves a technical matter") with BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, *59-60 
(“[T]erms of art, or technical terms, must be taken according to the acceptation of the learned in each art, 
trade, or science.”).  See also ENDLICH, supra note 113, at 4 (“The first and most elementary rule of 
construction is, that it is to be assumed that the words and phrases are used in their technical meaning if 
they have acquired one, and in their popular meaning if they have not[.]”) and PUFENDORF, supra note 83, 
at 83 (*93) ("Terms of the arts are to be explained according to the definitions of men versed in the 
particular art.  But if technical terms are differently defined by different persons, expressing in ordinary 
terms what we mean by the other word makes for the prevention of suits."). 
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legislator's intent,190 even if it seemingly contradicts the meaning of the words that were 
used.191  Finally, both schools recognize that there are circumstances under which the 
meaning of a particular word can acceptably be altered.192
                                                 
190 Compare HERBERT FELIX JOLOWICZ, ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN LAW 8 (1978) (“[W]hereas the 
plain words of a statute need no glossing, for, as Coke said, ‘absoluta sententia expositore non exiget’, it is 
also held that a law must not be applied except in accordance with its purpose, for ‘cessante ratione legis, 
cessat lex ipsa’.”) with CRAIES, supra note 77, § 16.1.4, at  539, citing R. v. Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions and another, Ex p. Spain Holme Ltd. [2001] 2 A.C. 349, 396, HL 
("The task of the court is often said to be to ascertain the intention of Parliament expressed in the language 
under consideration.  This is correct and may be helpful, so long as it is remembered that the 'intention of 
Parliament' is an objective concept, not subjective.  The phrase is a shorthand reference to the intention 
which the court reasonably imputes to Parliament in respect of the language used.  It is not the subjective 
intention of the minister or other persons who promoted the legislation.  Nor is it the subjective intention of 
the draftsman, or of individual members or even of a majority of individual members of either House.  
These individuals will often have widely varying intentions.  Their understanding of the legislation and the 
words used may be impressively complete or woefully inadequate.  Thus, when courts say that such-and-
such a meaning 'cannot be what Parliament intended', they are saying only that the words under 
consideration cannot reasonably be taken as used by Parliament with that meaning.").   
191 Compare BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, *61 ("[T]he most universal and effectual way of discovering the 
true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it; or the 
cause which moved the legislator to enact it.  For when this reason ceases, the law itself ought likewise to 
cease with it.") with GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS, THE HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF ROMAN 
LAW 32 (2003) (“Principles of interpretation relating to legal acts…proceed from the assumption that 
priority should be given to the parties' real intentions…over the words or form in which a legal act had been 
expressed[.]”), citing D. 50. 17. 96. (Marcianus) (“If ambiguous utterances occur, the intention of the 
person who used them should be taken into consideration.”) and MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 115 (“The 
authority quoted for translation according to the sense (spirit) rather than the letter (which often provokes 
also a quotation of St Paul [sic] (2 Cor. 3:6: 'the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life')) is Jerome, whose 
strictures on interpretation in his letter to Pammachus and in his commentary on Galatians are well 
known.”), citing “Jerome, Epistolae, lvii, ad Pammachum, PL, xxii. 568 and Commentarius in Epistolam 
ad Galatas, i.11-12 [vii.386], PL, xxvi.322 (also 473).”  See also Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, supra note 20, at art. 31, 1.A ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in…the light of its object 
and purpose.") and id. at art. 31, 2 ("The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise…the text…its preamble, and annexes[.]").  
192 Compare LIEBER, supra note 83, at 115 (“[T]here are considerations, which ought to induce us to 
abandon interpretation, or with other words to sacrifice the direct meaning of a text to considerations still 
weightier; especially not to slaughter justice, the sovereign object of laws, to the law itself, the means of 
obtaining it.”) with Zweigat and Puttfarken, supra note 8, at 708 (“If a code provision, taken at face value, 
thus ceases to conform to today's standards of law and social order, its meaning has to be changed by 
reinterpretation[.]”); Barnes, supra note 99, at 728 (“Civilians thus view the role of the judiciary, not as 
making law, but as serving a function in assisting in the actualization of the code - the courts add definition 
and sharpness to the code, they fill in the gaps of the code, and they even adjust it to conform to new 
societal pressures and innovations.”); and JOLOWICZ, supra note 190, at 13 (“Benignius leges 
interpretandeae sunt quo cluntas earum conservetur.”), translated in BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1621 (7th 
ed. 1999) (“Laws are to be liberally interpreted so that their intent may be preserved….”). 
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 d. Conclusions Concerning Civil and Common Law Interpretative 
Methodologies 
 
Due to the fact that the term "subsidiarity" is arguably ambiguous, neither civil 
nor common law jurists appear to be categorically precluded from interpreting its 
meaning.  Therefore, even if it is presumed that the word "subsidiarity" has no true 
meaning on its face, it is nonetheless evident that it has both a popular meaning and a 
technical meaning within the Catholic Church.  Further, although both traditions advocate 
the elevation of the legislator's intent over the specific words that were used, there is no 
evidence that the legislators at Maastricht either 1) did not know the meaning of the term 
as it was developed within Catholicism or 2) intended to adopt a definition that diverged 
from either the technical or popular meaning of the term "subsidiarity" within the 
Catholic Church.  Finally, there do not appear to be any overriding circumstances 
demanding an alteration of the term's meaning.  Therefore, it would appear that both the 
civil and common law traditions encourage an examination of subsidiarity's 
ecclesiological development in order to ascertain its meaning within the Treaty of 
Maastricht. 
 
 
VI. THE ECCLESIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SUBSIDIARITY  
 
 
a. Introduction 
 
The legal profession has apparently encountered substantial difficulty identifying 
the origins of subsidiarity.  While Pope Pius XI has been identified as the original 
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proponent of subsidiarity by numerous legal scholars193 (and at least one Catholic 
scholar),194 a review of Catholic scholarship reveals assertions that the doctrine was 
taught and/or practiced by Aristotle195 (384 BCE-322 BCE), Benedictine monks,196 St. 
Bernard197 (~1090-1153), St. Thomas Aquinas198 (~1225-1274), Johannes Althusius199 
                                                 
193 See, e.g., Bermann, supra note 2; Douglas W. Kmiec, Is the American Democracy Compatible with the 
Catholic Faith?, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 69, 72 (1996) (“The principle of subsidiarity was first explicitly 
formulated in 1931 in Quadragesimo Anno.”); Joseph S. Spoerl, Forum on Public Morality: Making Laws 
on Making Babies: Ethics, Public Policy, and Reproductive Technology, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 93, 109 n.27 
(2000) (“In the Roman Catholic moral tradition, the relevant principle is known as 'the principle of 
subsidiarity,' first articulated by Pope Pius XI in his encyclical Quadragesimo Anno.”); Edith Brown Weiss, 
The Rise or the Fall of International Law, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 362 n.58 (2000) (“The principle of 
subsidiarity is arguably rooted in Catholic social theory, where it was first articulated by Pope Pius XI in 
the 1931 encyclical Quadregesimo Anno.”).  See also Jared Bayer, Comment, Re-balancing the State and 
Federal Power: Toward a Political Principle of Subsidiarity in the United States. 53 AM. U.L. REV. 1421, 
1446 (2004); Henkel, supra note 12, at 364 ("In the understanding of the Catholic doctrine, the Principle of 
Subsidiarity was, however, most distinctly enunciated by Pope Pius XI in his encyclical letter 
Quadragesimo Anno, in 1931."); and Peter Judson Richards, Property and Epikeia: Theory, Life and 
Practice in the Western Christian Tradition, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 59, n. 245 (2005) ("The principle 
[of subsidiarity] was most clearly and elaborately stated in the papal encyclical of Pius XI…").  
194 REV. KELLEY, supra note 172, at 12 (“The phrase 'principle of subsidiary function' ('subsidiarii officii 
principium') was used by Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno for the first time."). 
195 See, e.g., HUEGLIN, supra note 118, at 153 (“[Subsidiarity] can be traced back to Aristotle who drew up 
an organic model in which individuals (persons) belonged to groups and groups formed the organs of the 
larger social body. Each group's autonomy had to be respected. The personal principle and subsidiarity 
were strongly connected in the mind of Aristotle, and they developed side by side with the concept of 
federal states.”); ESTELLA, supra note 2, at 77 (“[T]he agreed point of departure for tracing the origins of 
subsidiarity is Aristotle."); Delcamp, supra note 27, at 7, n.2; and Éva Bóka, The Idea of Subsidiarity in the 
European Federalist Thought: A Historical Survey, Working Paper (2005), available at http://www.ivan-
herman.net/Eva/Past/Szubszidiaritaswpaper.pdf (last visited 18 November 2007). 
196 See Section VI (b)(i)(1) infra. 
197 See Linnan, supra note 2, at 419 and 421 (1989) (“Bernard says that to violate the principle of 
subsidiarity is to violate the laws of nature and of [G_d]."). 
198 See CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 762 (“[The doctrine of subsidiarity], though not by name…is contained 
in the writings of Thomas Aquinas about the nature of law and the state.").  See also TRACEY ROWLAND, 
CULTURE AND THE THOMIST TRADITION: AFTER VATICAN II 61 (2003) (“[Alasadir MacIntyre has 
developed] a Thomistic critique of the professionalisation of administration by relying upon an 
interpretation of Aquinas on the subject of authority.  He asserts that Aquinas held that 'what the law is, on 
fundamentals at least, rests with plain persons and that the most important things that lawyers and 
administrators know about the law, they know as plain persons and not as lawyers and administrators'. [sic]  
This is consistent with the traditional principle of 'subsidiarity'[.]”); and Louis B. Ward, Forward to 
Benedict, The Angelus, August 2001, Volume XXIV, Number 8, at 
http://www.sspx.ca/Angelus/2001_August/Benedict.htm (last visited 23 October 2005) (“It will be good to 
recall simply that St. Thomas Aquinas taught that the best political system would fuse monarchy at the 
highest level, aristocracy at a subordinate level and democracy at the lowest level-at the level closest to the 
lives of people, thus giving people real control over the events that effect [sic] them most. This is a type of 
application of the principle of subsidiarity.").  C.f. AD LEYS, ECCLESIOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF THE PRINCIPLE 
OF SUBSIDIARITY 76 n. 68 (1995) (stating that, although O. von Nell Breuning sj [sic] and Hoffner both 
argue (in German) that the principle of subsidiarity is present in both the works of Thomas Aquinas and 
Dante, “this idea does not seem to be historically correct."). 
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(1557-1638), Pope Leo XIII200 (1810-1903), Bishop Wilhelm Emmanuel Freiherr von 
Ketteler201 (1811-1877), F.J. von Buss202 (1803-1878), Heinrich Pesch203 (1854-1926), 
O. von Nell Breuning204 (1890-1991), Gustav Gundlach205 (1892-1963) and Fr. Bernard 
                                                                                                                                                 
199 See Section VI (b)(i)(2) infra. 
200 Henkel, supra note 12, at 363.  See also Thomas A. Shannon, Commentary on Rerum Novarum (The 
Condition of Labor), in MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: COMMENTARIES & INTERPRETATIONS, 
supra note 34, at  141 (“[I]n a sentence anticipating some elements of the later development of the principle 
of subsidiarity, [Pope Leo XIII] says, 'the law must not undertake more, nor go further, than is required for 
the remedy of the evil or the removal of the danger.'”)  C.f., LEYS, supra note 198, at 57 (“One could say 
that Leo did not go beyond the first steps towards subsidiarity because there was no integration of liberal 
thought and the organological concept…because there is no integration Leo could not yet arrive at a 
formulation of the principle of subsidiarity.”). 
201 See LEYS, supra note 198, at 25 (“W.E. von Ketteler…is, in modern catholic [sic] tradition, the first one 
to use the principle of subsidiarity, without formulating it expressly.”) (citation omitted).  See also Virgil P. 
Nemoianu, Foreword to CHANTAL DELSOL, ICARUS FALLEN: THE SEARCH FOR MEANING IN AN UNCERTAIN 
WORLD 11 (2003) (“The term 'subsidiarity' was probably coined by the socio-Catholic essayist Bishop von 
Ketteler…soon after the middle of the nineteenth century. The concept was used…in Leo XIII's celebrated 
encyclical Rerum Novarum and then defined limpidly by Pius XI in 1931 in his Quadragesimo Anno.”), 
available at http://www.isi.org/books/content/343foreword.pdf (last visited 9 July 2007); William R. 
Luckey, Associate Professor and Chairman, Dept. of Political Science and Economics, Christendom 
College, The Intellectual Origins of Modern Catholic Social Teaching on Economics: An Extension of a 
Theme of Jesús Huerta de Soto, at 7, paper presented to the Austrian Scholars Conference at Auburn 
University (23-25 March 2000) (“[I]t is commonly known that [Ketteler] had a great influence on the way 
Pope Leo XIII viewed the economic world.”) (citations omitted) , available at 
http://www.mises.org/journals/scholar/Lucky6.pdf (last visited 9 July 2007); and Delcamp, supra note 27, 
at 11, n.12 (claiming that Ketteler “invented” the term subsidiarity). 
202 Compare LEYS, supra note 198, at 39  (F. J. von Buss (1803-1878) is reported to have written that “the 
individual person, and not the state, must take responsibility for those things he can do; and that, what an 
association of people can do, must be done, not by the state, but by that association.”) with Pope Pius XI, 
Quadragesimo Anno (Papal Encyclical), ¶ 79 (“Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what 
they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an 
injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher 
association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do.”), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-
anno_en.html (last visited 9 July 2007). 
203 Religion as Economic Praxis, http://www.sfecon.com/Religion.htm (last visited 9 July 2007) (“Fr. Pesch 
originated much of the terminology (e.g.: subsidiarity, solidarity) used by the Holy Fathers in guiding us 
away from the Marxian Error.”). 
204 See Marianne Helene Tofte Andersen Groesmeyer, MA Dissertation, The Social Teaching of the Roman 
Catholic Church from a Social Science Perspective, (Chapter 6) (2002) (unpublished MA dissertation, 
University of Copenhagen, Department of Economics) (“The drafting, sub silentio, of the second major 
social encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno, was by Nell-Breuning. Clearly influenced by Pesch's teaching, 
Nell-Breuning introduced the principle of subsidiarity in Quadragesimo Anno, and published shortly after 
the promulgation an extended commentary 'Reorganisation of Social Economy: The Social Encyclical 
Developed and Explained'.”) (internal citations omitted), available at 
http://mariannetofte.tripod.com/id10.html (last visited 9 July 2007).  
205 Anton Rauscher, Gustav Gundlach, S.J.: One of the architects of Christian social thinking, 
http://www.catholic.net/rcc/Periodicals/Homiletic/2002-10/rauscher.html (last visited 9 July 2007) (“In 
preparing the first draft (1930) of Quadragesimo Anno and in analyzing the great disorders of the industrial 
society and threat of the expanding ideologies, [Gundlach] concluded that a complete reorganization of 
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W. Dempsey, S.J.206 (1903-1960).  Other authors have observed that the idea of 
subsidiarity can be found in the writings of Locke207 (1632-1704), Montesquieu208 (1689-
1755), William von Humboldt209 (1767-1835), Alexis de Tocqueville210 (1805-1859), 
President Abraham Lincoln211 (1809-1865) and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon212 (1809-1865).  
Although a review of these scholars reveals substantial disagreement concerning its 
                                                                                                                                                 
society was necessary. Taking into account the economic, social, and political situation of his day, 
Gundlach concluded that society was not adequately fostering individual social talents and abilities, the 
keys to building up society and culture. What had been neglected was the 'principle of subsidiarity.' 
Gundlach was able to formulate for the first time in history a principle that is today acknowledged 
worldwide.").  See also Björn Gehrmann, Br(e)aking Centralization?: Subsidiarity Costs and the European 
Constitutional Treaty, paper submitted to the annual meeting of the European Public Choice Society at the 
University of Durham, at 2 (2005) (“The first notion of subsidiarity can be traced back to German priest 
and social philosopher Gustav Gundlach in the early 20th century.”), available at 
http://www.dur.ac.uk/john.ashworth/EPCS/Papers/Gehrmann.pdf (last visited 9 July 2007), and Paul 
Misner, A Role for Intermediate Bodies in Social Insurance: Precedents in the 'Ghent System' and the 
Weimar Republic (“What Gustav Gundlach was starting to call the principle of subsidiarity was operative 
in this equal participation as well as in the background role of the state in authorizing the labor agencies 
that administered the compulsory contributions.”), available at 
http://www.stthomas.edu/cathstudies/cst/mgmt/images/papers/misner.pdf (last visited 23 October 2005). 
206 KELLEY, supra note 172, at 18 (“In 1936 a translation of [Oswald von Nell-Breuning's] book, 
Reorganization of Social Economy: The Social Encyclical Developed and Explained was published by 
Bruce Publications.  The translator, Fr. Bernard W. Dempsey, S.J., uses the word subsidiarity, apparently 
for the first time in English.”).  See also Ross, supra note 4 (“The first occurrence of subsidiarity in English 
is in 1936, in a translation by B.W. Dempsey of a German work on political economy, which discussed 
Pius's [sic] principle."). 
207 FOUARGE, supra note 53, at 15 (“[T]he State should only have powers that cannot be dealt with at a 
lower level, such as justice and security…[Locke] favoured an individualistic society where the necessity 
of the State arises from the incapacity of entities at lower levels to resolve particular problems.  The main 
task of the State is to safeguard the interests of its citizens.").  See also Endo, supra note 68, at 10-11. 
208 Id.  
209 Id.  
210 See Alain de Benoist, The First Federalist: Johannes Althusius, at 56, at 
http://www.alaindebenoist.com/pdf/the_first_federalist_althusius.pdf (last visited 9 July 2007).  
211 Ken Endo, Subsidiarity & its Enemies: On a Post-National Constitutional Principle of the European 
Union, 11 (“The legitimate object of government is to do for a community of people whatever they need to 
have done but cannot do at all, or cannot so well do for themselves in their separate and individual 
capacities. In all that people can do individually well for themselves, government ought not to interfere.”), 
available at  
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/activitiesnews/conferences/1999_conferences/3rdannualconferenc
e/papers/Endo.pdf (last visited 9 July 2007) citing OSWALD NELL-BREUNING, BAUGESETZE DER 
GESELLSCHAFT: SOLIDARITÄT UND SUBSIDIARITÄT (1990). 
212 Rabinowitz, supra note 58, at 11 (“Of particular interest and importance is a conference on subsidiarity, 
chaired by the Commission President Jacques Delors, and held in Maastricht in 1991, the same year that the 
agreement on the Maastricht Treaty was reached. Tracing the concept back to Proudhon, Delors argued that 
the application of the subsidiarity principle in general would change Community structures completely.”). 
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pedigree, it is clear that its core teachings are very old indeed.213  Thus, in accordance 
with civilian and common law interpretative methodologies (outlined in Section V 
supra), an examination of some of these authors' writings can foreseeably provide 
guideposts that will help identify the meaning of the term "subsidiarity."  
 
b. A Selected Examination of Subsidiarity's Chronological Development  
 
While at least one scholar notes that subsidiarity is "not an exclusive possession 
of the Catholic social doctrine,"214 there is little dispute that Catholic scholars, 
commentators, and ecclesiastical authorities have significantly contributed to its 
development.  European jurisprudence therefore appears to demand an investigation into 
the Church's attempts to systematize the principle of subsidiarity because they are 
potentially capable of revealing the original meaning of the term.215  Thus, this section 
examines select contributors and surveys their respective impacts on subsidiarity's 
development. 
                                                 
213 David L. Gregory, Dorothy Day's Lessons for the Transformation of Work, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 57, 99 
(1996) ("Subsidiarity is powerfully situated in Catholic social theory, possessing political roots many 
centuries old."). 
214 Dr. M. Spieker, The Actuality of Catholic Social Doctrine, in PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL 
TEACHING, supra note 30, at 27 (“The subsidiarity principle is, of course, not an exclusive possession of 
Catholic social doctrine and is definitely not a doctrinal rule.  It is an organization principle that is 
anthropologically founded and that can be made rationally insightful."). 
215 Ken Endo, Subsidiarity & its Enemies: On a Post-National Constitutional Principle of the European 
Union, at 13 (“[T]he Church has made deliberate efforts to systematise the principle of subsidiarity. This 
fact makes it necessary to investigate specifically the context in which the Church elaborated the principle 
of subsidiarity and the world view that the Church expected to see with the introduction of this principle.”), 
available at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/activitiesnews/conferences/1999_conferences/3rdannualconferenc
e/papers/Endo.pdf (last visited 26 October 2007).   
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i. Pre-Papal Contributors 
 
 
1. Benedictine monks 
 
a. Introduction 
 
Saint Benedict (c. 480-543) established a monastic order within Catholicism 
whereby each monastery ruled itself concerning matters not settled by ecclesiastical 
law.216  Each monastery is effectively governed by an Abbot217 who is authorized to 
appoint monks to assist him if monastical life becomes too complex.218  Such assistance 
foreseeably helps the Abbot fulfill his duties to the monks,219 the most important of 
which is the non-delegable duty to safeguard their spiritual welfare.220   
                                                 
216 RIGHT REV. CUTHBERT BUTLER, BENEDICTINE MONACHISM; STUDIES IN BENEDICTINE LIFE AND RULE 
235 (1919) (“[E]ach monastery was an entirely independent unit, just as if it were the only monastery in 
existence.  Consequently when the question of union among Benedictine monasteries arises, the Rule has 
nothing to say, beyond this, that any union must be effected in such a way as not to interfere with St 
Benedict's [sic] fundamental principles."). 
217 See SAINT BENEDICT OF NURSIA, REGULA BENEDICTI ["THE RULE OF SAINT BENEDICT"], Chapter 45 
(“We foresee, therefore, that for the preservation of peace and charity it is best that the government of the 
monastery should depend on the will of the Abbot; and if it can be done, let the affairs of the monastery (as 
we have explained before) be attended to by deans, as the Abbot shall dispose; so that, the same office 
being shared by many, no one may become proud.”), available at 
http://www.kansasmonks.org/RuleOfStBenedict.html (last visited 2 July 2007).  See also RIGHT REV. 
BUTLER, supra note 216, at 216 (“[A]ccording to St Benedict's [sic] idea the ruler of the monastery is the 
abbot."). 
218 SAINT BENEDICT OF NURSIA, supra note 217, at Chapter 21 (“If the brotherhood is large, let brethren of 
good repute and holy life be chosen from among them and be appointed Deans; and let them take care of 
their deaneries in everything according to the commandments of [G_d] and the directions of their Abbot. 
Let such be chosen Deans as the Abbot may safely trust to share his burden.").  See also RIGHT REV. 
BUTLER, supra note 216, at 216 (“But he [St. Benedict] recognised that if the number of monks grows to 
any size, the abbot must have helpers in the government of the community…His reason is that if the 
authority be distributed among several no one of them will wax proud[.]”) and id. at 217 (“But as soon 
as…the life of the monastery became in any degree complex, the practical need for a second in command 
made itself felt[.]”). 
219 DOM DAVID KNOWLES, THE BENEDICTINES 40 (1930) (“[T]he Abbot is in a real sense the servant of the 
monks.  He is to lead them to [G_d], not in his way or at his pace, but in the way [G_d] wishes for each."). 
220 SAINT BENEDICT OF NURSIA, supra note 217, at Chapter 2 (“Let the Abbot always bear in mind that he 
must give an account in the dread judgment of [G_d] of both his own teaching and of the obedience of his 
disciples. And let the Abbot know that whatever lack of profit the master of the house shall find in the 
sheep, will be laid to the blame of the shepherd. On the other hand he will be blameless, if he gave all a 
shepherd's care to his restless and unruly flock, and took all pains to correct their corrupt manner….Above 
all things, that the Abbot may not neglect or undervalue the welfare of the souls entrusted to him, let him 
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b. Internal Monastical Affairs 
 
Further, it appears that the Rule of Saint Benedict also encourages an Abbot to 
ask other monks within the monastery for assistance in the event that a monk begins to 
waver in his commitment.221  If these efforts prove to be unsuccessful, however, then the 
Abbot is encouraged to intensify corrective measures via prayer or administering corporal 
punishment.222  These methods arguably represent subsidiarity's preference for action at 
lower levels until they prove incapable of adequately addressing the issue in question.  If 
these methods do not successfully achieve reform, however, then the Abbot should 
dismiss the monk from the monastic community.223  Therefore, although the Rule 
appears to prefer addressing problems at lower levels, the Abbot's ultimate responsibility 
for the monks' welfare demands that he personally take action when lower levels are 
                                                                                                                                                 
not have too great a concern about fleeting, earthly, perishable things; but let him always consider that he 
hath undertaken the government of souls, of which he must give an account.”).  See also  
KNOWLES, supra note 219, at 44 (“The danger, however, remains…that the Abbot…may forget that the 
welfare…of the individual monk is his responsibility, and that the care of it…cannot be delegated to any 
subordinate official."). 
221 SAINT BENEDICT OF NURSIA, supra note 217, at Chapter 27 (“Let the Abbot show all care and concern 
towards offending brethren because 'they that are in health need not a physician, but they that are sick' (Mt 
9:12). Therefore, like a prudent physician he ought to use every opportunity to send consolers, namely, 
discreet elderly brethren, to console the wavering brother, as it were, in secret, and induce him to make 
humble satisfaction; and let them cheer him up 'lest he be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow' (2 Cor 2:7); 
but, as the same Apostle saith, 'confirm your charity towards him' (2 Cor 2:8); and let prayer be said for 
him by all."). 
222 Id. at Chapter 28 (“If a brother hath often been corrected and hath even been excommunicated for a fault 
and doth not amend, let a more severe correction be applied to him, namely, proceed against him with 
corporal punishment.  But if even then he doth not reform, or puffed up with pride, should perhaps, which 
[G_d] forbid, even defend his actions, then let the Abbot act like a prudent physician. After he hath applied 
soothing lotions, ointments of admonitions, medicaments of the Holy Scriptures, and if, as a last resource, 
he hath employed the caustic of excommunication and the blows of the lash, and seeth that even then his 
pains are of no avail, let him apply for that brother also what is more potent than all these measures: his 
own prayer and that of the brethren, that the Lord who is all-powerful may work a cure in that brother."). 
223 Id. at Chapter 28 (“But if he is not healed even in this way, then finally let the Abbot dismiss him from 
the community, as the Apostle saith: 'Put away the evil one from among you' (1 Cor 5:13); and again: 'If the 
faithless depart, let him depart' (1 Cor 7:15); lest one diseased sheep infect the whole flock.'"). 
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unsuccessful.  Thus, it appears that the internal workings of Benedictine monasteries 
arguably embody both the positive and negative aspects of subsidiarity.   
 
c. The Autonomy of Each Monastery 
 
Further, each monastery is to remain autonomous unless it comes under the rule 
of an unrighteous Abbot.224  Although initial research is inconclusive, it could 
foreseeably be argued that this is also a manifestation of subsidiarity insofar as it is 
representative of a preference for action at a lower level (i.e., the monastery itself) until 
that level proves incapable of addressing the issue before it (e.g., the wickedness of the 
Abbott).  Further, at least one scholar observes that the monastic order of Cîteaux, a 
Benedictine order founded in 1098, employed a "system of filiation which…resulted in 
greater subsidiarity."225  Due to the fact that subsidiarity is expressly embraced by (at a 
minimum) the Cisterian Order,226 the American-Cassinese Congregation,227 and the 
                                                 
224 Id. at Chapter 64 (“But even if the whole community should by mutual consent elect a man who agreeth 
to connive at their evil ways (which [G_d] forbid) and these irregularities in some come [sic] to the 
knowledge of the Bishop to whose diocese the place belongeth, or to neighboring Abbots, or Christian 
people, let them not permit the intrigue of the wicked to succeed, but let them appoint a worthy steward 
over the house of [G_d], knowing that they shall receive a bountiful reward for this action, if they do it with 
a pure intention and godly zeal; whereas, on the other hand, they commit a sin if they neglect it."). 
225 Exordium: Batch 2, O.C.S.O. [Cistercian Order of the Strict Observance [Trappists]], at 
http://www.ocso.org/HTM/exord_unit1.pdf (last visited 9 July 2007).   
226 Declaration of the General Chapter of the Cistercian Order on the essential elements of cistercian life 
today, Declaration 83 (2000), at http://www.ocist.org/RBDCL-engl.htm (last visited 2 July 2007) (“In the 
organization and legislation of monastic life as well as in the exercise of personal authority one must 
carefully respect those sociological principles based in natural law that have been perceived more clearly in 
recent times and are proclaimed with great insistence by the Magisterium of the Church.  The most 
important of these for us are the correlative principles of personalism and solidarity as well as subsidiarity 
and a legitimate pluralism within a necessary unity.”).  See also id. at Declaration 86 (“The principle of 
subsidiarity orders the relations between individuals and the community as well as between narrower and 
wider communities.  It states that the higher authority of the broader community should leave those things 
to the subordinates themselves which they can accomplish well, and indeed very often better, but that when 
the subordinates are of themselves inadequate or neglect their duty, then the higher authority should offer 
assistance and help.  In this way both the vitality and the responsibility of the subordinates remains intact 
and the higher authority can carry out more effectively its own task of coordination and higher decision.”); 
and id. at Declaration 110 (“The principles of subsidiarity and of legitimate pluralism have great 
importance in the structure of the congregations.  Whatever the individual monasteries for their part can 
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Benedictine Sisters of Mount St. Scholastica,228 it is reasonable to conclude that elements 
of the Benedictine Order subscribe to the principles of subsidiarity concerning the 
conditional autonomy of each monastery.   
 
d. Conclusion 
 
Although a direct invocation of the word "subsidiarity" is altogether absent from 
the writings of Saint Benedict, his teachings nonetheless appear to invoke its meaning.  
More specifically, it appears that subsidiarity at least informs (if not governs) the internal 
affairs of each Benedictine monastery.  Further, this principle could also potentially apply 
to the autonomy of each independent monastery.  Finally, the Rule of Saint Benedict is 
ultimately concerned with preventing centralized authorities from encroaching upon the 
"natural autonomy and independent life and power" inherent in each individual.229  As a 
                                                                                                                                                 
carry out through their effective competence and more accurate knowledge of local conditions should be 
left to them.  It belongs to the organs of the congregation to help the efforts of the individual communities 
with fraternal advice and aid, to coordinate their efforts toward common goals, and to correct abuses if any 
should creep in; they also represent them before ecclesiastical and civil authorities.  According to the 
principle of pluralism, the monasteries' specific characteristics and special tasks are to be recognized and 
the diversity of their gifts are to be directed toward the harmony of common goals lest the unity of the 
Congregation be endangered."). 
227 American-Cassinese Congregation, The Constitutions and the Directory, at 
http://www.osb.org/amcass/const/genprin.html (last visited 2 July 2007) (“The Congregation exists to 
promote and protect the growth of its autonomous member monasteries in their life according to the 
Gospel, the Rule of Saint Benedict, and their own sound traditions, for the up building of the Body of 
[Chr_st]. It aims to do this, with due respect for the principle of subsidiarity and for legitimate pluralism, 
both by juridical means and by the encouragement of fraternal cooperation and support."). 
228 Benedictine Sisters of Mount St. Scholastica, Federation [of St. Scholastica] Purpose and History, 
http://www.mountosb.org/federation/federationex.html (last visited 9 July 2007) (“[I]t is recognized that 
each monastery has its own unique capacity to respond…. In its relationship to the member monasteries, 
the Federation functions according to the principle of subsidiarity. It facilitates communication among the 
monasteries and between the individual monasteries and the Apostolic See, thus maintaining the ecclesial 
relationship of the Benedictine tradition. Each Benedictine monastery, however, exercises the cenobitic 
authority present within it when the prioress and the community deliberate together, in the light of the Holy 
Spirit, on the Rule, tradition and their own experience."). 
229 RIGHT REV. BUTLER, supra note 216, at 238 (“When there is a question of union and organisation among 
monasteries, the chief point to consider is whether St Benedict's [sic] ideal of each monastery being a 
family is maintained, or whether the natural autonomy and independent life and power of reproduction 
inherent in a family are unduly encroached upon by any central authority."). 
 
 
59 
 
 
consequence, the Rule is rationally connected to the teachings of the Catholic Church 
concerning subsidiarity and is arguably worth further examination.   
 
 
2. Johannes Althusius  
 
a. Introduction 
 
Although scholars dispute the appearance of the term "subsidiarity" in Althusius' 
Politica Methodice Digesta, Atque Exemplis Sacris et Profanis Illustrata230 (originally 
published in 1603), there is no question that his ideas are inherently federalistic.231  One 
commentator has gone so far as to suggest that "the spirit of federalism…pervades 
[Politica] from bottom to top."232  In his book, Althusius identified the Bible as the 
original source of federalist thought233 and essentially established himself as "the first 
post-medieval defender of the principle of subsidiary authority."234   
                                                 
230 Compare Ken Endo, Subsidiarity & its Enemies: On a Post-National Constitutional Principle of the 
European Union, 3 ("It is reasonable however, to also identify Althusius as the first proponent of 
subsidiarity and federalism (he uses, in fact, the word of ‘subsidia’ in the text)."), available at  
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/activitiesnews/conferences/1999_conferences/3rdannualconferenc
e/papers/Endo.pdf (last visited 18 November 2007) and Benoist, supra note 210, at 55 (“The word 
'subsidiarity,' which Althusius used often…”) with HUEGLIN, supra note 118, at 152-153 (“Althusius in fact 
did not use the word subsidiarity which rather has its modern terminological root in nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century Catholic social doctrine where it was employed as a principle of the autonomy of family 
and church as its intermediary powers within modern state and individualized society.  Althusius, in his 
discussion of the general elements of politics, once refers to the subsidia vitae (requirements of life) which 
can only be provided through mutual sharing and aid.  Hence, there is at least a direct etymological link: 
subsidiarity as a concept denoting agency of one on behalf of another has its root in subsidium (literally: 
help or aid).”) and Breton, et al, supra note 61, at n.2. 
231 While federalism and subsidiarity are not identical, "subsidiarity 'has dominated discussions of 
European federalism for over five years."  Edwards, supra note 4, at 544, citing Bermann, supra note 2, at 
332. 
232 OTTO VON GIERKE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL THEORY 257 (Bernard Freyd, Ph.D., trans., 1966). 
233 See Daniel J. Elazar, Althusius' Grand Design for a Federal Commonwealth, in JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS, 
POLITICA METHODICE DIGESTA, ATQUE EXEMPLIS SACRIS ET PROFANIS ILLUSTRATA xxxvi (Frederick S. 
Carney, trans., 1995) (1614) (“The first grand federalist design, as Althusius himself was careful to 
acknowledge, was that of the Bible, most particularly the Hebrew Scriptures or Old Testament.  Biblical 
thought is federal (from the Latin foedus, covenant) from first to last – from [G_d's] covenant with Noah 
establishing the biblical equivalent of what philosophers were later to term natural law (Genesis, chapter 9) 
to the Jews' reaffirmation of the Sinai covenant under the leadership of Ezra and Nehemiah, thereby 
adopting the Torah as the constitution of their second commonwealth (Ezra, chapter 10; Nehemiah, chapter 
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b. The Necessity of Associations 
 
 
Althusius opened his book with the belief that,  
 
"Politics is the art of associating men for the purpose of establishing, cultivating, and 
conserving social life among them.  Whence it is called 'symbiotics.'  The subject matter 
of politics is therefore association, in which the symbiotes pledge themselves each to the 
other, by explicit or tacit agreement, to mutual communication of whatever is useful and 
necessary for the harmonious exercise of social life… 
 
Truly, in living this life no man is self-sufficient, or adequately endowed by nature…[I]n 
his adulthood [he is unable] to obtain in and by himself those outward goods he needs for 
a comfortable and holy life, [nor] to provide by his own energies all the requirements of 
life."235
 
 
 
Althusius further believed that the resulting and necessary mutual communication and 
common enterprise involves 1) things, 2) services, and 3) common rights;236 this 
communication, in turn, permits each individual or association to assume and maintain 
the advantages and responsibilities that are necessary or appropriate under the 
circumstances.237   
Althusius also maintained that,  
 
"[G_d] did not give all things to one person, but some to one and some to others, so that you have 
need for my gifts, and I for yours.  And so was born, as it were, the need for communicating 
necessary and useful things, which communication was not possible except in social and political 
life.  [G_d] therefore willed that each need the service and aid of others in order that friendship 
would bind all together, and no one would consider another to be valueless… 
 
"Thus, the needs of the body and soul, and the seeds of virtue implanted in our souls, drew 
dispersed men together in one place…[and into a commonwealth].  And that this was the true 
                                                                                                                                                 
8).  The covenant motif is central to the biblical world view, the basis of all relationships, the mechanism 
for defining and allocating authority, and the foundation of the biblical political teaching."). 
234Alain de Benoist, supra note 210, at 56 (“By posing the question of shared jurisdictions, and by arguing 
that on all levels of public life the state should take care only of tasks that lower levels cannot accomplish, 
Althusius established himself as the first post-medieval defender of the principle of subsidiary authority."). 
235 JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS, THE POLITICS OF JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS 12 (Frederick S. Carney, trans., 1964) 
(1614). 
236 Id. at 14. 
237 Id. 
 
 
61 
 
 
origin first of villages, and then of larger commonwealths embracing wide areas, is taught by the 
most ancient records of history and confirmed by daily experience."238
 
 
Thus, associations are both produced and maintained because they are inherently 
necessary.239  It therefore follows that because associations are necessary, so too is the 
developed and civil society in which man exists.240  Althusius readily admits, however, 
that the populace itself is plainly incapable of efficient and beneficial administration due 
to the inevitability of discord and difference; as a result, he argues that a leader or an 
administrator must be appointed so that both people and associations can be held 
responsible for the fulfillment of their respective duties.241   
 
c. The Development of Associations 
  
 
Althusius observes that society naturally develops from small, private associations 
into much larger and public ones in an effort to establish "an inclusive political order."242  
As this public association grows in size and diversity, it requires an increasing level of 
assistance in order to maintain its self-sufficiency.243  Unless this diversity is, "held 
together by some order of subordination, and regulated by fixed laws of subjection and 
                                                 
238 Althusius, supra note 233, § I (26-27), at 23. 
239 Id. § I (33), at 25 (“Necessity therefore induces association; and the want of things necessary for life, 
which are acquired and communicated by the help and aid of one's associates, conserves it."). 
240 Id. (“For this reason, it is evident that the commonwealth, or civil society, exists by nature, and that man 
is by nature a civil animal who strives eagerly for association.").  
241 Id. § VIII (52), at 62 (“For the public business of the various and differing orders of the province cannot 
be administered and governed conveniently and beneficially, let alone consistently and for any length of 
time, by many persons, much less by all, because of discord, dissension, and difference of opinion.  
Therefore, it is necessary that some director and governor be established who can hold the others, both 
orders and individuals, to their duties."). 
242 Id. § V (1), at 39 (“[H]uman society develops from private to public association by the definite steps and 
progressions of small societies.  The public association exists when many private associations are linked 
together for the purpose of establishing an inclusive political order."). 
243 Id. (“The larger this association, and the more types of association contained within it, the more need it 
has of resources and aids to maintain self-sufficiency."). 
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order, it would be destroyed in a short time by its own confusion."244  Althusius' beliefs 
that 1) society is inherently composed of smaller associated entities,245 2) society only 
possesses those powers expressly assigned to it by smaller consociations,246 and 3) 
smaller consociations therefore maintain autonomy over those affairs which they have 
not directly assigned to the government247 conclusively and syllogistically demonstrate 
his relationship to contemporary federalist philosophy.248
 
d. The Negative Aspect of Subsidiarity 
 
Althusius expands this argument even further by suggesting that inferior 
associations should be permitted to handle their own affairs until they prove incapable of 
doing so.  In Althusius' words,   
 
 
"Many districts of an extensive and populous city, or of a province, together with 
their presbyteries, constitute a diocese with its assembly of many churches.  The 
                                                 
244 Id. § I (35), at 25, quoting Petrus Gregorius, De republica, XIX, I, 1,7 ad 16 f.: I, 3, 12 f. 
245 Daniel J. Elazar, Althusius' Grand Design for a Federal Commonwealth, in ALTHUSIUS, supra note 235, 
at xxxviii (“Althusius' grand design is developed out of a series of building blocks or self-governing cells 
from the smallest, most intimate connections to the universal commonwealth, each of which is internally 
organized and linked to the others by some form of consensual relationship.”).  See also GIERKE, supra 
note 231, at 266 (“[L]arger society is always composed of smaller societies as corporative units, and only 
through them does it act upon their members[.]”). 
246 Id. at 266 (“[E]very smaller society, as a true and original community, draws from itself its own 
communal life and its own sphere of right [and gives] up to the higher society only so much of this as is 
indispensably required for the attainment of its specific end[.]”).  
247 See ALTHUSIUS, supra, note 233, § XIX (7), at 121 (“The supreme magistrate exercises as much 
authority as has been explicitly conceded to him by the associated members or bodies of the realm.  And 
what has not been given to him must be considered to have been left under the control of the people or 
universal association.").  See also id. § VIII (50), at 62 (“In difficult matters involving the entire 
province…the prefect can do nothing without the consent and agreement of the provincial orders."). 
248 See WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON, FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 308 (1956) (“Federal 
government presupposes a desire and an ability to secure the component units against encroachment by the 
central government.").  See also id. at 310 (“By its very nature federalism is anti-majoritarian.  A federal 
government is designed to protect and afford a means of articulation for the territorial diversities within the 
larger community.  All the instrumentalities of federal government are devices whose purpose is to prevent 
the unqualified majority of the whole society from riding unchecked over the interests of any of the 
federated elements."). 
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more serious controversies and questions concerning doctrine and church matters 
that cannot be decided by a presbytery are referred to this assembly for decision."249
 
 
Although this passage does not expressly require lower levels to resolve less serious 
controversies, the construction of the sentence permits a good faith argument that 
Althusius presumes that they should be permitted to do so until they prove incapable.     
Although Hueglin argues that the negative aspect of subsidiarity is manifested via 
a lower level's retention of those powers that are not expressly delegated,250 this 
observation is potentially subject to dispute.251  Instead, it appears that Althusius' 
expression of subsidiarity's negative aspects can be found in his belief that:  
 
"Every city is able to establish statutes concerning those things that pertain to the 
administration of its own matters, that belong to its trade and profession, and that relate to 
the private functions of the community…Also pertaining to this communication are the 
right of the vote in the common business and actions of managing and administering the 
community, and the form and manner by which the city is ruled and governed according 
to laws it approves and a magistrate that it constitutes with the consent of the citizens.  
When, on the contrary, these common rights of the community are alienated, the 
community ceases to exist…"252
 
 
                                                 
249 ALTHUSIUS, supra note 233, § VIII (33), at 60. 
250 HUEGLIN, supra note 118, at 167 (“Lower level consociations retain all residual powers not explicitly 
delegated to a higher level.  This is the negative aspect of subsidiarity.").   
251 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-157 (1992) ("The Tenth Amendment likewise 
restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, 
which, as we have discussed, is essentially a tautology.  Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that that 
the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the 
States.").  See also Peter A. Lauricella, The Real 'Contract with America': The Original Intent of the Tenth 
Amendment and the Commerce Clause, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1377, n. 99 (1997) (“Patrick Henry, a ferverant 
Anti-federalist, made the typical argument for a State sovereignty amendment at the Virginia convention: 
“What do they tell us? - That our rights are reserved. Why not say so?” 3 The Debates in the Several State 
Conventions on the Federal Constitution 448 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1941) (1836)…It should be noted that 
this statement by Henry supports the argument that the Tenth Amendment is pure tautology and not a 
substantive limitation."). 
252 ALTHUSIUS, supra note 233, § VI (43-45), at 49. 
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This represents the negative aspect of subsidiarity insofar as it stands for the proposition 
that lower consociations should have exclusive control over "those things that pertain to 
the administration of its own matters."253
 
e. Conclusions 
 
 
 Althusius essentially believed that associations naturally developed throughout 
society in response to humanity's natural inability to be individually self-sufficient.  As 
these associations develop, so too does the scope of their respective responsibilities.  
Lower levels must become responsible for some of these duties in order for the higher 
levels to effectively fulfill their functions.  Those higher levels, in turn, must refrain from 
unnecessarily interfering with the responsibilities of the lower levels.  Finally, Althusius' 
concern with protecting peoples' liberties254 represents a central component of the 
subsidiarity.255   
                                                 
253 Compare ALFORD, supra note 2, at 103 (“In other words, the operation of the principle of subsidiarity 
requires that power rest at the most basic level of production, so that those working at this level can call on 
higher levels of management to aid them in their contribution to the common effort.”) with ALTHUSIUS 
supra note 233, § VI (43-45), at 49. 
254 ALTHUSIUS, supra note 233,§ XXIX (2), at 175 ("The imperium of the king ought not to be so enlarged 
that the liberty of the people is suppressed."). 
255 HUEGLIN, supra note 118, at 221 (“In practice [the principle of subsidiarity entails] the appropriate 
distribution of powers in such a way as to maximize self-organizing autonomy for a plurality of 
communities of character without giving up a commitment to necessary degrees of mutual solidarity.  In 
many ways this is of course exactly what civil society theory would like to suggest.  Maintaining the 
dichotomous juxtaposition of state and civil society, however, precludes a more radically restructured 
vision of organized social life in which government by the state would be replaced by multilevel 
governance shared among a plurality of self-organizing communities.  For Althusius, such a vision still was 
within practical reach[.]”). 
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3. Other Noteworthy Contributors 
 
While several scholars have concluded Bishop Wilhelm Emmanuel Freiherr von 
Ketteler was initial promulgator of subsidiarity256 (although they apparently disagree on 
whether or not he actually used the term),257 at least three others claim that its origins lie 
with Gustav Gundlach.258  Further, at least one scholar appears to believe that an 
economist named Heinrich Pesch is responsible for the term's origin.259  
Like Pope John XXIII, Pesch believed that subsidiarity was a natural component 
of a properly functioning economy.260  Pesch also believed that individuals' autonomy 
                                                 
256 See, e.g., JUDITH A. MERKLE, FROM THE HEART OF THE CHURCH: THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL TRADITION 99-
100 (1986) (“Subsidiarity is a social concept that arose out of the German social movement of Bishop von 
Ketteler.") and ESTELLA, supra note 2, at 78 (“Ketteler may…be considered as the father of the concept of 
'subsidiarity'.”).   
257 Compare LEYS, supra note 198, at 25 (1995) (“W.E. von Ketteler…is, in modern Catholic tradition, the 
first one to use the principle of subsidiarity, without formulating it expressly.”) (internal citation omitted) 
with Nemoianu, supra note 201, at 11 (“The term 'subsidiarity' was probably coined by the socio-Catholic 
essayist Bishop von Ketteler…soon after the middle of the nineteenth century. The concept was used…in 
Leo XIII's celebrated encyclical Rerum Novarum and then defined limpidly by Pius XI in 1931 in his 
Quadragesimo Anno.”), available at http://www.isi.org/books/content/343foreword.pdf (last visited 9 July 
2007) and Delcamp, supra note 27, at 11, n.12 (claiming that Ketteler “invented” the term subsidiarity). 
258 16 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 199 (The Catholic University of America, ed., 1967).  See also 
Rauscher, supra note 205 (“In preparing the first draft (1930) of Quadragesimo Anno and in analyzing the 
great disorders of the industrial society and threat of the expanding ideologies, [Gundlach] concluded that a 
complete reorganization of society was necessary. Taking into account the economic, social, and political 
situation of his day, Gundlach concluded that society was not adequately fostering individual social talents 
and abilities, the keys to building up society and culture. What had been neglected was the 'principle of 
subsidiarity.' Gundlach was able to formulate for the first time in history a principle that is today 
acknowledged worldwide."); Gehrmann, supra note 205, at 2 (“The first notion of subsidiarity can be 
traced back to German priest and social philosopher Gustav Gundlach in the early 20th century.”), 
available at http://www.dur.ac.uk/john.ashworth/EPCS/Papers/Gehrmann.pdf (last visited 10 July 2007); 
and Paul Misner, A Role for Intermediate Bodies in Social Insurance: Precedents in the 'Ghent System' and 
the Weimar Republic (“What Gustav Gundlach was starting to call the principle of subsidiarity was 
operative in this equal participation as well as in the background role of the state in authorizing the labor 
agencies that administered the compulsory contributions.”), available at 
http://www.stthomas.edu/cathstudies/cst/mgmt/images/papers/misner.pdf (last visited 23 October 2005). 
259 Religion as Economic Praxis, http://www.sfecon.com/Religion.htm (last visited 10 July 2007) (“Fr. 
Pesch originated much of the terminology (e.g.: subsidiarity, solidarity) used by the Holy Fathers in 
guiding us away from the Marxian Error."). 
260 RICHARD E. MULCAHY, S.J., THE ECONOMICS OF HEINRICH PESCH 175-176 (1952) (“[L]ike socialism, a 
planned economy is rejected in theory and practice by Pesch.  Fundamentally, it is opposed to the principle 
of subsidiarity which requires that a higher social organization should not undertake what a social 
organization, lower in scale, can do at least equally well."). 
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should not be suppressed by centralizing authorities so long as the common good could 
still be pursued and that such suppression was only justifiable if the common good was 
endangered.261  Therefore, it appears that Pesch's belief that higher associations should 
not interfere with lower levels unless it is necessary to effectuate the common good 
embodies both the positive and negative components of subsidiarity. 
 
ii. Papal Contributors 
 
The Pope is unquestionably the highest authority within the Catholic Church.262  
Of all the various teachings that each Pope promulgates, documents called "encyclicals" 
are the most authoritative263 and the Church considers the teachings contained therein to 
be both universally valid264 and permanent.265  This section examines the relevant 
encyclicals of several popes that have materially contributed to Catholicism's position 
concerning subsidiarity.   
                                                 
261 Id., at 176-177, quoting HEINRICH PESCH, DIE VOLKSWIRTSCHAFTSLEHRE 198-199 (1924) (“On 
principle, private property and private enterprise may not be suppressed in any sphere where its effective 
continuance can satisfy the common welfare.  Rather, only according to the postulates of social justice does 
a limitation of freedom take place: a substitution of private enterprise by the public enterprise takes place 
exclusively, solely, and only, in such sectors where indubitably the national economic need in reference to 
the whole rightly demands the suppression of a private enterprise incapable, unsuited or harmful to the 
needs of the national economy."). 
262 David A. Boileau, Introduction to PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING, supra note 30, at 14 
(“All is natural law based, and the Magisterium of the Pope is the only legitimate interpretation.").  See also 
PATRICK GRANFIELD, THE LIMITS OF THE PAPACY: AUTHORITY AND AUTONOMY IN THE CHURCH 1 (1987) 
("Catholics…usually start with three dogmatic truths.  First, the papacy, as the continuation of the primatial 
ministry established by [Chr_st] in Peter, is of divine origin; it can be reformed but not abolished.  Second, 
the episcopate, in succession to the apostolic college, received from [Chr_st] the authority to govern the 
local Churches and, under the leadership of the Pope, this College of Bishops has supreme authority.  
Third, all believers, through the sensus fidelium, manifest, when in harmony with Scripture and tradition, 
the infallibility of the Church."). 
263 JOHN PAUL II: THE ENCYCLICALS IN EVERYDAY LANGUAGE ix (Joseph G. Donders, ed.) (2001) 
(“Encyclicals are the most important and the most authoritative documents a pope writes."). 
264 Pope John XXIII, supra note 51, ¶ 72 (“The above principles are valid always and everywhere.”) and id. 
¶ 220 (“The principles [the Church] gives are of universal application, for they take human nature into 
account, and the varying conditions in which man's life is lived. They also take into account the principal 
characteristics of contemporary society, and are thus acceptable to all.”). 
265 Id. ¶ 218. 
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1. Pope Leo XIII 
 
Pope Leo XIII presented an encyclical entitled Rerum Novarum on 15 May 1891 
in an effort to demonstrate the inherent incompatibility between Catholicism and 
socialism.  Specifically, the Pope observed that socialism would naturally lead to an 
injustice because it, "would rob the lawful possessor, distort the functions of the State, 
and create utter confusion in the community."266  This arguably represents an invocation 
of subsidiarity insofar as it draws a bright line rule demarcating unacceptable intervention 
from higher consociations. 
Although the Pope recognized that governments are primarily responsible for the 
protection of their respective citizens,267 he also believed that the unique orientation of a 
family vis-à-vis society meant that families possessed unique rights and obligations.268  
The Pope proceeded to invoke the specter of subsidiarity (albeit via natural law) when he 
concluded that, "The socialists…in setting aside the parent and setting up a State 
supervision, act against natural justice, and destroy the structure of the home."269   
                                                 
266 Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (Papal Encyclical), ¶ 4, available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-
novarum_en.html (last visited 4 November 2007). 
267 Id. ¶ 14 (“The foremost duty, therefore, of the rulers of the State should be to make sure that the laws 
and institutions, the general character and administration of the commonwealth, shall be such as of 
themselves to realize public well-being and private prosperity. This is the proper scope of wise 
statesmanship and is the work of the rulers.”).  See also Pope Pius XI, supra note 202, ¶ 25 (“With regard 
to civil authority, Leo XIII…fearlessly taught that government must not be thought a mere guardian of law 
and of good order, but rather must put forth every effort so that 'through the entire scheme of laws and 
institutions . . . both public and individual well-being may develop spontaneously out of the very structure 
and administration of the State.'”) (citing internal footnote 19). 
268 Pope Leo XIII, supra note 266, ¶ 12 (“Hence we have the family, the 'society' of a man's house - a 
society very small, one must admit, but none the less a true society, and one older than any State. 
Consequently, it has rights and duties peculiar to itself which are quite independent of the State.").   
269 Id. ¶ 14. 
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Like Althusius before him, the Pope recognized humanity's tendency to enter into 
associations270 and postulated that failure to account for and/or to respect this tendency 
could lead people to detest society.271  Thus, Pope Leo XIII arguably outlined the 
negative prong of subsidiarity insofar as he believed unnecessary governmental action 
concerning the affairs of the people would impede "public well-being and private 
prosperity."272   
The Pope also directly invoked subsidiarity's positive prong by indicating that if 
lower levels of society (e.g., families) are incapable of properly fulfilling their 
responsibilities, then the government has an obligation to intervene.  More specifically, 
the Pope said that,  
 
"[I]f a family finds itself in exceeding distress, utterly deprived of the counsel of friends, 
and without any prospect of extricating itself, it is right that extreme necessity be met by 
public aid, since each family is a part of the commonwealth. In like manner, if within the 
precincts of the household there occur grave disturbance of mutual rights, public 
authority should intervene to force each party to yield to the other its proper due; for this 
is not to deprive citizens of their rights, but justly and properly to safeguard and 
strengthen them….Whenever the general interest or any particular class suffers, or is 
threatened with harm, which can in no other way be met or prevented, the public 
authority must step in to deal with it. Now, it is to the interest of the community, as well 
as of the individual, that peace and good order should be maintained… there can be no 
question but that, within certain limits, it would be right to invoke the aid and authority of 
the law."273
                                                 
270 Id. ¶ 27 (“And if human society is to be healed now, in no other way can it be healed save by a return to 
Christian life and Christian institutions. When a society is perishing, the wholesome advice to give to those 
who would restore it is to call it to the principles from which it sprang; for the purpose and perfection of an 
association is to aim at and to attain that for which it is formed, and its efforts should be put in motion and 
inspired by the end and object which originally gave it being.”). 
271 Id. ¶ 13 (“That right to property…must…belong to a man in his capacity of head of a family…A family, 
no less than a State, is…a true society, governed by an authority peculiar to itself, that is to say, by the 
authority of the father. Provided, therefore, the limits which are prescribed by the very purposes for which 
it exists be not transgressed, the family has at least equal rights with the State in the choice and pursuit of 
the things needful to its preservation and its just liberty…[T]he family must necessarily have rights and 
duties which are prior to those of the community, and founded more immediately in nature. If the citizens, 
if the families on [sic] entering into association and fellowship, were to experience hindrance in a 
commonwealth instead of help, and were to find their rights attacked instead of being upheld, society 
would rightly be an object of detestation rather than of desire."). 
272 Id. ¶ 14. 
273 Id. ¶¶ 14 and 38. 
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The Pope perceived such assistance to represent an "intrusion" upon the dignity of the 
people274 and warned that, although they are sometimes warranted,275 such intrusions 
should be as limited as possible.276  As a consequence, he advised governments to 
analyze each situation, prospective intrusion, and the limitation placed thereon on a case-
by-case basis.277  Specifically, the Pope feared that undue government influence in the 
affairs of society could very well destroy the essence of the freedoms that the government 
had a specific duty to protect.278  Thus, Pope Leo XIII's efforts to prevent governmental 
interference until lower levels prove incapable of addressing the problems before them 
appears to represent an implicit invocation of the principle of subsidiarity.   
                                                 
274 Id. ¶ 14 (“The contention, then, that the civil government should at its option intrude into and exercise 
intimate control over the family and the household is a great and pernicious error.”) (emphasis added). 
275 Id. ¶ 36 (“If by a strike of workers or concerted interruption of work there should be imminent danger of 
disturbance to the public peace; or if circumstances were such as that among the working class the ties of 
family life were relaxed…if religion were found to suffer through the workers not having time and 
opportunity afforded them to practice its duties; if in workshops and factories there were danger to morals 
through the mixing of the sexes or from other harmful occasions of evil; or if employers laid burdens upon 
their workmen which were unjust, or degraded them with conditions repugnant to their dignity as human 
beings; finally, if health were endangered by excessive labor, or by work unsuited to sex or age-in such 
cases…”). 
276 Id. ¶ 14 (“But the rulers of the commonwealth must go no further; here, nature bids them stop. Paternal 
authority can be neither abolished nor absorbed by the State; for it has the same source as human life 
itself."). 
277 Id. ¶ 38 (“The limits must be determined by the nature of the occasion which calls for the law's 
interference - the principle being that the law must not undertake more, nor proceed further, than is required 
for the remedy of the evil or the removal of the mischief.”). 
278 Id. ¶ 35 (“[T]he State must not absorb the individual or the family; both should be allowed free and 
untrammelled action so far as is consistent with the common good and the interest of others….The State 
should watch over these societies of citizens banded together in accordance with their rights, but it should 
not thrust itself into their peculiar concerns and their organization, for things move and live by the spirit 
inspiring them, and may be killed by the rough grasp of a hand from without."). 
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 2. Pope Pius XI 
 
Pope Pius XI presented an encyclical entitled Quadragesimo Anno to 
commemorate the fortieth anniversary of Rerum Novarum279 and, in doing so, made a 
substantial contribution to the ecclesiological development of subsidiarity.280  There, 
Pope Pius XI expressed his fear that if governments did not serve a "subsidiary 
function,"281 they would take on far more responsibilities than they could efficiently 
bear;282 thus, he effectively and expressly invoked the principle of subsidiarity as a 
means of effectuating "the proper ordering of civil society."283  This proper ordering 
meant that it was "wrong" to prevent lower levels of society from attempting to address 
issues that affected them.  More specifically, Pope Pius XI expressed that, 
 
 
"As history abundantly proves, it is true that on account of changed conditions many 
things which were done by small associations in former times cannot be done now save 
by large associations. Still, that most weighty principle, which cannot be set aside or 
changed, remains fixed and unshaken in social philosophy:  Just as it is gravely wrong to 
take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and 
give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and 
disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and 
subordinate organizations can do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to 
furnish help to the members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb them." 284
 
 
                                                 
279 Hence the name, Quadregisimo Anno, or “Fortieth Year.” 
280 SIONAIDH DOUGLAS-SCOTT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 174 (2002) (“[I]t was 
Pope Pius XI…who played a large part in developing subsidiarity as a substantial doctrine of Catholic 
philosophy."). 
281 Pope Pius XI, supra note 202, ¶ 80. 
282 Id. ¶ 78 (“When we speak of the reform of institutions, the State comes chiefly to mind…[because] there 
remain virtually only individuals and the State. This is to the great harm of the State itself; for, with a 
structure of social governance lost, and with the taking over of all the burdens which the wrecked 
associations once bore, the State has been overwhelmed and crushed by almost infinite tasks and duties."). 
283 MERKLE, supra note 256, at 100. 
284 Pope Pius XI, supra note 202, ¶ 79 (emphasis added). 
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Furthermore, Pope Pius XI also suggested that lower levels of society should be 
permitted to execute functions where they are capable of doing so, thereby enabling the 
state to concentrate its resources on issues of greater importance and/or complexity.285  
Pope Pius XI (and later, Pope John XXIII) warned that the unnecessary involvement of 
government in the affairs of the people could potentially result in the pursuit of political 
aims instead of the public good.286
The Pope affirmed the negative component of subsidiarity through the promotion 
of the idea that lower levels of society should be permitted to address those issues that 
affect them where common benefits are being pursued.287  He proceeded to expressly 
invoke its positive component by advocating the intervention of governments when lower 
levels of society prove incapable of adequately resolving or addressing the issues that 
affect them.288  Finally, Pope Pius implicitly recognized that associations other than the 
government can be relied upon to promote the common good.289   
                                                 
285 Id. ¶ 80 (“The supreme authority of the State ought, therefore, to let subordinate groups handle matters 
and concerns of lesser importance, which would otherwise dissipate its efforts greatly. Thereby the State 
will more freely, powerfully, and effectively do all those things that belong to it alone because it alone can 
do them: directing, watching, urging, restraining, as occasion requires and necessity demands. Therefore, 
those in power should be sure that the more perfectly a graduated order is kept among the various 
associations, in observance of the principle of 'subsidiary function,' the stronger social authority and 
effectiveness will be the happier and more prosperous the condition of the State."). 
286 Id. ¶ 95 (“We are compelled to say that to Our certain knowledge there are not wanting some who fear 
that the State, instead of confining itself as it ought to the furnishing of necessary and adequate assistance, 
is substituting itself for free activity; that the new syndical and corporative order savors too much of an 
involved and political system of administration; and that…it rather serves particular political ends than 
leads to the reconstruction and promotion of a better social order.").  See also COMPENDIUM, supra note 26, 
¶ 565, at 245 (“Special attention must be paid to [the observation of, inter alia, subsidiarity] by those who 
occupy institutional positions dealing with the complex problems of the public domain, whether in local 
administrations or national and international institutions.”) (citations omitted).  
287 Pope Pius XI, supra note 202, ¶ 25 (“Just freedom of action must, of course, be left both to individual 
citizens and to families, yet only on condition that the common good be preserved and wrong to any 
individual be abolished."). 
288 Id. ¶ 94 (“Strikes and lock-outs are forbidden; if the parties cannot settle their dispute, public authority 
intervenes.").   
289 ALBINO BARRERA, O.P., MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL DOCUMENTS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 264 (2001) 
(“[Quadragesimo Anno] observes that the wisdom of subsidiarity is not only that it strikes a balance 
between the legitimate demands of individual initiative and collective action, but that it also allows for a 
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 3. Pope John XXIII 
 
Minimizing governmental interference with lower levels of society was also 
advocated by Pope John XXIII in his encyclical entitled Mater et Magista.  There, Pope 
John XXIII recognized that although governments are responsible for facilitating 
economic development, they should not do so at the expense of individuals' freedom.290  
Echoing Popes before him, he maintained that Catholicism mandated cooperation 
between the State and the People in order to generate economic benefits.291  Although 
one Catholic scholar observes that Pope John XXIII recognized that modern society 
required more state interference than past generations,292 he also clearly believed that the 
State has an obligation to proactively impose limitations upon itself in order to prevent 
                                                                                                                                                 
fuller and richer specification of the latter.  The state is no longer the only institution that can work toward 
the protection and promotion of the common good; it can also rely on various social institutions and 
associations of individuals to discharge on various social institutions and associations of individuals to 
discharge this duty."). 
290 Pope John XXIII, supra note 51, ¶ 55 (“But however extensive and far-reaching the influence of the 
State on the economy may be, it must never be exerted to the extent of depriving the individual citizen of 
his freedom of action. It must rather augment his freedom while effectively guaranteeing the protection of 
his essential personal rights. Among these is a man's right and duty to be primarily responsible for his own 
upkeep and that of his family. Hence every economic system must permit and facilitate the free 
development of productive activity.”). 
291 See  id. ¶ 56 (“Moreover, as history itself testifies with ever-increasing clarity, there can be no such 
thing as a well-ordered and prosperous society unless individual citizens and the State co-operate in the 
economy. Both sides must work together in harmony, and their respective efforts must be proportioned to 
the needs of the common good in the prevailing circumstances and conditions of human life.”).  See also 
Francis Caravan, S.J., The Popes and the Economy, 11 ND J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 429, 436 (1997), 
quoting Paul VI, Populorum Progressio (Papal Encyclical), ¶ 34 (1967) ("Every programme made to 
increase production has, in the last analysis, no other raison d'etre than the service of man... It is not 
sufficient to increase wealth for it to be distributed equitably. It is not sufficient to promote technology to 
render the world a more human place in which to live…Economics and technology have no meaning 
except from man, whom they should serve. And man is only truly man insofar as, master of his own acts 
and judge of their worth, he is author of his own advancement, in keeping with the nature which was given 
him by his Creator, and whose possibilities and exigencies he himself freely assumes."), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
vi_enc_26031967_populorum_en.html (last visited 20 November 2007). 
 292 MERKLE, supra note 256, at 117 (“While John XXIII affirmed the principle of subsidiarity, he also 
recognized that the common good required far more state 'interference' than was needed in the past.  Men 
and women had to join together in new associations, such as health care and insurance programs, to meet 
their needs in modern society."). 
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the destruction of private property.293  Further, like Althusius before him, Pope John 
XXIII recommended implementing a system of checks and balances to ensure that power 
is not impermissibly consolidated.294  Thus, Pope John XXIII believed that governments 
must pursue the common good, that this pursuit will ultimately result in the development 
of society, and that higher consociations must be a part of the community while also 
seeking to promote the common good.295
 
 
iii. Conclusions Concerning the Ecclesiological Development of 
Subsidiarity 
 
Thus, it appears that Catholicism has made a significant contribution to the 
development of subsidiarity.296  St. Benedict arguably embodied the earliest institutional 
example of subsidiarity via his teachings concerning the Abbott.  Specifically, the 
preference that the Abbott refrain from personally intervening until other monks fail to 
                                                 
293 Pope John XXIII, supra note 51, ¶ 117 (“State and public ownership of property is very much on the 
increase today. This is explained by the exigencies of the common good, which demand that public 
authority broaden its sphere of activity. But here, too, the 'principle of subsidiary function' must be 
observed. The State and other agencies of public law must not extend their ownership beyond what is 
clearly required by considerations of the common good properly understood, and even then there must be 
safeguards. Otherwise private ownership could be reduced beyond measure, or, even worse, completely 
destroyed."). 
294 Id. ¶ 118 (“It is important, too, not to overlook the fact that the economic enterprises of the State and 
other agencies of public law must be entrusted to men of good reputation who have the necessary 
experience and ability and a keen sense of responsibility towards their country. Furthermore, a strict check 
should constantly be kept upon their activity, so as to avoid any possibility of the concentration of undue 
economic power in the hands of a few State officials, to the detriment of the best interests of the 
community."). 
295 Id. ¶ 65  (“To this end, a sane view of the common good must be present and operative in men invested 
with public authority. They must take account of all those social conditions which favor the full 
development of human personality. Moreover, We consider it altogether vital that the numerous 
intermediary bodies and corporate enterprises—which are, so to say, the main vehicle of this social 
growth—be really autonomous, and loyally collaborate in pursuit of their own specific interests and those 
of the common good. For these groups must themselves necessarily present the form and substance of a 
true community, and this will only be the case if they treat their individual members as human persons and 
encourage them to take an active part in the ordering of their lives.").  
296 LEYS, supra note 198, at 42. 
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remedy the issue in question appears to be a manifestation of both the positive and 
negative aspects of subsidiarity.  Furthermore, monastical autonomy could foreseeably 
represent a manifestation of subsidiarity as well.   
Further, Althusius taught that the inevitable growth of necessary associations 
required increased assistance from society in order to remain viable while advocating the 
propriety of permitting lower levels to address those issues that they were capable of 
addressing.  Althusius also believed that it was important to protect personal liberty and 
autonomy.  Pesch agreed that this autonomy was necessary in order to promote the 
common good and believed that centralizing authorities should not intervene unless that 
common good was threatened.   
Pope Leo XIII believed that the State should not supplant lower levels of society 
(specifically parents) unless and until such lower levels proved incapable of adequately 
addressing the issues that were confronting them.  Like Althusius, he believed that people 
naturally developed collectives and that the government should honor their respective 
developments and freedoms.  As a consequence, the State should either avoid undue 
intrusions altogether or limit them where necessary in order to prevent the destruction of 
liberty and/or autonomy. 
Pope Pius XI furthered this idea by suggesting that too much government was 
ultimately ineffective, that a proper ordering of society was required, and that 
unnecessary intrusions perpetrated injustices thereon.  As a consequence, his teachings 
advocated permitting lower levels to address that which they were capable of addressing, 
thereby leaving higher levels to dedicate their resources to larger problems.  This, in turn, 
promoted the common good. 
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Finally, Pope John XXIII concurred with Pesch concerning both the government's 
responsibility for economic development and its obligation to do so while concurrently 
protecting freedom within the society.  This result could foreseeably be achieved by 
facilitating cooperation between the State and the People so long as the State avoided the 
destruction of private property interests.  This cooperation could, in turn, permit the 
government to allocate a greater number of resources to pursuing the common good.  
Essentially, Catholics appear to believe that the principle of subsidiarity permits 
individuals to contribute to the community while preventing the destruction of 
autonomy.297
 
 
VII. ANALYSIS CONCERNING THE ECCLESIOLOGICAL AND SECULAR DEVELOPMENT 
OF SUBSIDIARITY  
 
 
a. Similarities between EU and Ecclesiological Development  
 
  
i. The Ability of Subsidiarity to Adapt to Political and Social 
Realities 
 
The Catholic Church, as the original expositor of subsidiarity, has noted that, "To 
arrive at a proper understanding of the principle of subsidiarity, one must look to the 
nature of the state and society."298  Further, while by no means binding on the European 
Union, Pope Leo XIII has specifically observed that, "The limits [of governmental 
assistance] must be determined by the nature of the occasion which calls for the law's 
                                                 
297 COMPENDIUM, supra note 26, ¶ 187, at 82 (“[The principle of subsidiarity] is imperative because every 
person, family and intermediate group has something original to offer to the community.  Experience shows 
that the denial of subsidiarity, or its limitation in the name of an alleged democratization or equality of all 
members of society, limits and sometimes even destroys the spirit of freedom and initiative.”) (emphasis in 
the original). 
298 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 762. 
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interference - the principle being that the law must not undertake more, nor proceed 
further, than is required for the remedy of the evil or the removal of the mischief."299  As 
a consequence, the Church clearly advocates preventing unnecessary interference in the 
affairs of the citizenry300 and believes that such necessity should be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.301
It is noteworthy that the European Parliament clearly concurs with the Catholic 
Church on this all-important assessment.302  Further, the European Union was developed 
(at least in part) in an effort to foster economic development while respecting individual 
and social autonomy.303  In order to do so, the Union recognized that it would require a 
flexible structure capable of changing with the times.304   
Thus, both the European Union and Catholicism believe that the proper allocation 
of responsibilities between higher and lower consociations should be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.  This similarity is crucial insofar as it demonstrates a fundamental 
                                                 
299 Pope Leo XIII, supra note 266, at ¶ 38.  It is also noteworthy that Hueglin has argued that subsidiarity 
meant something different to Althusius at the time that he was writing due to the different economic mold 
of his time.  See HUEGLIN, supra note 118, at 160. 
300 See Crosson, supra note 30, at 170 ("[W]hatever individuals and groups can do for themselves in pursuit 
of their proper goals should not be done by the state.").  See also GRANFIELD, supra note 262, at 123 
("[T]he Pope should not do for all other local Churches what they can well do for themselves."). 
301 See supra note 277. 
302 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document: Annex to the Report 
from the Commission “Better Lawmaking 2004” pursuant to Article 9 of the Protocol on the application of 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (12th Report), at 22 (“While subsidiarity allows 
Community action to be extended if circumstances so require, it also means such action must be limited or 
ended when it is no longer justified.”), available at 
http://www.cymru.gov.uk/keypubassemeuropeancomm2/content/euleg050328/7583-05-add1.pdf (last 
visited 17 December 2005). 
303 Report on European Union by Belgium Prime Minister, ["Tindemans Report"], 1/76 Bull. Eur. 
Communities (29 December 1975), at 24 ("One of the fundamentals of the European Union…is the 
common search within a wider framework for progress towards a modern society and a form economic 
growth which respects human values and social needs. Social and regional policies meet this objective and 
give substance to the solidarity of Europeans by reducing the inequalities which separate them. In this field 
I propose that the European Council should adopt the following general guidelines.”), available at  
http://aei.pitt.edu/942/01/political_tindemans_report.pdf (last visited 26 October 2007). 
304 Supp. 5/75, supra note 69, ¶ 15, at 11 (“The Union should be dynamic in character and flexible in 
structure, so that it can adapt to political reality and to the requirements of a changing society."). 
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compatibility between ecclesiastical and secular positions on an issue that is of critical 
importance to each.  Furthermore, it is also noteworthy that both the European Union and 
Catholicism advocate the involvement of centralized authorities where the greater 
interests of the community as a whole are at stake.305   
 
ii. Closeness to the Citizen and the Propriety of Intervention 
 
Although some commentators argue that subsidiarity inherently implies that 
authority should be vested in the lowest possible level of government,306 others argue that 
it simply requires authority to be vested in the best level available.307  One article has 
gone so far as to mistakenly suggest that, "The principle of closeness to the citizen, while 
meriting high regard, is not an inherent part of the subsidiarity principle…because the 
subsidiarity principle addresses only the relationship between the Community and the 
                                                 
305 Compare Pope Paul VI, supra note 291, ¶ 33 (“Individual initiative alone and the interplay of 
competition will not ensure satisfactory development. We cannot proceed to increase the wealth and power 
of the rich while we entrench the needy in their poverty and add to the woes of the oppressed. Organized 
programs are necessary for “directing, stimulating, coordinating, supplying and integrating” the work of 
individuals and intermediary organizations…It is for the public authorities to establish and lay down the 
desired goals, the plans to be followed, and the methods to be used in fulfilling them; and it is also their 
task to stimulate the efforts of those involved in this common activity. But they must also see to it that 
private initiative and intermediary organizations are involved in this work. In this way they will avoid total 
collectivization and the dangers of a planned economy which might threaten human liberty and obstruct the 
exercise of man's basic human rights.”) with TEU, supra note 120, at Title V, art. J.1 (4) ("The Member 
States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty 
and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or 
likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that 
these principles are complied with."); id., art. J.2 (2) ("Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall 
define a common position.  Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common 
positions."); id., art. J.3 (1) ("The Council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines from the 
European Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint action."); and id., art. J.8 (1) ("The European 
Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy.").  
306 See, e.g., Nicholas Emiliou, Subsidiarity: Panacea or Fig Leaf, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT 
TREATY, supra note 4, at  66, citing Task Force Report on The Environment and the Internal Market, EC 
Commission, December 1989, x (“[S]ubsidiarity establishes the presumption that the primary responsibility 
and decision-making competence should rest with the lowest possible level of authority of the political 
hierarchy."). 
307 See, e.g., Stabile, supra note 56, at 4 (“[S]ubsidiarity emphasizes action at the level most suited to 
address a problem, not merely action at the lowest level.”). 
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Member States."308  These authors fail to recognize, however, that subsidiarity's 
preference for Member State action when they are capable of adequately addressing the 
issue in question inherently represents action closer to the citizenry.  In other words, the 
Member States are "closer to the citizen" than the Institutions are.  As a consequence, 
closeness to the citizen is not necessarily precluded from a working definition of 
subsidiarity within the EU. 
Similarly, Pope Leo XIII noted that if an employer deals unjustly with his or her 
employees, then the naturally occurring and relevant association within the society in 
question should be the first to address it instead of the government.309  Pope John XXIII 
believed that since physical labor represents both a duty and a right, the laborer should 
possess the responsibility to manage work-related relationships until s/he proves 
unwilling or incapable of properly doing so.310  If laborers are in fact incapable or 
unwilling, then, and only then, does the State possess proper justification for 
                                                 
308 von Borries and Hauschild, supra note 6, at 374.  If this were true, however, then it arguably represents 
“the most serious flaw” of the EU's codification of subsidiarity.  See HUEGLIN, supra note 118, at 157 
(“[T]he most serious flaw in the 'subsidiary' construction of the European Union [is the fact that] the 
process of deliberation from below is truncated and begins only at the nation-state level."). 
309 Pope Leo XIII, supra note 266, at ¶ 45 (“If through necessity or fear of a worse evil the workman accept 
harder conditions because an employer or contractor will afford him no better, he is made the victim of 
force and injustice. In these and similar questions…in order to supersede undue interference on the part of 
the State, especially as circumstances, times, and localities differ so widely, it is advisable that recourse be 
had to societies or boards such as We shall mention presently, or to some other mode of safeguarding the 
interests of the wage-earners; the State being appealed to, should circumstances require, for its sanction and 
protection.”). 
310 Pope John XXIII, supra note 51, ¶ 44 (“On the subject of work, Pius XI repeated the teaching of the 
Leonine encyclical, maintaining that a man's work is at once his duty and his right. It is for individuals, 
therefore, to regulate their mutual relations where their work is concerned. If they cannot do so, or will not 
do so, then, and only then, does 'it fall back on the State to intervene in the division and distribution of 
work, and this must be according to the form and measure that the common good properly understood 
demands.'”) (citing internal footnote 21). 
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intervention.311  Mater et Magistra reiterated this notion by requiring higher 
consociations to assist lower ones.312   
It should be noted that both Spinelli and Pope Pius XI are concerned with efficient 
governance within higher echelons of authority313 and the potential problems that lower 
levels may encounter when attempting to resolve the issues that affect them.314  Further, 
both Spinelli and the Catholic Church seek to avoid the creation of super-states and 
advocate the maintenance of proper order so that each level can fulfill its respective 
responsibilities.315  Finally, Spinelli and the Church both advocate the delimitation of 
                                                 
311 Id. 
312 BARRERA, supra note 289, at 25 (“Mater et Magistra strengthens the principle of subsidiarity by noting 
that, together with a healthy respect for the realm properly reserved for private initiative, higher bodies are 
obligated to furnish assistance to floundering lower bodies (MM #53, 65)."). 
313 Compare Report of the Commission on European Union, supra note 66, ¶ 12 (“Consequently, and in 
accordance with the principe de subsidiarité, the Union will be given responsibility only for those matters 
which the Member States are no longer capable of dealing with efficiently.”) with Pope Pius XI, supra note 
202, ¶ 80 (“The supreme authority of the State ought, therefore, to let subordinate groups handle matters 
and concerns of lesser importance, which would otherwise dissipate its efforts greatly. Thereby the State 
will more freely, powerfully, and effectively do all those things that belong to it alone because it alone can 
do them: directing, watching, urging, restraining, as occasion requires and necessity demands. Therefore, 
those in power should be sure that the more perfectly a graduated order is kept among the various 
associations, in observance of the principle of 'subsidiary function,' the stronger social authority and 
effectiveness will be the happier and more prosperous the condition of the State.”). 
314 Compare Report of the Commission on European Union, supra note 66, ¶ 12 (“[T]he Union will be 
given responsibility only for those matters which the Member States are no longer capable of dealing with 
efficiently.”) with Pope Pius XI, supra note 202, ¶ 79 (“Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals 
what they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an 
injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher 
association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do. For every social activity ought of its very 
nature to furnish help to the members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb them.”). 
315 Compare Report of the Commission on European Union, supra note 66, ¶ 12 (“European Union is not to 
give birth to a centralizing super-state.”) with COMPENDIUM, supra note 26, ¶ 441, at 191 (“In the course of 
history…there has been a constant awareness of the need for a similar authority to respond to worldwide 
problems arising from the quest for the common good:  it is essential that such an authority arise from 
mutual agreement and that it not be imposed, nor must it be understood as a kind of 'global super-State.'”) 
(citations omitted) and John Courtney Murray, S.J., The Juridical Organization of the International 
Community, in BRIDGING THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR: SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN COURTNEY 
MURRAY, S.J. 31 (J. Leon Hooper, S.J., ed., 1994) (“[T]he Catholic doctrine of the organic 
state…maintains the natural necessity for a corporative organization of society, based on the principle that 
there is a natural sociability among the members of particular groups within a state and among the member 
of a national community.  This natural sociability is based on certain common aspirations, interests, and 
needs; and it creates the right to pursue by organized action the ends that are of value to the group.  
Catholic doctrine, therefore, would maintain that national states, with their proper sovereignty, are natural 
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responsibilities for each authority that is potentially involved in a particular issue.316  
Thus, it appears that both the EU and Catholicism prefer lower levels to take those 
actions they are capable of effectively taking.   
 
 
iii. Pursuit of the Common Good 
 
 
Both the Catholic Church and the European Union clearly advocate doing what is 
necessary in the interests of the common good.317  Although this interest is obviously 
                                                                                                                                                 
political units; they exist by natural necessity and right, and they may not be merged into a community of 
world citizens under some supranational government."). 
316 Compare Report of the Commission on European Union, supra note 66, at 12 (“Hence, the competence 
of the Union will be limited to what is assigned to it, meaning that its fields of competence will be specified 
in the Act of Constitution, other matters being left to the Member States. There is nothing new in this.”) 
with COMPENDIUM, supra note 26, ¶ 418, at 179-180 (“The State must provide an adequate legal 
framework for social subjects to engage freely in their different activities and it must be ready to intervene, 
when necessary and with respect to the principle of subsidiarity, so that the interplay between free 
associations and democratic life may be directed to the common good.  Civil society is in fact multifaceted 
and irregular; it does not lack its ambiguities and contradictions.  It is also the arena where different 
interests clash with one another, with the risk that the stronger will prevail over the weaker.”) (emphasis in 
the original). 
317 Compare Pope Pius XI, supra note 202, ¶ 110 (“The public institutions themselves, of peoples, 
moreover, ought to make all human society conform to the needs of the common good; that is, to the norm 
of social justice. If this is done, that most important division of social life, namely, economic activity, 
cannot fail likewise to return to right and sound order.”) and Pope John XXIII, supra note 51, ¶ 40 (“The 
second point which We consider basic in the encyclical is his teaching that man's aim must be to achieve in 
social justice a national and international juridical order, with its network of public and private institutions, 
in which all economic activity can be conducted not merely for private gain but also in the interests of the 
common good.”) with Roy Jenkins, President of the Commission of the European Communities, Europe's 
Present Challenge an Future Opportunity, Jean Monnet Lecture delivered in Florence, 28 October 1977, at 
14 ("We must only give to the Community functions which will, beyond reasonable doubt, deliver 
significantly better results because they are performed at a Community level.  We must fashion a 
Community which gives to each Member State the benefits of results which they cannot achieve alone.  We 
must equally leave to them functions which they can do equally well or better on their own."), available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/archive/00004404/01/001971_1.pdf (last visited 10 July 2007).  See also FOUILLÉE, et al, 
supra note 130, § 86, at 115 (“Juridical organization proposes in fact to realize in the life of humanity an 
ideal of justice and utility, 'meaning by utility that which the general opinion regards as the greatest good 
for the greatest number.'”) citing GÉNY, supra note 135, at 471; and JOLOWICZ, supra note 190, at 14 (“It is 
also permissible in deciding between possible interpretations, quite apart from the question of 'mildness', to 
take into account the relative values of the results that will be achieved, though the Romans themselves put 
the point slightly differently; and under this head can be brought the so-called argumentum ad absurdum, 
for a sensible result is more likely to have been intended by the legislator than an absurd one.  The principle 
can also appear as a general theory of 'beneficial' construction, not in the sense of construction which is 
favourable to a particular person, but of what is favourable to the human race generally.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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concerned with the public at large, governments should also be directly concerned with 
the development of each individual.318  The law should pursue "the greatest possible 
amount of good" as a function of its purpose319 while considering utility and equity in 
order to facilitate the achievement of that good.   
Similarly, subsidiarity is a core principle of Catholic social philosophy320 and is 
inherently concerned with promoting the public good.321  As a consequence, Catholics 
believe that the devolution of authority via subsidiarity will directly facilitate individual 
development while promoting human dignity.322  The Church posits that this dignity is 
naturally and inextricably connected to the principle of subsidiarity.323  Thus, when 
                                                 
318 GIERKE, supra note 232, at 45 (“The government, however, is concerned not only with the good of the 
whole but also with the good of the individuals, and while it wields the State's rights of superiority over 
persons and property, it must avoid any arbitrary encroachment on liberty or property."). 
319 PLANIOL, supra note 131, § 224, at 162 (“Laws, however, are made in order to obtain for man the 
greatest possible amount of good.  A juridical science which would lead to unjust or dangerous solutions 
would be false.  It would defeat its own purpose.").  See also CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 18 (2d. ed., 1963) (1958) (“For since it is the task of…a founder of 
the law to make the community as a whole and its members happy, and since such happiness can be 
understood only as a participation in the idea of the good, law must in every respect be shaped in such a 
way that the human beings living under it become better."). 
320 Jonathan Chaplin, Subsidiarity as a Political Norm, in POLITICAL THEORY AND CHRISTIAN VISION: 
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF BERNARD ZYLSTRA 84 (Jonathan Chaplin and Paul Marshall, eds., 1994) 
(“Subsidiarity has always been understood to apply comprehensively to all social relationships and thus lies 
at the heart of Catholic social philosophy.”) 
321 COMPENDIUM, supra note 26, ¶ 160, at 71 (“The permanent principles of the Church's social doctrine 
constitute the very heart of Catholic social teaching.  These are the principles of: the dignity of the human 
person…the common good, subsidiarity, and solidarity.”) (internal citation omitted). 
322 Føllesdal, supra note 62, at 19 (“The Catholic argument for subsidiarity rests on the view that the human 
good is to develop and realize [sic] one's good potential, thus realizing one's dignity as made in the image 
of [G_d].").  
323 See Joseph Card. Ratzinger and Alberto Bovone, Introduction on Christian Freedom and Liberation ¶ 
73, 22 March 1986 ((“The supreme commandment of love leads to the full recognition of the dignity of 
each individual, created in [G_d's] image. From this dignity flow natural rights and duties. In the light of 
the image of [G_d], freedom, which is the essential prerogative of the human person, is manifested in all its 
depth. Persons are the active and responsible subjects of social life.  Intimately linked to the foundation, 
which is man's dignity, are the principle of solidarity and the principle of subsidiarity. By virtue of the first, 
man with his brothers is obliged to contribute to the common good of society at all its levels.  Hence the 
Church's doctrine is opposed to all the forms of social or political individualism. By virtue of the second, 
neither the State nor any society must ever substitute itself for the initiative and responsibility of 
individuals and of intermediate communities at the level on which they can function, nor must they take 
away the room necessary for their freedom.  Hence the Church's social doctrine is opposed to all forms of 
collectivism.”), available at 
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politicians act in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity, they augment the ability of 
society to promote the common good.324  Similarly, the Pontifical Council for Justice and 
Peace has argued that: 
 
 
"On the basis of this principle, all societies of a superior order must adopt attitudes of 
help ('subsidium') – therefore of support, promotion, development – with respect to 
lower-order societies.  In this way, intermediate social entities can properly perform the 
functions that fall to them without being required to hand them over unjustly to other 
social entities of a higher level, by which they would end up being absorbed and 
substituted, in the end seeing themselves denied their dignity and essential place."325  
 
 
This development of freedom and dignity is inextricably connected to the principles of 
natural law theory that form the foundations of both the civil law tradition326 and 
Catholicism.327  Due to the inevitable changes within both society at large and the 
development of the EU, resulting changes in relationships between various levels of 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19860322_freedo
m-liberation_en.html (last visited 26 October 2007).    
324 Id. ¶ 84 (“As a result, the political authorities will become more capable of acting with respect for the 
legitimate freedoms of individuals, families and subsidiary groups; and they will thus create the conditions 
necessary for man to be able to achieve his authentic and integral welfare, including his spiritual goal."). 
325 COMPENDIUM, supra note 26, ¶ 186, at 81 (emphasis in the original).  See also ALBERTO M. PIEDRA, 
NATURAL LAW: THE FOUNDATION OF AN ORDERLY ECONOMIC SYSTEM 159 (2004). 
326 TRIDIMAS, supra note 12, at 2-3, citing H.G. SCHERMERS AND D. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 28-30 (6th ed., 2001) (“Schermers and Waelbroeck identify…compelling or 
constitutional legal principles…[that] encompass[] principles which stem from the common European 
constitutional heritage and are perceived by the authors to form part of natural law, such as the protection 
of fundamental rights.”) 
327 PIEDRA, supra note 325, at 126 (“Man must come to the realization that he has to respect an objective 
moral order founded on Natural Law and be committed to the principle of responsible freedom.  Unless 
capitalism corrects its traditional prejudice against the application of moral values in economic matters and 
responds exclusively to market forces, the threat of the State overstepping its boundaries and endangering 
personal freedom becomes a distinct reality.  To avoid such an eventuality the free enterprise system must 
accept and apply [a] basic principle[] which [is] at the core of Catholic Social Doctrine and which [is] 
indispensable for the proper ordering of society…[i.e.] the principle of subsidiarity…To ignore [it] 
threatens to impede the harmonious relationships between individuals, in particular between capital and 
labor, not to mention intermediary associations such as the family.").  See also Linnan, supra note 2, at 437 
("The pope is obliged to observe the natural law…The pope must also observe the divine positive law, that 
is, all that is understood to have been revealed by [G_d].").     
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consociations are to be expected.328  Subsidiarity permits all associations to adapt to 
those changes by supporting the development and maintenance of dignity, autonomy, and 
efficiency.  Finally, lower consociations are presumed to be aware of their inability "to 
achieve a truly human life by their own unaided efforts" and, as a consequence, they 
establish political communities in order to further the common good.329  Thus, in many 
ways, it can be claimed that, "The law of subsidiarity and the law of the common good 
are, in substance, identical."330
 
 
b. Conclusions Concerning the Ecclesiological and Secular Development of 
Subsidiarity 
 
 
 
Both EU and Catholic scholars have observed that subsidiarity is primarily 
concerned with preserving harmonious relationships while protecting individual 
autonomy from both internal and external threats.331  Further, both have recognized that 
                                                 
328 POLITICAL ORDER AND THE PLURAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY, supra note 9, at  199 (“In our times 
profound transformations are to be noticed in the structure and institutions of peoples; they are the 
accompaniment of cultural, economic, and social development.  These transformations exercise a deep 
influence on political life, particularly as regards the rights and duties of the individual in the exercise of 
civil liberty and in the achievement of the common good; and they affect the organization of the relations 
of citizens with each other and of their position vis-à-vis the state."). 
329 Id., at 200 (“Individuals, families, and the various groups which make up the civil community, are aware 
of their inability to achieve a truly human life by their own unaided efforts; they see the need for a wider 
community where each one will make a specific contribution to an even broader implementation of the 
common good.  For this reason they set up various forms of political communities.  The political 
community, then, exists for the common good: this is the full justification and meaning and the source of its 
specific and basic right to exist.  The common good embraces the sum total of all those conditions of social 
life which enable individuals, families, and organizations to achieve complete and efficacious 
fulfillment."). 
330 Chaplin, supra note 320, at 86, quoting J. MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS 196 (JJ. Doherty trans., 1949).  
331 Compare BARRERA, supra note 289, at 11 (“[Subsidiarity] seeks to defend the scope of individual action 
not only from an overextended state but also from the threat emanating from within the private sector itself 
in the form of the larger corporations' insatiable appetite for expanding and absorbing smaller entities.”); 
Føllesdal, supra note 62, at 19 (“The Catholic argument for subsidiarity rests on the view that the human 
good is to develop and realize [sic] one's good potential, thus realizing one's dignity as made in the image 
of [G_d].”); Ratzinger and Bovone, supra note 323; JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE 
TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 334 (1960) ("[Subsidiarity] asserts the 
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the state exists for the benefit of the people332 and that centralized decision-making can 
ultimately alienate intended constituencies.333  Therefore, it becomes clear that both the 
EU and Catholicism believe that subsidiarity requires lower levels of authority to address 
                                                                                                                                                 
organic character of the state – the right to existence and autonomous functioning of various sub-political 
groups, which unite in the organic unity of the state without losing their own identity or suffering 
infringement of their own ends or having their functions assumed by the state.  These groups include the 
family, the local community, the professions, the occupational groups, the minority cultural or linguistic 
groups within the nation, etc.”); and Peter Widulski, Subsidiarity and Protest: The Law School's Mission in 
Grutter and Fair, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 415, 421 (2006), citing FINNIS, supra note 25, at 147 ("Since an 
individual fully participates in human good only through his or her own actions, 'one who is never more 
than a cog in big wheels turned by others is denied participation in one important aspect of human well-
being.'") with Endo, supra note 68, at 12 (“It was Altiero Spinelli…who introduced the principle of 
subsidiarity in the EU's formal document: he first led the European Commission to make a contribution 
report to the Tindemans Report in 1975, and then the European Parliament to adopt the Draft Treaty on 
European Union in 1984. On these two occasions, he attempted to soothe the fear for a over-centralised 
Leviathan in Brussels, by stressing the negative aspect of subsidiarity."), available at  
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/activitiesnews/conferences/1999_conferences/3rdannualconferenc
e/papers/Endo.pdf (last visited 20 November 2007); Delcamp, supra, note 27, at 10, n. 9 (“[S]ubsidiarity 
proceeds from a moral defence, which makes respect for the dignity and responsibility of the individuals of 
which it is composed the purpose of every society.”) and POLITICAL ORDER AND THE PLURAL STRUCTURE 
OF SOCIETY, supra note 9, at 140 (“The principle of subsidiarity is concerned broadly with the harmonious 
relationship among persons and institutions (autonomous in their own peculiar spheres) in a hierarchically 
ordered society."). 
332 Compare MERKLE, supra note 256, at 100 ("[T]he state and all other associations exist for the 
individual.”) with TEU, supra note 120, at pmbl. 
333 Compare COMPENDIUM, supra note 26, ¶ 187, at 82 ("In order for the principle of subsidiarity to be put 
into practice there is a corresponding need for: respect and effective promotion of the human person and 
the family; ever greater appreciation of associations and intermediate organizations in their fundamental 
choices and in those that cannot be delegated to or exercised by others; the encouragement of private 
initiative so that every social entity remains at the service of the common good, each with its own 
distinctive characteristics; the presence of pluralism in society and due representation of its vital 
components; safeguarding human rights and the rights of minorities; bringing about bureaucratic and 
administrative decentralization; striking a balance between the public and private spheres, with the 
resulting recognition of the social function of the private sphere; appropriate measures for making citizens 
more responsible in actively ‘being a part’ of the political and social reality of their county.") with 
European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market, Report on the Commission 
report to the European Council on better lawmaking 2000 (pursuant to Article 9 of the Protocol to the EC 
Treaty on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality)(COM(2000) 772 – C5-
0097/2001 – 2001/2044(COS)) and on the Commission report to the European Council on better 
lawmaking 2001 (pursuant to Article 9 of the Protocol to the EC Treaty on the application of the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality)(COM(2001) 728 – C5-0102/2002 – 2001/2044(COS)), Final, a5-
0100/2003, 25 March 2003, at 6, ¶ 1 (“[L]egislative and regulatory inflation in the Member States and at 
the Community level weakens the rule of law and alienates citizens from their institutions.").  See also 
DONAL DORR, THE SOCIAL JUSTICE AGENDA: JUSTICE, ECOLOGY, POWER AND THE CHURCH 91-92 (1991) 
(“It has become clear in recent times that people become alienated when they find that the major decisions 
which affect their lives are made by people with whom they have little personal contact….The present 
situation requires a twofold movement away from the…emphasis on the nation-State.  On the one hand, 
some of the authority exercised in the past by the State must now be passed upward to international 
agencies.  On the other hand, some of it must be passed downward to regional or local authorities.”). 
 
 
85 
 
 
issues that affect them when they are capable of doing so.334  Both EU and Catholic 
scholars also believe that higher levels of society are responsible for organizing activities 
that lower levels are simply incapable of implementing on their own. 335  Finally, both 
EU and Catholic scholars recognize that subsidiarity has both a positive and a negative 
component.336
                                                 
334 Compare ESTELLA, supra note 2, at 5 (“[T]he principle of subsidiarity implies…that central 
intervention…must cede to intervention by the Member States.  This amounts to giving priority to 
'autonomy' when the circumstances of the case recommend it.”) with U.S. Catholic Bishops, Economic 
Justice for All (1986), in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE ¶ 124, at 608 (David 
J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon eds.) (1992) (“[The principle of subsidiarity] states that, in order to 
protect basic justice, government should undertake only those initiatives which exceed the capacity of 
individuals or private groups acting independently.  Government should not replace or destroy smaller 
communities and individual initiative.  Rather, it should help them to contribute more effectively to social 
well-being and supplement their activity when the demands of justice exceed their capacities.").  
335 Compare POLITICAL ORDER AND THE PLURAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY, supra note 9, at  140 (“With 
respect to institutions, for example, the rational law of nature dictates, and the common good requires, that 
the lower or smaller societies depend on the higher or more self-sufficient societies for ordering activities 
and support that they cannot provide for themselves.”) with  
COMPENDIUM, supra note 26, ¶ 188, at 82-83 (“Various circumstances may make it advisable that the State 
step in to supply certain functions…One may…envision the reality of serious social imbalance or injustice 
where only the intervention of the public authority can create conditions of greater equality, justice, and 
peace.  In light of the principle of subsidiarity, however, this institutional substitution must not continue 
any longer than is absolutely necessary, since justification for such intervention is found only in the 
exceptional nature of the situation.  In any case, the common good correctly understood, the demands of 
which will never in any way be contrary to the defence and promotion of the primacy of the person and the 
way this is expressed in society, must remain the criteria for making decisions concerning the application of 
the principle of subsidiarity.”) (emphasis in the original) and U.S. Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for 
All (1986), in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE ¶ 124, at 608 (David J. O'Brien 
and Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992) (“This does not mean, however, that the government that governs least 
governs best.  Rather it defines good government intervention as that which truly 'helps' other social groups 
contribute to the common good by directing, urging, restraining, and regulating economic activity as 'the 
occasion requires and necessity demands.'  This calls for cooperation and consensus-building among the 
diverse agents in our economic life, including government.  The precise form of government involvement 
in this process cannot be determined in the abstract.  It will depend on an assessment of specific needs and 
the most effective ways to address them."). 
336 Compare DAVIES, supra note 31, at 19 (“In effect, two tests must therefore be satisfied: a negative one 
in the sense that objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved (the 'necessity' criterion); and a positive test in 
that the objective of the action is better achieved at the EC level by reason of scale or effects of the 
proposed action (the 'effectiveness' criterion.”) with COMPENDIUM, supra note 26, ¶ 186, at 81-82 
(“Subsidiarity, understood in the positive sense as economic, institutional or juridical assistance offered to 
lesser social entities, entails a corresponding series of negative implication that require the State to refrain 
from anything that would de facto restrict the existential space of the smaller essential cells of society.  
Their initiative, freedom and responsibility must not be supplanted.”) (emphasis in the original) and Ken 
Endo, Subsidiarity: A Matter of Political Vocabulary in a Fragmented World, at 2, available at 
http://www.global-g.jp/paper/4-11.pdf (last visited 8 November 2005).  See also TAMANAHA, supra note 
152, at 77 (“Self-determination can be understood, in negative terms, to mean that individuals should be 
left alone by government to live as they desire; self-determination can also be understood, in positive terms, 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
 
Thus, an examination of 1) the methods utilized by civil and common law 
jurisdictions to interpret ambiguities like subsidiarity, 2) subsidiarity's development 
within Catholicism, and 3) subsidiarity's development within the EU appears to reveal 
seemingly material similarities and no material dissimilarities.   
Although by no means exhaustive, the analysis undertaken herein indicates that 
religious and secular scholars alike have either implemented the principle of subsidiarity 
or contributed to its development.  Refraining from interference in matters concerning 
lower consociations until such levels prove incapable of addressing those matters has 
been practiced and/or advocated by (inter alia) St. Benedict, Althusius, Pesch, Pope Leo 
XIII, Pope Pius XI, and Pope John XXIII.  Each of these contributors was expressly 
concerned with preserving the autonomy and dignity of lower consociations within 
society.   
This concern with protecting autonomy and freedom is clearly echoed within the 
European Union.  More specifically, the EU has expressly recognized that devolution of 
power towards the citizenry can produce both a more efficient government and a more 
involved citizenry.  These results could arguably permit the Union to concentrate its 
efforts on addressing those issues which require the force, resources, and/or organization 
that it alone is capable of harnessing.  This compatibility between EU and Catholic goals 
could foreseeably indicate that the invocation of subsidiarity within the Treaty of 
Maastricht either comports with or relies upon the Catholic definition of the term.   
                                                                                                                                                 
to mean that the government is obligated to empower individuals – to assist them in acquiring the tools 
necessary to become self-determining – in order that their liberty may be fully enjoyed."). 
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This conclusion is generated in large part through the application of select 
jurisprudential methodologies.  This application is arguably justified because the 
European Court of Justice could potentially interpret the term according to (at least) two 
primary methodologies.  First, it could apply its own interpretative methodologies; 
second, it could defer to the general principles of law as developed by Member States' 
judiciaries (all of which are currently rooted in either the civil or the common law).  A 
cursory examination of these methodologies appears to reveal at least an occasional 
willingness to rely upon (inter alia) unambiguous texts where present, established 
meanings where ascertainable, and/or a variety of historical records where available in an 
effort to interpret and apply the intended meaning of ambiguities.   
As a consequence, "subsidiarity" could be deemed unambiguous on its face 
because the Treaty of Maastricht either 1) provides its intended meaning337 or 2) intended 
to invoke its Catholic meaning.338  Conversely, the term could be deemed ambiguous and 
therefore be interpreted according to either its ordinary or its technical definition (both of 
which are available within its Catholic pedigree).  Further, the Court could foreseeably 
rely on the historical development of the term within Catholicism as an independent 
interpretative aid.  Therefore, unless the Court finds that the Treaty of Maastricht clearly 
                                                 
337 See Theodore Shilling, Subsidiarity as a Rule and a Principle, or; Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/95/9510ind.html (last visited 20 March 2006) (“Could it 
possibly be that "the word that saved Maastricht" is just that, just a word, bare of any concept? It may well 
be that this was the intention of some, or even many, of the delegations at the Maastricht Conference. 
However, it is not possible to ascertain how the individual members of the Maastricht Conference 
conceived of this word. Neither is it necessary. They introduced the word into what, after ratification, 
became the amended treaties, and it is there, in the treaties, where its meaning, the concept of subsidiarity, 
must be found. In the context of Community law, the German adage according to which the law is wiser 
than the law-giver must clearly apply. There was never any question of applying, to European law, 
anything similar to the American theory of original intent. Possible mental reservations of some, or many, 
delegations at the Maastricht conference are therefore no argument against taking subsidiarity seriously.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
338 After all, even the European Commission has clearly recognized that, “Subsidiarity…[was] not invented 
at Maastricht.”  Commission of the European Communities, The Principle of Subsidiarity, supra note 2, at 
2.  
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identifies the intended meaning of subsidiarity, an examination of its development within 
Catholicism appears to be warranted. 
 Originally, it appears that the concept of the Union itself was, “bearable to the 
member states [sic] as long as only very little was to be decided at the European level.”339  
The people of Europe could conceivably manifest their support for this proposition 
through apparent opposition to increased centralization.340  While the principle of 
subsidiarity is potentially capable of mitigating the complexities (and the resulting 
controversies) of modern political life341 while remaining vital to Union legislation,342 it 
remains a source of substantial disagreement343 and may even be subject to "perpetual 
                                                 
339 Dahrendorf, supra note 68, at 74. 
340 Anna Vergés Bausili, Rethinking the Methods of Dividing and Exercising Powers in the EU: Reforming 
Subsidiarity and National Parliaments, Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/02 (2002) (“It has been estimated 
that in 5% of cases of legislation, the Community has trespassed the limits as to what was necessary or 
better achieved by the Community. Yet at the same time, and although it has been quantified as only a 5% 
of cases where subsidiarity and proportionality have not been observed, pervasive public perception is that 
the proportion is higher and Community action is too intrusive. The Court itself has never found a violation 
of the principle of subsidiarity by legislative actions of the Community.  Its overuse is also made by using it 
as a catch-phrase or reassuring measure for hostile public opinion's perceptions of creeping federalism.”), 
available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/02/020901.pdf.  
341 Phil Syrpis, Legitimising European Governance: Taking Subsidiarity Seriously within the Open Method 
of Coordination, EU Working Papers, European University Institute, Law No. 2002/10, at 11, quoting De 
Burca, Reappraising Subsidiarity’s Significance After Amsterdam, 1999, at 3 ("[Subsidiarity forms] part of 
a language which attempts to articulate and mediate…some of the fundamental questions of political 
authority, government and governance which arise in an increasingly interlocking and independent world.”) 
342 European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market, Report on the Commission 
report to the European Council on better lawmaking 2000 (pursuant to Article 9 of the Protocol to the EC 
Treaty on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality)(COM(2000) 772 – C5-
0097/2001 – 2001/2044(COS)) and on the Commission report to the European Council on better 
lawmaking 2001 (pursuant to Article 9 of the Protocol to the EC Treaty on the application of the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality)(COM(2001) 728 – C5-0102/2002 – 2001/2044(COS)), Final, a5-
0100/2003, 25 March 2003, at 5 (“[T]he subsidiarity principle has a vital role to play in establishing the 
authority of Community legislation”), available at 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/registre/seance_pleniere/textes_deposes/rapports/2003/0100/P5_A(2003)0100_
EN.doc (last visited 27 October 2005).  See also Rabinowitz, supra note 58, at 125 (“Subsidiarity is likely 
to play a growing role in the general development of the EU in the 21st century, not only in agriculture, but 
also in fiscal policy, defence and many other areas.”). 
343 See, e.g., Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, speech to the House of Commons, 21 November 1989, 
Hansard HC [162/21-35], available at 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=107824 (last visited 20 March 
2006) (“[[T]he present draft of the social charter] will lead to the export of jobs to other more competitive 
countries and will also infringe a principle with the terrible jargon name of subsidiarity, which means that 
the Community should not set out to do those things that nation states can best do for themselves. It is still 
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redefinition"344 due to the inevitable changes that will occur within politics and/or 
society.345  Therefore, in order to properly understand and apply the principle of 
subsidiarity, jurists should examine the ecclesiological and secular forces that gave rise to 
its codification at Maastricht.   
Charles Phineas Sherman once wrote, “Strenuous endeavors to improve the law 
are not impeded but forwarded by a zealous study of legal history….To-day we study the 
day before yesterday, in order that yesterday may not paralyze to-day, and that to-day 
may not paralyze to-morrow.”346  Therefore, a study of subsidiarity's history could 
                                                                                                                                                 
possible for our approach to succeed if others are willing.”).  See also Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, 
speech at the House of Commons, 26 June 1991, Hansard HC [193/1026-31] (“[O]ne of the difficulties of 
discussing the matter of the Community is that it is riddled with jargon and Eurospeak, and that words are 
used which do not have a precise meaning, such as the word ‘subsidiarity’. It is a vague term which [sic] 
raises far more questions than it answers. When we use those terms, we should be careful to define them.”), 
available at  http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=108276 (last visited 
20 March 2006); Bermann, supra note 2, at 332, citing Editorial Comment, Subsidiarity: Furthering the 
Confusion, 5 Europe 2000 – Executive Review (June 1992) (Subsidiarity is “the epitome of confusion.”); 
and Toth, supra note 4, at 37 (“It is no exaggeration to say that there are few concepts in the Maastricht 
Treaty, or indeed in Community law as a whole, which are more elusive than the concept of subsidiarity.”). 
344 Andrew Duff, Towards a Definition of Subsidiarity, in SUBSIDIARITY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY 31 (Andrew Duff ed.) (1993) (“In the constitutional development of the European 
Community…subsidiarity promises to be an abiding force subject to perpetual redefinition.”). 
345 HUEGLIN, supra note 118, at 154 (“The question of who gets to do what…can only be answered through 
a continuous process of deliberation and negotiation according to changing times and circumstance.  It is 
this dynamic quality which, while clearly setting Althusius’ notion of subsidiarity apart from its more static 
employment in Catholic social doctrine, may indeed have been a source of inspiration for the architects of 
European political union.”).  See also BISHOP, supra note 105, § 92 (d), at 83 ("Language is the offspring of 
the past, but its life is in and for the ever opening and progressive future.  Its principle mission is to convey, 
from one mind to the other, the new thoughts as they arise; for the old is continually dying, while the new is 
being born.  If each word had a single fixed and unchanging meaning, and if there were simply certain 
established collocations of words, each with its one signification, the powers of language would be very 
limited, and it could never express a new idea.”). 
346 CHARLES PHINEAS SHERMAN, 1 ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 11 (2d. ed., 1994) (1922) citing 
MAITLAND, 3 COLLECTED PAPERS, “A Survey of A Century” 438-439.  See also Lieber, supra note 83, at 
198 (“We are, indeed, as to experience, the old ones, and the past generations the young ones, provided all 
the opportunities are the same, or we do not throw away the experience of past ages by neglecting faithfully 
to study them.”)  See also SAMUEL, supra note 8, at 30 (“The modern…cannot…be explained without 
reference to the whole of the past."); and id. at 114 (“In science itself the progress of each science is 
accomplished by inventions, discoveries and revolutions, but always on the basis of previously 
accumulated knowledge; and this is ‘why the study of the history of science is an absolute requirement for 
anyone who wants to understand and interpret the sense and scope of existing discoveries.’”). 
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foreseeably transform the interpretation of its meaning from an "epitome of confusion”347 
(or worse) into a viable doctrine capable of facilitating an increasingly efficient allocation 
of governmental resources while impermeably protecting ever priceless freedoms as the 
invariably changing conditions of our collective existence require.  This transformation 
appears to be a worthy goal indeed.   
                                                 
347 See Bermann, supra note 2, at 332, citing Editorial Comment, Subsidiarity: Furthering the Confusion, 5 
Europe 2000 – Executive Review (June 1992). 
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